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theoretical model of “judicialization,” arguing that when courts affect politics outside of 
the judicial system, they reshape politics to resemble the adversarial legal system, 
sparking polarized conflict and causing non-judicial political actors to make arguments in 
the form of constitutional doctrine.  Analyzing editorials and letters to the editor from 
Southern newspapers, I show that debate after Brown was characterized by appeals to 
constitutional principles, and that Brown increased the salience of segregation in schools 
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from African-American newspapers and analyze Southern elections in the periods 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction and Overview:  The Supreme Court and the 
Broader Political System 
  
For the states to deny the power of the Court to regulate the purely internal affairs 
of the separate states would not constitute nullification by the states, but a refusal 
to permit nullification of the Constitution by actions of the Court in assuming 
powers it does not possess, under the Constitution -  J.R. Creighton, from a letter 
published in the Richmond (VA) News-Leader, Jan. 3, 1956. 
 
 With Brown v. Board of Education, the United States Supreme Court remade 
politics in the American South.  One particularly important effect of the landmark 
integration opinion was to change the way Southerners talked about race, law, and 
politics.   The above quotation, written in a letter to the editor from a resident of South 
Carolina, shows the constitutional form of argument prevalent after the Court’s decision.  
The author is advocating a particular view of the structure of government, based on a 
states’ rights theory of constitutional interpretation.  He is arguing for a narrowed role for 
the Supreme Court, as constituted by the Constitution.  This dissertation focuses on how 
the Supreme Court affected politics outside the judicial system, and how it drew citizens 
like J.R. Creighton into a dialogue about the proper functioning of the constitutional 
system. 
This dissertation seeks to answer the question “What is the effect of a United 
States Supreme Court opinion?”  I conduct a detailed historical study of the impact of 
Brown v. Board of Education, concentrating on the decision’s impact outside the judicial 
system.  Such a focus allows me to produce an empirical analysis of the decision’s 
impact, a theoretical framework for understanding indirect opinion effects that is 
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transferable beyond the issue area of school integration, and insight into the Court’s role 
in American politics.  This dissertation makes a contribution to political science 
scholarship about the Supreme Court, court impact, and American Political Development.  
This opening chapter presents the research puzzle this dissertation attempts to solve, and 
the theoretical framework of the inquiry.  It closes with a discussion of each of the four 
empirical chapters, and how they together constitute an analysis of the effect of a 
Supreme Court opinion outside the judicial system. 
The impact of judicial decisions is the subject of an extensive literature produced 
by political scientists studying law and courts.  Much of it, notably The Hollow Hope by 
Gerald Rosenberg, has come to the conclusion that the Supreme Court has little impact 
upon political and social change.  This dissertation argues the contrary position that the 
Court, through its opinion, can have a significant impact on American politics.  I argue 
that the Court’s extra-judicial contribution can be best understood as “judicializing” 
political conflict.  An opinion like Brown makes the political process concerning school 
integration more like a judicial process.  Competing groups occupy roles similar to 
opposing sides in a trial, with political actors polarized into competing camps.  Political 
actors, like politicians, parts of government, interest groups, and courts themselves 
function like participants in an adversarial judicial system.  This dissertation explores 
how the Supreme Court’s extra-judicial1 effect is an institutionally-specific effect, 
transmitting characteristics of the judicial branch to other parts of the political system. 
                                                 
1 The focus on extra-judicial effect contrasts with that of much of the literature on judicial implementation 
(See Horowitz 1977), which finds courts have limited capacity to mold social policy. 
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Making this argument about the Court’s causal role in the political process 
requires a detailed empirical inquiry into the relationships between the Court and other 
parts of the political system, including institutions like Congress, the President and state 
governments as well as groups and citizens.  It also requires a reconceptualization of 
events and ideas in a manner that relates the actions and arguments of non-Court political 
actors to Court opinions.   
I. THEORY 
 This dissertation attempts to identify and describe the role of the Supreme Court 
in a highly complex change process in the 1950s and 1960s.  Conflict over school 
integration involved all major components of the federal government:  presidents, 
Congress, higher and lower courts, bureaucratic agencies, the military.  It also involved 
states as makers of law, providers of services, and enforcers of law.  The conflict reached 
both elite and mass, and implicated fundamental ideas and disagreements about American 
politics.  The theory I propose to test is an attempt to conceptualize the role of an 
important Supreme Court opinion within this complex change process.  The following set 
of analytical constructs conceptualizes Court-involved political conflict that allows me to 
ascertain the contribution of the Court to the debate over and settlement of important 
issues. 
 I propose that the Supreme Court affects American politics with major decisions 
like Brown, reorganizing conflict in a particular issue area.  The Court changes political 
conflict into a form that parallels the organization of conflict within the judicial system.  
Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 78 that American courts “have neither force nor 
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will, but merely judgment,” and that the judiciary “can take no active resolution.”  This 
limitation to “judgment” channels the Supreme Court’s power into the realm of political 
ideas.  The Court can directly affect what ideas are part of settled law, and which ideas 
are permissible or impermissible as motivations for government action.  Brown made the 
idea of segregation impermissible as an organizing principle of American society.  But I 
am concerned in this project with the Court’s indirect effects on political conflict and the 
place of ideas within such conflict.  The following concepts form the theory that I hope to 
explore in this dissertation. 
Judicialization of Political Conflict 
 After the Court judicializes a given issue area with the issuance of a 
transformative opinion, certain kinds of arguments are more likely to be made and be 
successful than before the opinion.  Arguments will be framed in terms of legality, 
constitutionality, jurisdiction, and adherence to core principles.  These arguments will be 
less amenable to settlement through legislative and executive bargaining, and debate 
participants will gravitate toward categorical solutions that exclude the possibility of 
compromise.   
 I do not mean by judicialization the growth of the power of courts, or the 
conversion of legislative or executive areas of policy power to ones characterized by 
judicial power.  This inquiry is directed at understanding the effect of Brown v. Board of 
Education, which is the paradigm case of what Rauol Berger has called “Government by 
Judiciary” (1977).  But I am not concerned, as Berger and others are, with documenting 
or criticizing the growth of judicial power in America.  I am not interested in the project 
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of identifying the process by which courts in general, and the Supreme Court and lower 
federal courts in particular, came to make decisions governing the administration of 
public schools.  I take that growth of direct judicial power as a given, and proceed to 
study indirect judicial power.   
 I also am not using judicialization in the related way it is used by scholars of 
comparative public law to describe the rise of independent high courts and increasing 
judicial resolution of disputes outside of the United States.  Alec Stone-Sweet, in 
Governing With Judges:  Constitutional Politics in Europe, argues that European politics 
has undergone a “judicialization of law-making,” which he defines as “(a) the production, 
by constitutional judges, of a formal normative discourse that serves to clarify, on an 
ongoing basis, the constitutional rules governing the exercise of legislative power, and (b) 
the reception of these rules, and of the terms of this discourse, by legislators” (p. 195).  
While Stone-Sweet’s judicialization process concerns the formal power of courts, my 
theorized judicialization process concerns the informal power of courts.  While I am 
concerned with the reception of Court decision by legislators, the kind of effect I am 
looking for is different.   
 For the purposes of this project, judicialization is the transformation of political 
conflict to a form similar to the form of judicial politics.  Judicialized politics is 
characterized by polarized conflict, discussion of the constitutionality of government 
action, and argument focused on constitutionality.  Political conflict that has been 
judicialized by the Supreme Court is most similar to the form of appellate courts engaged 
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in judicial review, assessing whether a given government action is consistent with the 
Constitution.   
My theory of judicialization of political conflict has two components that are the 
focus of this dissertation:  social/political doctrine and constitutional advocacy politics.  
Social/political doctrine is argument presented by political actors outside of the judicial 
system that advocates a particular understanding of the constitutional system.   
Constitutional advocacy politics is a kind of political conflict in which groups and actors 
take polarized positions on constitutional issues, and those polarized positions define the 
wider conflict in venues like campaigns and elections. 
The arguments that interested groups put forth in response to a Supreme Court 
opinion will articulate and reveal existing social/political doctrine.  This doctrine will 
have the characteristics of constitutional doctrine, with theories of interpretation, 
identification of sacred higher law texts, conceptions of institutional design, and logical 
arguments.  These doctrinal positions will support, oppose, or both support and oppose 
the Court opinion. 
The extra-judicial effect of a transformative Court opinion is stimulative of this 
creative process.  In response to the challenge of an argument presented by the judicial 
branch of the federal government, affected groups will reconceptualize and present to the 
larger community a justification for their values, laws and political institutions.  This 
justification, while built upon an existing worldview, is organized in the form of legal 
doctrine.  With an opinion on constitutionality like Brown, the Court stimulates an 
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alternate process of the construction of meaning, which is presented as a competing 
theory of constitutional interpretation. 
Opinions like Brown not only stimulate argument about constitutionality, they 
motivate politicians and citizens to act in support of their chosen understanding of the 
constitutional system.  Federal and state officeholders use their positions of power to 
support or prevent change to existing institutional arrangements, and support or oppose 
policies that implicate their constitutional visions.  Citizens use their power as voters to 
support particular politicians engaged in constitutional politics.  Such actions constitute 
constitutional advocacy politics, or the transformation of normally non-constitutional 
arenas of conflict into arenas in which the proper form of the constitutional system is 
contested. 
OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 The first empirical chapter of this dissertation, Chapter Two, examines the effect 
of Brown on political debate in the American South.  The South was committed to 
segregation, and the Supreme Court’s challenge to separate schools was a direct attack on 
the region’s social system.   The reaction to the decision was swift and negative, and 
Southern politics were dominated by opposition to integration for years, and for decades 
in some states (see Klarman 2004, Bartley 1969, and Black 1976).  The electoral 
ramifications of that backlash are discussed in Chapter Four, but this Chapter examines 




In order to assess the effect of Brown on political debate, I assembled a data set of 
newspaper opinion in the 1950s.  I collect every editorial or letter to the editor that 
discuss race in five Southern newspapers, covering 1950-56.  The five papers chosen, 
from Richmond, Virginia; Birmingham, Alabama; Florence, South Carolina; Meridian, 
Mississippi; and Bryan, Texas, provide data from large and small newspapers, and from 
different parts of the Southern region.  I examined every editorial and letter to the editor 
in those five newspapers over six and a half years, looking at over 10,000 editorial pages, 
and collected 648 editorials and 791 letters to the editor.  I selected race as a subject to 
capture discussion of Brown, as well as other racial issues.  Examining both editorials 
and letters to the editor allows me to study both elite and mass opinion, expressed in a 
public forum.     
In examining this non-random, yet diverse sample of Southern opinion on race in 
the 1950s, I find that constitutional arguments are more prevalent after Brown than 
before.  This finding occurs across newspapers, and derives from both qualitative and 
quantitative analysis.  After Brown, writers of both editorials and letters responded to the 
Supreme Court’s decision with arguments about the constitutionality of segregation, and 
presenting theories of interpretation, particular interpretations of the Constitution, and 
theories of the historical foundations of American politics.  Taken together, these 
editorials and letters form a doctrinal response to Brown, and reveal a regional 
social/political doctrine.  These qualitative conclusions are supported by quantitative 
analysis, with discussion of race increasing after the decision, and that discussion more 
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constitutional in content.  This chapter contributes to scholarship on Supreme Court 
impact by finding a particular kind of indirect effect through use of a new data set. 
Chapter Three is an analysis parallel to Chapter Two, directed at African-
American newspapers.  I look at editorials sampled from three African-American 
newspapers, the Chicago Defender, Atlanta Daily World and Birmingham World.  This 
chapter finds that while reaction in the black and Non-Southern papers followed the same 
judicialized pattern as Southern papers show, the massive reaction to Brown did not 
occur.  I find that the amount of constitutional argumentation in black newspaper 
editorials increased, but the overall quantity of editorials that discussed race decreased. 
Race was the predominant subject on black newspaper editorial pages before the 
Supreme Court’s decision, and thus Brown’s impact was limited to altering the frame of 
argument.  The kind of intense discussion that dominated white-oriented newspapers after 
Brown was already evident in black papers before the decision.  I argue that racial 
differences are an important factor affecting the reception of Supreme Court decisions on 
racial issues, and that the Court’s effect is strongest on the beneficiaries of white 
supremacist institutions and values. 
Like Chapter Two, Chapter Three presents qualitative, as well as quantitative 
analysis of newspaper opinion.  The text of editorials in African-American newspaper 
exhibits much of the same judicialized argumentation as the five white newspaper 
analyzed previously, with increased attention to issues of constitutionality and 
institutional power relationships.  The black paper editorials lack one particular theme 
that was prominent post-Brown in predominantly white newspapers, the proposing of 
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potential alterations of the constitutional system.  This lack of support for altering the 
constitution likely arises from the hope of black political leaders that the Supreme Court 
decision would contribute to the weakening and eventual demise of Jim Crow 
segregation.  This hopefulness about the Brown decision is evident in the frequent claim 
in black newspaper editorials that the power of militant segregationist politicians was 
diminishing. 
Southern politics did not follow this integrationist path hoped for in black 
newspapers, at least not in the immediate post-Brown period.  Chapter Four examines the 
backlash to Brown in Southern campaigns and elections in the 1950s and the effect of 
that backlash.   
Chapter Four discusses the path of Southern electoral politics after 1954, focusing 
on the connection between the Supreme Court decision and the careers of Southern 
politicians.  This chapter builds upon existing scholarship about Southern white backlash, 
and focuses on the Supreme Court’s role in stimulating that backlash.  I find evidence for 
Brown’s effect in Southern elections in the 1950s, finding that conservative 
segregationists were much more successful after Brown than before.2   
The careers of important segregationist politicians are particularly useful in 
illuminating the effect of a Supreme Court decision outside of the judicial system.  I trace 
the effect of Brown on the behavior and success of chosen elected officials who were 
significant in the change process that led to a national commitment to racial equality in 
the 1960s.  This Chapter examines three governors:  George Wallace of Alabama, Orval 
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Faubus of Arkansas, and James Byrnes of South Carolina, as well as Eugene “Bull” 
Connor, an unsuccessful candidate for governor of Alabama.   
The career of Birmingham Police Commissioner Bull Connor is an illustrative 
case.  Like many of the reactionary segregationist politicians that held power in the post-
Brown backlash era, he had served in public office before the Supreme Court decision.  
He finished last, running as a reactionary segregationist in the Democratic primary for 
governor in 1950, and by 1953 he was forced from office by allegations of corruption and 
infidelity.  While opposition to racial integration had always been part of Connor’s public 
image, he put the issue at the center of his mid-1950s attempts to get back into power. He 
was successful in this quest, riding racist backlash to victory in 1957.  This resurgence of 
Connor’s career as a reactionary segregationist is reflective not just of a broader trend in 
Southern politics, but also this resurgence put him at the right place at the right time to 
play a crucial part in the integration of Southern society, as he led the violent suppression 
of civil rights protests in 1963. 
Chapter Four finds Brown caused a massive backlash in the white South, and this 
backlash remade Southern politics into a politics of militant opposition to integration.  
This finding, while in many ways intuitive, actually challenges scholarship on Supreme 
Court impact, particularly The Hollow Hope by Gerald Rosenberg.  I argue that conflict 
over integration constitutes constitutional advocacy politics.  Southern white politics, 
which because of disenfranchisement of black voters constituted Southern electoral 
politics, was occupied with polarized conflict over its segregationist social and political 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 J. Harvie Wilkinson, currently a federal judge on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, wrote in From 
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system.  Some Southern politicians used their positions of power to present critiques of 
the Supreme Court’s argument, with the Southern Manifesto of 1956 as the most 
prominent example.  Other elected officials like Bull Connor, George Wallace and 
Orville Faubus used the institutional resources of their offices to oppose integration, 
expanding their constitutional argument into violence in some cases.3  The backlash, 
taken as a whole, was a regional, multi-institutional movement advocating a particular 
position on proper organization of the constitutional system.  Support for States’ Rights, 
segregation, and white supremacy were presented, often but not always in a coordinated 
manner, as a kind of regional constitutional argument.  This chapter analyzes how that 
argument drove Southern elections of the 1950s. 
Chapter Five integrates the empirical findings of previous chapters into the 
analysis of American Political Development.  This chapter analyzes the Supreme Court’s 
role in the development of American political institutions.  Here I use the empirical 
findings of other chapters to present an extension and critique of Rosenberg’s argument 
in The Hollow Hope.  I draw on the work of Rogers Smith and Angus King, using their 
concept of racial institutional orders to integrate reaction to Brown with other events like 
the direct action civil rights movement and 1960s civil rights legislation.   
Southern Politics in the 1950s was a painstakingly constructed and highly 
effective equilibrium system, designed to prevent Northern challenge to the Jim Crow 
                                                                                                                                                 
Brown to Bakke that “Nowhere in the region did black rights make good politics” after Brown. 
3 I more fully explore the connection between official government action and constitutional argument of 
integration in “Violence and Non-Violence as Constitutional Argument:  An Analysis of the 1963 Civil 




system of racial segregation.  The Supreme Court was the only part of the national 
government that was not an integrated part of this equilibrium system, and when the 
Court promoted integration it sparked opposition from white southerners.  I argue this 
opposition was not merely an example of privileged elite and mass actors defending their 
prerogatives, but the defense of a white supremacist constitutional order.4   
The backlash against Brown took the form of not just support for segregationist 
politicians, but the production of an alternate constitutional doctrine opposing the Court’s 
argument.  I argue that Supreme Court decisions can identify and stimulate such broad 
reactions, making clear the deep popular and institutional support for particular political 
doctrines.  I argue that examining how the Court stimulates the defense of deep 
institutional orders helps to explain how the Court and constitutional law affect the 
development of American politics.  The reconstruction of institutional orders, which 
occurred with the adoption of legal commitments to racial equality in the 1960s, 
demonstrates the continuing importance of Supreme Court decisions on broader 
American politics. 
Chapter Four continues this work’s engagement with the argument of Rosenberg 
in The Hollow Hope.  Rosenberg finds that court decisions only lead to social change in 
the rare occasions that certain constraints on court action are absent, and certain 
conditions that support court action are present.  I agree with Rosenberg that such 
constraints and conditions are important determinants of the effectiveness of court 
                                                 
4 Rogers Smith and Angus King (APSR 2005) recently argue that American politics has always been, and 
is currently characterized in part by conflict between a white supremacist racial order and an egalitarian 
racial order.  Also Paul Frymer (APSR 2005) argues that institutional structures often cause racist behavior 
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decisions, and the Supreme Court has limited control of them.  I argue, however, that a 
dialectical change process stimulated by the Court can overcome constraints and 
contribute to social change in the absence of conditions conducive to change.  If negative 
reaction to a decision like Brown can help lead to social change, even in an issue area 
where Rosenberg’s constraints are evident and his conditions are absent, then possibly 
the Court is a venue of possibility for the advocate of social change.  I argue that 
presenting intellectually coherent interpretations of national political commitments, even 
if this presentation leads to massive backlash and is later determined to be morally 
incorrect and reprehensible, is a way the Supreme Court can lead to positive social 
change. 
These five chapters together form a multifaceted analysis of one particular 
Supreme Court opinion’s extra-judicial effect, and of the Court’s role in American 
politics generally.  It contributes to scholarship on Public Law, identifying and describing 
how the Court can transform politics outside the judicial system.  It contributes to 
scholarship on American Political History and Development, showing how the Court can 
contribute to electoral politics and institutional change.  By integrating data from political 
debate, campaigns, and elections, which illuminate the arguments and actions of elite and 
mass actors, this work presents an institutionally specific analysis of the Supreme Court’s 
effect on the American political system.  I find that when the Court affects politics 
outside of the judicial system, it still affects politics as a court.  By remaking politics 
                                                                                                                                                 
on the part of individuals.  My project builds upon such work, identifying the Supreme Court’s contribution 
to such racial institutional frameworks. 
15 
 
along the lines of appellate constitutional argument, the Supreme Court has a substantial 






















Chapter 2:  Judicialization of Political Conflict: 
Evidence of Brown’s Effect in Newspaper Opinion 
 
 The United States Supreme Court, with its landmark racial integration case Brown 
v. Board of Education, stimulated a heated debate in the editorial pages of Southern 
newspapers.  This debate encompassed arguments not just about the rightness or 
wrongness of the decision, but also included discussion of the roles of courts, states and 
law in the American constitutional system.  This chapter analyzes Southern editorials and 
letters to the editor, and finds a sizable and substantively distinctive effect of Brown on 
discussion of race.  I find that the Court stimulated an increase in the volume of 
discussion of racial issues, and reoriented that discussion of race to constitutional issues. 
 This dissertation presents a theory of “judicialization” that identifies and describes 
the effect of a Supreme Court opinion outside of the judicial system.  My focus is on how 
a decision shapes and transforms debate, instead of how much compliance or support 
follows a decision.  I am concerned most directly in this chapter with how and to what 
extent the Court can affect political debate, and how it affected Southern political debate 
with Brown v. Board of Education in particular.  When the Court judicializes political 
conflict, it reshapes it in the form of the appellate legal process.  Discussion in a given 
issue area that previously focused on the desirability or effectiveness of a given public 
policy is now also focused on issues of constitutionality.  Participants in the debate, after 
the judicializing decision from the high court, argue about the constitutionality of public 
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policy, the proper role of governing entities like states and the federal government, and 
the proper theory used to interpret the Constitution. 
 A decision like Brown expands the scope of constitutional argument, involving 
more individual and institutional actors in debate over the constitutionality of an action of 
government.  This debate is substantively similar to judicial review, but occurs in an 
expanded political environment.  Appellate courts engage in two processes:  statutory 
interpretation and judicial review.  While statutory interpretation is concerned with 
whether a given piece of legislation is being interpreted and applied correctly, judicial 
review is the process of testing whether a given action of government is consistent with 
the Constitution.  Judicial review is concerned with the Constitution as higher law, and 
what kind of legislation or execution of legislation is impermissible under that higher 
law.   
When individual citizens, like the Alabamians cited above, debate the proper 
application of the Constitution to a particular public policy like school segregation, they 
are engaged in a kind of constitutional interpretation.  This expanded judicial review 
debate lacks the concrete mechanism for finality that appellate courts possess.  Supreme 
Court Justices debate over the proper application of judicial review, and they eventually 
vote for one interpretation or competing interpretation.  The issuance of an opinion or 
opinions brings the discussion to a close, at least until the Justices decide to begin the 
process again.  Debate outside the Court has no means of ending debate; discussion 
continues as long as there are people interested in discussing.  The only means of 
achieving finality are elections, but only if those elections are contested on the same 
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issues as the judicialized public debate, and the elections produce a stable governing 
majority of representatives who are committed to a common constitutional and policy 
vision. 
A major component of this judicialized political debate, stimulated but not 
controlled by a Supreme Court opinion, is the social/political doctrine.  This chapter 
argues that when a Court opinion stimulates discussion, that discussion often takes the 
form of constitutional doctrine.  These doctrinal arguments are legal in focus, but arise 
from core commitments of parts of society and politics.  While white Southerners 
responded to Brown with an alternate constitutional vision, that vision was influenced 
and motivated by regional commitments to white supremacy and institutional structures 
that protected white supremacy.  Thus that doctrine was social and political, as well as 
legal.  The arguments that interested groups put forth in response to a Supreme Court 
opinion will articulate and reveal existing social/political doctrine.  This doctrine will 
have the characteristics of constitutional doctrine, with theories of interpretation, 
identification of sacred higher law texts, conceptions of institutional design, and logical 
arguments.  These doctrinal positions will support, oppose, or both support and oppose 
the Court opinion. 
Here it is significant not merely that in the 1950s the Court stimulated increased 
opposition to school integration in the South.  The form of argument used by Southern 
defenders was legal and constitutional, opposing the foundations of the Court’s 
integration arguments.  White Southern leaders did not merely disagree with Chief 
Justice Warren’s assertion that separate institutions were inherently unequal, or that all 
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citizens were entitled to equal treatment from federal and state government.  White 
Southerners presented a developed alternate constitutional doctrine, still working with the 
Constitution as the primary sacred text.  Defenders of segregation added to their 
interpretive theory new sacred texts, like the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions and the 
writings of John C. Calhoun.  They offered a state-centered creation story to counter the 
Marshallian nationalist origins assumed for the Union by Warren.  White southerners also 
grounded their thinking in the concept of interposition, which was at the core of their 
understanding of institutional design.   
The presentation of social/political doctrine is an important component of the 
effect of a transformative Court opinion, because it allows for a kind of communication 
between the Court and its adversaries, in a type of discourse that is shaped by the 
arguments and institutional characteristics of the judiciary.  The presentation of 
arguments in a doctrinal form by Court opponents allows for debate with groups in 
government and society who support the general issue position of the Court, but for 
different reasons or from different perspectives.  This chapter makes use of newspaper 
opinion as a sample and reflection of the broader debate about race stimulated by Brown, 
and uses the theory of judicialization to analyze this data. 
In this chapter I present newspaper opinion to demonstrate the effect of a 
Supreme Court decision on political debate in a public forum outside of the judicial 
system.  Examining editorials and letters to the editor before and after Brown helps to 
identify whether the Court can affect broader politics, and the particular effect the Court 
can have on political debate.  Identifying a particular effect of Brown challenges the 
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claim of Gerald Rosenberg in The Hollow Hope that review of the history of the Civil 
Rights Era “the extra-judicial effects thesis lacks evidence” (131).  While Chapter 4 
challenges Rosenberg’s claims that Brown did not make a meaningful contribution to the 
end of legal segregation in the South, and Chapter 5 challenges his conclusion that Courts 
are not effective actors in bringing about social change, this chapter is concerned with the 
more narrow question of whether or not Courts have an empirically measurable impact 
on politics outside of the judicial system. 
Data and Methods 
 This chapter is an empirical examination of the Court’s indirect effect, testing 
whether the judicialization model discussed above describes discussion of race in the 
1950s South.  To provide data demonstrating Brown’s effect on political debate in the 
South, I examine every editorial or letter to the editor mentioning or discussing race or 
segregation in five Southern daily newspapers, 1950-1956.  I examine two large 
metropolitan papers, The Richmond News-Leader and The Birmingham News.  I also look 
at three smaller papers published in small cities, The Bryan (TX) Eagle, The Florence 
(SC) Morning News, and The Meridian (MS) Daily Star.   
 The newspaper editorial page is a useful data source because it provides a record 
of the debate over political issues, and that debate consists of arguments made by elite 
and mass political actors.  Newspapers have several advantages over polls in an inquiry 
into Brown’s effect.  Polls were much less frequent in the 1950s than in later eras, and 
demonstrate merely that white Southerners were opposed to the decision and supportive 
of segregation.  Polls were more frequent in the 1960s, but by then many other important 
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race-related events had occurred, obscuring connections to Brown.  Most importantly, 
polls would not present data about the arguments made by Southern elites and citizens.  
Editorials and letters to the editor by their very nature are argumentative, and show how 
people publicly discussed politics, and how that discussion changed over time. 
 Newspaper opinion data can support measures of what is best understood as 
“volunteered opinion,” the arguments made by individuals who choose to communicate 
their political views in public.  Looking backward six decades, such opinion reflects what 
both political elites and individual citizens were discussing, and what kinds of arguments 
they were making to each other.  This “volunteered” opinion has been used by scholars of 
politics to establish the nature and focus of politics and political debate at a particular 
time at the national level.  Taeku Lee (2002) uses letters written to the President of the 
United States as an indicator of public opinion, arguing that such data avoids the problem 
of “non-attitudes,” and reflects the subject and direction of national political debate.  
Sarah Binder (2003) uses editorials from the New York Times to examine the content of 
policy debates from 1947 to 2000.  She uses this data to identify the moments when 
gridlock or other forms of policy stalemate prevented legislation addressing major policy 
concerns from passing through Congress. 
 For my purposes here newspaper opinion is a reflection of political debate about 
race in Southern politics 1950-56.  Race was an issue of concern before and after the 
Brown decision, with both editorials and letters making arguments about the nature and 
wisdom of segregation.  An editorial or letter is a data point that indicates a decision by 
an individual or group to publicly state an opinion, and the content and structure of their 
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argument.  I am not claiming that newspaper opinion is the primary, or most influential, 
site of Supreme Court impact.  I am also not claiming that newspaper opinion is a perfect 
representation of what the entire regional population of the South spoke about, or a 
representation of all the arguments held by Southerners or the proportions in which 
Southerners held them.  Newspaper opinion, however, is a representation of political 
debate, and in the time before large-scale consumption of television news a particularly 
important forum for political communication and debate.  Newspaper opinion is also a 
documentary record of the content of politics at a given place at a given time.  
 In order to establish that shifts in the amount and type of newspaper opinion are 
not merely short-term effects of coverage of a Court decision, and to capture both the 
variety and depth of discussion of a given issue, I examine every editorial or letter to the 
editor that discusses race in the chosen newspapers in the chosen time period.  Sampling 
particular periods of interest does have advantages, and I use a particular sampling 
strategy in Chapter 3 to examine Brown’s effect on black newspaper opinion.  Including 
all editorials and letters that discuss race, and by omission all days of editorial opinion 
that do not contain discussion of race, I am able to establish the broader significance of a 
particular trend or type of argument.  Including every day of editorial opinion does limit 
the number and type of newspapers under review (discussed below), and helps to better 
identify and describe the effect of an event like a Supreme Court decision on political 
debate. 
I argue that Brown should increase the frequency and constitutional content of 
debate on southern editorial pages, and that the debate will take the form of an alternate 
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constitutional doctrine to that propounded by the Supreme Court.  From my 
judicialization theory I derive three empirical implications, or expectations.  First, I 
expect that southern newspapers will publish more editorials and letters about race and 
segregation after Brown is issued that before the decision, owing to increased attention to 
the issue of race once segregation is under perceived threat.  Second, I expect that more 
editorials and letters to the editor concerning race will discuss constitutional issues after 
Brown than before the decision, with elite and mass political actors adopting the 
discourse and subject matter of constitutional interpretation.  Third, I expect that the 
editorials and letters to the editor, taken together, will take a doctrinal position on race 
and segregation, and present constitutional arguments to support that position.   
The evidence found for the third expectation, involving the substantive content of 
editorials and letters to the editor, is the core finding of this chapter.  The first two 
quantitative expectations, however, support the qualitative argument in that they help to 
establish that judicialization is prevalent and significant.  If discussion was reshaped by 
the Court into a form paralleling appellate courts, but such discussion was sparse and 
infrequent, then the content of discussion would not be crucial to an understanding of 
Brown’s effect.  If editorials and letters making constitutional arguments made up only a 
small fraction of the increase in discussion of race, then judicialization would likewise 
not be very significant to a full understanding of Brown’s effect.  Findings of frequency 
and constitutional focus, however, are evident and supportive of qualitative findings.   
The first two expectations lend themselves to some basic descriptive statistics, 
and the third (while possibly not a hypothesis, but a theoretical proposition) requires 
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more interpretive evidence.  The data set collected from Southern newspapers 1950-56 
provides data supporting all three expectations.  Editorials and letters to the editor speak 
to the concerns of this inquiry, in that they are public expressions of argumentative 
positions about race in the era of Brown v. Board of Education.  As arguments they 
consist, with varying degrees of logic and complexity, of propositions supported by 
evidence.  As arguments they can demonstrate the importance of constitutional concerns 
in discussion before and after the Supreme Court decisions. 
The selection of data is not random, which limits claims about its 
representativeness of Southern or American opinion in the 1950s.  This non-randomness, 
however, is also an asset for this inquiry.  Writers of editorials and letters to the editor 
chose to express their opinions publicly, evidencing some degree of thought about the 
issue of race.  Thus these data are unlikely to reflect what public opinion researchers call 
“non-attitudes,” statements that do not reflect well thought-out opinions, but merely on-
the-spot reactions to posed questions.  Writers of editorials and letters in this data set are 
likely to have been active and thoughtful participants in a national and regional 
conversation, and likely to shape discussion about race and segregation.5 
I focus on debate in the South for both theoretical and practical reasons.  While 
the eleven former confederate states were not the only states operating segregated school 
systems, the South was home to the largest concentration of blacks in America, and to the 
                                                 
5 Taeku Lee (2002) makes similar use of non-random data to analyze historical public opinion.  He uses 
letters to the president as a proxy for informed public opinion, sampling 1 of every 20 letters 1948-1965.  
He argues that this data is more indicative of public opinion than survey responses, since letter data is 
created by individuals who have thought about an issue and formed an opinion, instead of being created by 
an interaction between an individual and a survey.  The kind of effects that are the subject of my qualitative 
analysis would not be evident in a survey, but are evident in editorials and letters sent to newspapers. 
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most entrenched and pervasive form of racial segregation.  Thus reaction to Brown was 
most pronounced in Southern states, even though only one of the five desegregation cases 
decided on May 17, 1954 was from a Southern state.  Brown was regarded as a direct 
challenge to regional customs, traditions, and ways of life, and thus provoked a massive 
reaction.  Focusing on the South allows me to examine reaction to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in a relatively unfiltered form, since white Southern opposition to integration 
became dominant in many Southern states before other important events involving 
integration, like the 1957 integration of Little Rock High School in Arkansas and the 
protest movements of the 1960s.  Also focusing mainly on Southern reactions allows me 
to assemble a data set of five newspapers from different parts of the South, making my 
sample a more representative regional sample, instead of having one Southern paper in a 
larger national data set. 
The five-newspaper data set is representative of the 1950s South in several 
important ways.  While all five papers are dailies, the Richmond and Birmingham are 
major metropolitan dailies, while the Florence, Meridian and Bryan papers are small city 
dailies.  Having data from large and small papers captures both metropolitan and rural 
opinion.  Small city papers are the best approximation of a rural paper for this inquiry, 
since most small-town papers are either weekly and would not provide enough data, 
and/or not available on microfilm.  The five papers are also differentiated by sub-region, 
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with Birmingham, Meridian, Mississippi and Florence, South Carolina in the Deep South, 
and Richmond, Virginia and Bryan, Texas in the Peripheral South.6 
The states served by the five papers examined here also differ in their immediate 
connection to the Supreme Court decision in 1954.  Clarendon County in South Carolina 
was the origin of the Briggs v. Elliott, one of Brown’s companion cases.  School districts 
in Virginia and Texas were the subject of desegregation orders issued by federal judges in 
1956.  Court-ordered integration did not come to Alabama and Mississippi for over a 
decade after Brown and Brown II, the 1955 implementation decision.  The data set 
includes one paper, the Richmond News-Leader, which was a regional and national leader 
in forming a counter-argument to the Court on integration.  Thus many letters are written 
in response to editorials in that paper about integration, and are therefore once-removed 
from Brown in the causal chain.  The Richmond paper provides the strongest example of 
the judicialized debate, but the other four papers provide corroborating evidence.  All 
these important differences among the five chosen newspapers make the data set as 
representative as possible, considering the labor required to sort through six and a half 
years of one newspaper, a period encompassing over 2000 days of coverage.7 
                                                 
6 The grouping of states into Deep and Peripheral South follows the usage of scholars of Southern Politics, 
for example Earl Black (1976).  This distinction captures differences in the relative size of the black 
population in the two sub-regions, with Deep South states having much higher black populations.  
Richmond during the period under review was the site of a particularly vociferous backlash against 
integration, and the News-Leader was a leading voice supporting segregation.  However, distinction 
between Deep and Peripheral Southern states is not intended to be a kind of index of “southerness” or 
support for segregation, and thus the nature of the Richmond reaction to Brown does not remove its 
identification as a Peripheral Southern city in a Peripheral Southern state.  
7 The number of days of editorial opinion examined differs slightly from paper to paper, since some did not 
publish on Sunday, or did not have an editorial page on Sunday.  Also some papers did not publish on 
certain holidays.  The data set also does not include opinion from Feb. 1-15, 1953 of the Richmond News-
Leader, due to a missing reel in the microfilm collection of the Center for Research Libraries. 
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 The five newspapers are presented as a sample of Southern opinion and political 
argument, as reflected by the choice of individuals and groups to write editorials and 
letters and the content of their arguments.  This newspaper data is not offered as a 
representative sample of the most influential published opinion in the South in the 1950s, 
or in the broader area of Civil Rights Era political change.  The Richmond and 
Birmingham papers are clearly important in their own right, because of the regional 
significance of the Richmond paper and the later occurrence of important events in 
Birmingham and Alabama generally in the 1960s.  They are not presented as the most 
important papers in the region, however.  The Atlanta Constitution, New Orleans Times-
Picayune, and the News-Leader’s Richmond competitor the Times-Dispatch would be 
contenders for such distinction, if such influence was the criteria for selection. 
 Small papers were included in the analysis in order to provide a kind of 
demographic diversity, including debate from more rural areas.  I could include three 
small papers instead of one large paper, because small papers publish less pages and 
usually less editorials and letters than large papers.   Also the inclusion of the three small 
papers allows for more states and parts of the South to be analyzed, more so than the 
inclusion of one other large metropolitan newspaper.  The three particular small 
newspapers under review were chosen primarily because the entirety of their issues 1950-
56 were available by either interlibrary loan or, in the case of the Bryan, Texas paper, 
within driving distance of my location in Austin, Texas.  Collections of all issues of small 
daily newspapers are scarce, since the two major repositories of microfilm archives, The 
Center for Research Libraries and The Library of Congress, contain mainly large 
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metropolitan papers from the 1950s.  From the few available small papers, I selected 
Florence, Meridian and Bryan to achieve some measure of intra-regional diversity. 
I chose the period from June 1, 1950 to Nov. 31, 1956 for reasons of substance 
and practicality.  The foremost advantage of studying newspaper opinion in that time 
period is that Brown occurs in the middle of it, on May 17, 1954.  Thus I can track 
change in response to Supreme Court action.  Also Brown is the only major Supreme 
Court decision on race in the period, although there is some discussion of the 1950 Sweatt 
v. Painter decision, which ordered that state law schools be integrated, in the beginning 
of the period.  Also the Little Rock crisis of 1957 is outside of the scope of the data set, as 
are all major direct action protest events except for the Montgomery bus boycott of 1955.  
The regional and temporal features of the five-newspaper data set allow for a focus on 
Brown as the event that caused increases in and transformation of the discussion of race. 
I constructed this data set with a two-step sorting process.  First I collected every 
editorial or letter to the editor that discussed race.  An opinion piece was classified as 
discussing race if it used the words Negro or colored, or if it referred specifically to a 
particular race or ethnicity, or to racial minorities.  Explicit discussion of “civil rights,” 
qualified as race discussion, as did any explicit or implicit mention of segregation or 
integration.  Pieces using terms like FEPC, the acronym for the Fair Employment 
Practices Commission, were included if in context the writer was referring to the FEPC in 
its dealings with racial discrimination, since that federal agency dealt with other kinds of 
discrimination.  Mentions of “the Supreme Court’s recent decision” were only classified 
as discussion of race if the context made clear that the decision discussed was Brown or 
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another race relations decision.  This sorting collected 648 editorials and 791 editorials, 
taken from over 10,000 daily editions of the five newspapers.  Table 1 lists the 
breakdown of editorials and letters by newspaper.  All papers usually published several 
editorials, although the Richmond and Bryan papers occasionally published only one.  
The Bryan and Florence papers published letters so infrequently that they do not provide 
data useful for this analysis.  The Meridian paper normally printed one letter to the editor, 
and the Richmond and Birmingham papers most days printed several, with Richmond 
occasionally printing more than a dozen. 
I then coded the observations for the presence of one or more of four frames:  
constitutional, economic, religious and Cold War.  Many scholars, notably Gamson 
(1992) have discussed the importance of frames as conceptual structures that condition 
the presentation and reception of information and argument.  I argue that the Supreme 
Court discussed race using a constitutional frame, and Southerners responded with 
arguments presented through a constitutional frame.  Editorials and letters also show use 
of other frames as well, although they are not as prevalent as the constitutional frame. 
An opinion piece was coded as constitutional, or as using a constitutional frame, 
if it discussed one of the following issues or topics:  the Supreme Court or other courts, 
the constitutionality of government actions, interpreting the Constitution, the structure of 
the political system, or the relationship between political institutions like states and the 
federal government.  A piece was coded as using an economic frame if it discussed the 
national or local economy, employment, economic prosperity or growth, or the 
connection between race and economics.  A piece was coded as religious if it discussed 
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race with reference to Christianity or another religion, supported an argument with 
reference to religious authority, or if the writer used phrases like “God help us” or 
“Almighty God” when discussing racial issues.  A piece was coded as using a Cold War 
frame if the writer linked racial issues to the Soviet Union, communism or socialism.  
Some editorials and letters used more than one frame, and were coded as such. 
Quantitative Findings 
 While the core of this chapter’s argument lies in the qualitative analysis of 
newspaper opinion as argumentative text, it is useful to first discuss quantitative findings.  
Descriptive and bivariate statistics help to support the judicialization theory, and to 
establish the generalizability of the patterns found in particular textual passages discussed 
below.  The expression of a critique of Brown v. Board of Education expressed in 
Southern newspaper opinion after the decision is significant partly because it was part of 
an expanded discussion of race that followed the decision.  This expansion is evident in 
quantitative analysis of newspaper editorials and letters in the aggregate.  
 Concerning frequency, my theory generates an expectation that there will be more 
editorials and letters to the editor that discuss race after Brown than before the decision.  
Analysis of the newspaper data follows the expected pattern.  Table 2 presents the 
frequency of editorials before and after May of 1954.8  The five newspapers published 
4.5 editorials per month before the decision, and 13.9 per month after, more than tripling 
                                                 
8 For purposes of quantitative analysis, the entire month of May 1954 is counted as after the Supreme Court 
decision, even though it was handed down on the 17th, and reported in newspapers on the 18th.  When the 
data are analyzed by year, the years used begin with May of the calendar year.  If classifying the entire 
month of May 1954 as after the decision would have any effect on the findings of this paper, it would be to 
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after May of 1954.  Since the Richmond News-Leader devoted such a large part of its 
editorial pages to presentation of the constitutional argument against integration, devoting 
the entire editorial page to the theory of “interposition” for months in late 1955 and early 
1956, I also analyzed the editorial data without the Virginia paper.  Table 3 presents those 
results, showing an increase from 3.4 editorials per month before the decision to 9.5 per 
month after, nearly the same percentage increase as the full sample.  Figure 1 shows the 
number of editorials by year, with years designated in distance from May of 1954.  The 
fifth year, beginning with the month of the Supreme Court decision, shows the sharpest 
increase in discussion.9 
 Letters to the editor that discuss race also increase in number after Brown, and the 
increase is much larger than that observed in editorials.  Table 4 shows these results, with 
an increase from 2.2 letters per month before the decision to 22.0 per month after, and 
Figure 2 shows the increase in letters by year.  This tenfold increase is much larger than 
the threefold increase observed in editorials.  The difference might be due to the fact that 
newspaper editorial writers, as members of the Southern elite, were likely aware of the 
potential threats to segregation, from both courts and Non-Southerners in the legislative 
and executive branches.  Thus editorial writers began the 1950s with a substantial interest 
in racial issues, with Brown contributing to an increased focus in the middle of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
slightly reduce the observed impact of Brown.  Since May 1-17 is such a small part of the time studied, any 
effect on analysis is minimal or nonexistent. 
9 Both Figure 1, showing frequency of editorials, and Figure 2, showing frequency of letters, show the 
highest frequency in 1955 and 1956, not in 1954.   This might be a result of a lagged effect of Brown, or an 
effect of Brown II, in June 1955.  Two events, however, may explain the lagged increase.  Discussion of 
race in Birmingham spiked in response to the attempt of a black student, Autherine Lucy, to enter the 
University of Alabama.  In Virginia, discussion of race increased surrounding a special session of the state 
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decade.  The decision was a greater shock to the mass of Southern whites, who could no 
longer count on their elected leaders to prevent a challenge to segregation coming from 
the national government.10 
 I also analyzed the letter to the editor data without the Richmond News-Leader, 
which provided over two-thirds of the letters.  Table 5 presents those results. The sample 
with Richmond removed, which is mostly Birmingham letters, showed an increase from 
.69 letters per month before Brown to 5.9 letters per month after the decision.  The 
increase was similar, but slightly smaller in percentage terms, than that observed in the 
full sample.   
 My second empirical expectation derived from my judicialization theory is that a 
larger percentage of editorials and letters to the editor will present constitutional 
arguments, or utilize constitutional frames, after the decision than before.  To capture 
such an increase I calculate the percentage of editorials that are coded as constitutional 
for each year studied.  I designate year periods from May of 1954 in order to capture the 
effect of Brown.  Table 6 presents the results of this analysis, showing that in the fifth 
year studied constitutional editorials jumped from 19% to 45% of total editorials 
                                                                                                                                                 
legislature, and letters increased in response to a series of editorials, discussed below, that attempted to 
influence that special session.  Both these events, however, were to a great extent results of Brown. 
10 I must make one caveat to my treatment of letters to the editor as data indicative of Southern mass 
opinion in the 1950s.  These letters are a clearly non-random sample not just because the writer had to 
decide to submit a letter, but also because a newspaper editor had to decide to print the letter.  I have no 
way of knowing how many letters sent to the five newspapers in my sample were not printed, or whether 
the unprinted letters differ in substantively important ways from the printed letters.  The printed letters, 
however, are from both supporters and opponents of the Supreme Court.  Some make constitutional 
arguments, some do not.  This diversity leads me to infer that editors were not excluding certain letters 
based on the argument of writers.  Also the quantitative and qualitative findings of this chapter are robust 
enough to be valid even if there was some substantive filtration of letters.  I am using the letter and editorial 
data to advance a particular empirical interpretation of Brown’s effect, not to paint an exactly representative 
picture of Southern public opinion in the 1950s. 
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discussing race.  Table 7 presents a more focused analysis, with 23% of editorials before 
Brown making constitutional arguments, and 47% making constitutional arguments after.  
Table 8 presents the same analysis with data from the Richmond News-Leader removed, 
with a greater percentage increase, from 10% to 33%. 
 Letters to the editor show a parallel increase in the proportion of constitutional 
argumentation after Brown.  Table 9 shows the percentage of constitutional letters by 
year, with years after May 1954 showing a higher percentage of letters making 
constitutional arguments.  Table 10 shows that before Brown letters making constitutional 
arguments constituted 21% of the total, and after the decision were 55% of the total.  
Table 11 presents results for the sample without Richmond letters, showing an increase 
from 3% to 41%. 
 If Brown had the judicializing effect that I claim here, the constitutional frame 
should be more prevalent that other frames after the decision.  Tables 12 and 13 show 
such a relationship, with use of constitutional frames outnumbering use of the other three 
frames after May of 1954.  The only other frame that is significantly more common after 
the decision is the religious frame in the letters sample.  While the constitutional frame is 
nearly three times as prevalent, the religious frame is used in 127 out of 683 letters after 
Brown.  Much of this use of religious frames comes from the argument that segregation is 
ordained by God, a particular religious argument not often found in editorials.  Such 
religious argument would likely be made by letter writers in response to any threat to 
segregation, not just one coming from the Supreme Court. 
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Quantitative analysis of newspaper opinion demonstrates that discussion of race 
increased sharply after Brown, and that discussion was often carried on using 
constitutional argument.  The most interesting finding of this chapter, however, comes 
from textual analysis of editorials and letters to the editor.  I find that the arguments made 
in response to Brown constitute an ongoing dialogue about the nature of the American 
constitutional system, and demonstrate how the Supreme Court stimulated non-judicial 
actors to engage in constitutional argument. 
Textual Findings 
 The best and most coherent example of judicialized argument, and in particular 
social/political doctrine, is the editorial campaign waged on the editorial pages of the 
Richmond News-Leader in late 1955 and early 1956.  Within the conflict over integration 
that later played out in elections and street protests, White southerners constructed an 
alternate constitutional vision.  Written by James J. Kilpatrick, these writings were an 
explicit attempt to give legal and constitutional form to the reactionary movement of the 
White South.  Powe identifies the editorials as key documents in the development of the 
Southern resistance.  “The political and intellectual problem facing the South was how to 
explain to itself and the rest of the nation why defying the Supreme Court of the United 
States was okay” (Powe 58).   
 The News-Leader editorials present a constitutional interpretation constructed 
around the concept of interposition, in which a state “interposes” itself between its 
citizens and an unjust federal government action.  Thus resistance to the Supreme Court 
decision was not unlawful, but “the highest possible example of fidelity to the compact” 
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(Nov. 23, 1955).  According to Kilpatrick’s understanding, the moral and legal high 
ground is occupied by Southern Whites, with their “reverence for law, and our obedience 
to constituted authority” (Nov. 22).  This states’ rights-centered theory was justified with 
reference not just to the nature of the ratification of the Constitution, but to other 
documents like Jefferson and Madison’s Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, and the 
writings of Calhoun.  The Southern federalist theory is argued against the Court’s 
nationalism; individual rights are confronted by sovereign power.   
 These editorials follow the form of what I call the production of social/political 
doctrine.  Previously-existing regional values are publicly presented as a coherent 
doctrine that is grounded in legal and historical authority.  An interpretation of the 
Constitution is supplemented by the inclusion of supportive sacred texts into the 
constitutional canon.  A revised founding narrative is offered as the foundation for 
opposition to the Court’s argument and directives.  Thus the Court stimulates an 
intellectual process that replicates its own process, but using different inputs and ideas. 
 Not only do the arguments of the Richmond paper’s Kilpatrick editorials follow 
the form of social/political doctrine, they were published in a form clearly meant to be 
taken as constitutional doctrine.  The News Leader published them in a pamphlet called 
Interposition, and included as supporting materials like the Kentucky and Virginia 
Resolutions, writings by states’ rights proponents like Calhoun, John Taylor of Caroline 
and Littleton Waller Tazewell, governor of South Carolina in the 1830s.  These sacred 
texts were included along with resolutions and reports of the Virginia legislature in 
support of massive resistance to integration.  This pamphlet includes all the components 
36 
 
of a social/political doctrine, and was produced in opposition to Brown, and to support 
the movement against the Court’s position. 
 Kilpatrick wrote in 1962 an extended book version of the argument presented in 
his 1955-56 editorials, called The Southern Case for School Segregation.  In the 
Introduction, he framed his project as the production of constitutional doctrine. 
May it please the court:  When this book was conceived, it was intended to be 
titled “U.S. v. the South:  A Brief for the Defense,” but it seemed a cumbersome 
title and the finished work is not, of course, a brief for the South in any lawyer’s 
sense of the word.  It is no more than an extended personal essay, presented in this 
form because the relationship that exists between the rest of the country and the 
South, in the area of race relations, often has the aspect of an adversary 
proceeding.  We of the South see ourselves on the defensive, and we frequently 
find ourselves, as lawyers do, responding in terms of the law and the evidence. 
(Kilpatrick 1962). 
 
This project, however, was not exclusively pursued by one newspaper over a few months, 
but by different newspapers and hundreds of letter writers across the South.  Analysis of 
the five-newspaper data set finds that discussion of race shifted to a constitutional focus 
in the mid-1950s, and this shift was a result of Brown v. Board of Education. 
 Before moving to a detailed discussion of the argumentative content that followed 
Brown, it important to note that the constitutional focus of Southern thinking about race 
was not new or unique, and that particular constitutional arguments made in defense of 
segregation had antecedents in the recent and earlier past of the South.  The News-
Leader’s inclusion of supporting documents points to the importance of authors like 
Madison and Jefferson in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, and of Calhoun in 
crafting the doctrine of Interposition.  Other moments of Southern resistance to perceived 
Northern threats to regional autonomy, like the Civil War and Dixiecrat revolt of 1948, 
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were justified in constitutional terms.  The Southern argument against integration in the 
1950s is part of a history of states’ rights argument that has antecedents in the period of 
the American Revolution and the Founding, and in the demarcation of British possessions 
in North America into colonial units like Virginia or Georgia.  A search for the oldest 
roots of the Southern argument against federal power likely would stretch back to the 
construction of the concept of sovereignty in European history.  The inquiry at hand need 
not make such a search, since the “judicialized” backlash under review is not presented as 
originated by the Supreme Court, but instead stimulated by the Court’s action.  Of 
interest here is how Southerners reacted to Brown, and how they chose to draw on their 
long political and ideological history to present their opposition to particular 
integrationist policies. 
 Before moving to a discussion of post-Brown judicialized dialogue, it is important 
to examine dialogue before the Supreme Court decision.  Race in general, and 
segregation in particular, were often discussed as public policy before the decision, and 
not in terms of constitutionality.  An illustrative example is this passage, from the 
editorial “Crime and the Deep South, III” from the Richmond News-Leader on May 1, 
1953, discussing the relationship between high murder rates and large black populations 
in Southern cities: 
The level of morality and respect for law indicated by these figures constitutes 
one of the principal reasons advanced by the South in defense of its historic public 
policy of racial segregation, though for some reason it is difficult to get our critics 
to recognize the facts.  But these demonstrably high crime rates constitute more 
than that.  They represent an economic loss and a social evil of the first magnitude 
and they justify thoughtful study by leaders of both races to determine how the 




Segregation is discussed as a desirable governmental policy, and resulting in reduction of 
crime.  Argument about race does not here involve a vision of the constitutional system.   
 An editorial from the Bryan (TX) Eagle, titled “Public Housing,” published June 
21, 1951, gives another example of discussion of race in terms of policy, not 
constitutionality: 
In the opinion of citizens of Bryan who are generally familiar with conditions the 
need for such a project is greater than it was a decade or more ago.  In that period 
there has been a heavy influx of Mexicans and many of these families are in 
deplorable condition from the point of housing.  Many Negro families are in no 
better condition. 
 
This editorial, the only one in the data set discussing a minority group other than blacks, 
is concerned with segregation as public policy.  It advocates the expansion of public 
housing, and argues this expansion should occur within the framework of segregation.  A 
lengthy example of pre-Brown argument on race comes from an editorial published July 
19, 1951 in the Florence Morning News, under the title “The North could profit by 
studying methods of the South in handling of race riots.” 
The South has never had a race riot equivalent to the one staged in Cicero, a 
suburb of Chicago, not even during the bitter Reconstruction days.   
It should stop the mouths of the Northern agitators who like to give the 
impression that the South is the only section of the nation where relations between 
the races is not what is ought to be . . . we [the South] recognize the problem for 
what it is and set up conditions in which the two races can live side by side 
peaceably and profitably.  
 
This defense of segregation is made on policy grounds, not grounds of constitutionality or 
in terms of the proper organization of the political system. 
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 Non-constitutional, policy-focused arguments about race also were prevalent in 
letters to the editor before Brown.  A letter signed “Meridian Home Owner” published 
Dec. 19, 1950 in the Meridian (MS) Star calls for more available housing for black 
citizens, arguing in terms of segregationist policy, not constitutionality: 
Southern Negroes are not clamoring for anti-segregation.  They want homes 
where they can have peace, quiet, sanitary surroundings, where they can rear their 
children properly and enjoy the friendship and companionship of their own kind.  
They want to become first-class, taxpaying, home-owning citizens.  They are part 
and parcel of the community. 
 
Such support for segregationist public policy was also evident in a letter from Henry L. 
Jones of Birmingham, Alabama, published in the Birmingham News under the title of 
“Another negro park, or improve present one” August 31, 1952:  “There is no reason why 
the city cannot at least have a properly equipped park.  There are a lot of places smaller 
than Birmingham which try to show that they are interested in their Negro population 
also.”  This focus on policy, not constitutionality, was characteristic of discussion of race 
in the pre-Brown period.   
 The shock to the Southern social and political system that came from the high 
court in May of 1954 shifted the focus of Southern race debate to one of constitutionality.  
Segregation was still defended as desirable and effective public policy, but now the 
constitutional frame was most evident.  Some of this constitutional argument concerned 
the practical questions raised by the Brown decision.  The Birmingham News discussed 
issues of implementation in an editorial published on Dec. 13, 1954, titled “Alabama 
communities vary widely as to school segregation problem.” 
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Alabama in some respects has the gravest problem of all the states in regard to 
carrying out the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that segregation should be 
abolished in public schools.  No other state has a wider range in the proportions of 
the races which live in various counties . . . the school problems growing out of 
the court’s de-segregation decision can best be regarded as local with methods 
and timing in dealing with the situation having regard for the make-up of 
population.  The situation surely is one that the Supreme Court recognizes and 
will consider in making its order of last May 17 effective. 
 
Many other editorials and letters engaged in discussion of the direct effect of the Court’s 
ruling. 
 Others, particularly the Richmond News-Leader, presented highly theoretical and 
historically-grounded arguments for action that would preserve a States’ Rights version 
of the constitutional system, a system which many white Southerners believed was 
ordained by the Founding and the Constitution.  Kilpatrick’s editorials reached a fever 
pitch with “Time to Fight It Out,” a call for massive resistance by the state legislature, 
then meeting in special session: 
We resist now, or we resist never.  We surrender to the court effective control 
over our reserved powers, or we make a fight to preserve these powers.  We lie 
down, piteous and pusillanimous, or we make a stand.  We rely upon what great 
men have termed a State’s ‘right to interpose,’ or we confess there is no right in a 
sovereign people effectively to protect their most vital institutions.  
This is the showdown, gentlemen.  We face the transcendent issue directly:  Do 
we abandon this basic structure of our country and become docile subjects of 
Chief Justice Warren?  Do we stand by the Constitution, or do we submit to 
judicial usurpation? 
 
The doctrine of interposition was also supported by other Southern newspapers.  The 
Florence Morning News argued on Jan. 8, 1956: 
There is a serious question in the minds of the Southern states as to whether or not 
the Supreme Court exceeded the rights and authority given it in the Constitution.  
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Since the purity of the Constitution is at the heart of the test, Interposition would 
be an act to strengthen the Constitution.  It would not challenge the Constitution.   
 
Recognizing the right of the States to challenge a questionable act places the 
burden of proof properly on the shoulders of the Federal Government.  It must 
win support for its position by making the Court’s decree an acceptable 
amendment to the Constitution.  The result, then, will bind all or none.  As John 
Milton asked in a famous discussion of freedom, “What can be juster in a state 
than this?” 
 
Interposition was the chosen doctrinal response of the editorial page of Richmond News-
Leader, and was often presented approvingly by other Southern newspapers and letter-
writers.  The constitutional argumentation that responded to Brown, however, was not 
limited to presentation of this particular theory.  Writers of editorials and letters offered 
many types of argument drawing on many different sources, and chose varied parts of the 
Supreme Court’s explicit argument and implicit assumptions to criticize.   
 These editorials and letters to the editor collectively form a doctrinal response to 
the threat of integration because they possess particular characteristics that are found in 
doctrinal arguments about constitutionality and constitutional structure.  The newspaper 
opinion under review discusses constitutionality of government decisions, historical 
precedent, the proper role and power of governing institutions, and proposed alteration of 
the constitutional order.  Discussion of particular examples of these characteristics 
demonstrates the importance of the doctrinal component of the Southern response to 
Brown.  Some of the following quotes are quite long, and some cover similar ground, but 
it is important here to present a sizable portion of the voluminous constitutional argument 
that followed Brown in fora that previously were not involved in constitutional argument 
to such a great extent. 
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Constitutionality of Government Action 
 In criticizing the Supreme Court’s integration decision, Southerners expressed in 
newspaper opinion the same opposition to integration they had always expressed, and 
argued that segregation was a social good and integration will bring harm to society.  But 
after Brown, editorials and letters to the editor added criticism of the Court’s higher law 
position to their defense of segregation as government policy.  Such direct criticism of 
how the Court was using the power of judicial review to strike down state laws is not 
surprising, but its existence does help establish the power of Court decisions to stimulate 
indirect effect. 
 These arguments about the constitutionality of the education policies of Southern 
states are interesting particularly because of what concerns they bring to the discussion of 
judicial review and constitutionality.  R. R. Hazlett, Sr., of Petersburg, VA, writes in the 
Richmond News-Leader one May 24, 1954 about the proper application of the 
constitution to race relations, and ties his argument to the Cold War: 
Personally, I cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, interpret the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution to mean equality socially, Equal rights and 
privilege—yes.  As a matter of fact their decision is fraught with unseen dangers 
and far reaching and dangerous possibilities.  For when you abolish States’ rights 
you automatically embrace centralization of power, which is in reality 
communism. 
 
Hazlett here expresses an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment narrower than that 
presented in Brown, but somewhat consistent with pre-1954 precedent on race.  He also 
ties his constitutional argument to a broader argument about communism, here using both 
the Constitutional and Cold War frames as discussed above. 
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 The importance of previous precedent was asserted by an editorial in the News-
Leader on June 1, 1955: 
For let this be said once more, in unmistakable language:  In May of 1954, that 
inept fraternity of politicians and professors known as the United States Supreme 
Court chose to throw away the established law.  These nine men repudiated the 
Constitution, spit upon the tenth amendment, and rewrote the fundamental law of 
this land to suit their own gauzy concepts of sociology.  If it be said now that the 
South is flouting the law, let it be said to the high court:  You taught us how. 
 
This colorfully-argued passage contains several argumentative points that are of interest 
here.  The News-Leader argues that previous precedent, here called “established law,” 
supports segregation.  The paper also argues that the Tenth Amendment to the 
constitution protects state control of public education by “reserving” certain 
unenumerated powers to the states.  Precedent and particular language of the constitution 
are presented as superior to social scientific evidence.  Finally, in its last sentence the 
passage finds in Brown a kind of precedent for the the resistance to integration it 
conceptualized as interposition. 
 The editorial pages of other newspapers were sites of judicialized debate after 
Brown, with editorial and letter writers arguing that the Court has erred in its position on 
the constitutionality of state-run segregated school systems.  The Meridian Star on May 
23, 1956 printed quotes from then-presidential candidate Dwight Eisenhower supporting 
a states’ rights understanding of the constitution, and argued that such an understanding 
made integration ordered by federals courts unconstitutional: 
We quote President Eisenhower to show further that the general conception of 
states’ rights is something no American should take lightly.  Said Mr. Eisenhower 
in 1952:   
“The Federal Government did not create the states of this Republic.  The states 
created the Federal Government.  The creation should not supersede the creator.  
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For if the states lose their meaning, our entire system of government loses its 
meaning, and the next step is the rise of the centralized national state, in which the 
seeds of autocracy can take root and grow.” 
Historical Precedent 
 Critics of Brown sought justification in American history for their opposition to 
integration.  This opposition was another important component of the Southern doctrinal 
response.  Just as the justices of the Court consumed and made use of historical 
background on the drafting and passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1954, their 
Southern critics drew on the past to establish their chosen political actions as right and 
just.  The News-Leader presented a detailed exposition of the many cases in which other 
states “interposed” themselves between their citizens and federal actions deemed unjust. 
This discussion included not just the history of Southern resistance to federal 
influence, but also instances of Northern states resisting, including New England States 
concerning the War of 1812,  Wisconsin concerning enforcement of federal fugitive slave 
law, and Iowa concerning grants of state land to railroad companies.  On Nov. 28, 1955, 
the News-Leader argued that interposition had long been understood as a right states 
possessed inherently as part of the constitutional system of dual sovereignty: 
We may note, in concluding this brief sketch of challenges to the Supreme 
Court’s authority, this aspect of the story:  Georgia defied the court in the 1790s, 
refused to obey its orders, and remained in the Union as a loyal, and obedient 
State in every other regard.  So, too, did Wisconsin 60 years later defy the court, 
refuse to obey its orders, and remain in the Union as a loyal and obedient State in 
every other regard.  So, too did Iowa, in the 1870s and 1880s, defy the court, 
refuse to obey its orders, and remain in the Union as a loyal and obedient State in 




The Meridian, Mississippi newspaper also sought support for resistance to integration in 
American history, in this case referencing Andrew Jackson’s defiance of Chief Justice 
John Marshall’s ruling on the rights of Indian tribes: 
Judges - like [the] rest of folks - should correct mistakes—Or reverse own 
unenforceable and/or erroneous findings.  Again we return to the stand of good 
he-man Andy Jackson…grand old patron saint of real democracy.  Senility has 
rules; let judges enforce senile ruling!  Democratic “Old Hickory” has set historic 
pattern.  And modern “us” may well wisely follow suit! 
 
Resistance to federally-ordered integration is presented as not just good public policy, but 
as the proper functioning of the constitutional system, and supported by the action of 
Jackson in the 1830s. 
Power of Governing Institutions 
 The Judicialized response to Brown, which consisted partly of doctrine-like 
arguments made on newspaper editorials pages, often concerns the proper extent of the 
power of governing institutions like Congress, state governments, and federal courts.  
The doctrine of states’ rights, for example, is grounded in a theory of government 
structure and function that proposes an enhanced role for states and a limited one for the 
federal government.  Many of the passages discussed above critique Brown as beyond the 
authority of federal courts, and passages discussed below that propose alterations to the 
constitutional structure also contain such critiques.  It is useful here to examine an 
exchange in the Birmingham News that was begun by a letter from S.F. Moody of 
Birmingham on June 16, 1954 about the proper application of Article 4, Section 4 of the 
U.S. Constitution, the republican guarantee clause: 
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A state is not a republic in which the ruler or group of rulers, dedicated to rule at 
will, can truly tell the subjects that the sovereignty resides in himself or the group 
possessed with the powers to rule.  Likewise, when the court directs social 
problems and abolishes traditions in the name of law when there is no law 
covering such matters, there is a complete denial of a republican form of 
government. 
 
Moody’s letter, arguing for a more restrained role for courts, drew a response from 
Charles M. Kidd of Birmingham, who argued on June 22 that 
The Supreme Court of the United States is given complete power to exercise the 
law in connection with our Constitution, and concerning any action which will in 
the long run improve our country . . .  Could we venture so far as to say that our 
republic is downfalling?  Certainly not, but we could say and should say that our 
republic is even strengthened by this decision abolishing segregation. 
 
This exchange is indicative of the kind of debate stimulated by the Supreme Court with 
its Brown decision, in particular a discussion of the proper extent of the power of federal 
courts.  This kind of discussion, about the constitutional arguments for and against 
integration as well as policy arguments, increased in frequency after Brown. 
Proposed Constitutional Revision 
 Brown v. Board of Education stimulated in some Southern citizens a desire to 
remake the constitutional system, and to express support for such a transformation in 
print.  A common subject for suggestion was to alter how Supreme Court justices are 
chosen.  R.R. Johnson of Blackstone, VA wrote in the Richmond News-Leader on June 
10, 1955 that popular election would be a useful and just alternative to presidential 
appointment, which he likens to the leadership structure of communist nations: 
That there are nine men in this country in whose appointment to office the voters 
have had no voice whatsoever, who assume that they are the law - that with a 
word or stroke of the pen they can negate any or all legislation, both State and 
Federal, enacted by chosen representatives of the people - is a fact that should 
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spur every citizen of the United States, regardless of race, into immediate action 
to put those fools in their respective places.  If the Constitution is no more stable 
than are the minds of the present members of the Supreme Court, then God help 
us!  That document should be re-written and make its members, as are the 
President and members of Congress, subject to election by the people.  The 
founders of this nation didn’t fight, bleed and die to establish a politburo to 
enslave men but rather to destroy all dictatorial authority and give to every man 
his inalienable right to freedom. 
 
This passage also is an example of the use of other frames, in this case Religious and 
Cold War, and of the combination of historical argument with suggestions for changes to 
the constitution. 
Along with selection by appointment, the lack of previous judicial experience by 
many of the Supreme Court justices provoked criticism and calls for revision.  The 
Florence, South Carolina newspaper argued on July 3, 1955 that the South should lead a 
national drive to mandate previous judicial experience as a prerequisite for service on the 
high court: 
Our section of the country has always led in the traditions of the Constitution and 
love of Constitutional law.  The Court is getting away from the proper 
interpretation of the Constitution, and the South now has the proper motive and 
cue for action to bring the Court back into line.  This could be done through a 
Constitutional Amendment that should be accepted to all.  It would be acceptable 
because it would strengthen the integrity of the nation’s tribunal.    
 
Only those with experience and ability as lawyers, trial court judges and judges of 
appeals court should be nominated.  Each man nominated should be held in high 
esteem by the members of this profession. 
 
Our section will be able to do little about the decision that has been made; but it 
could lead in a movement of reform to protect what is left of the Constitution. 
 
The Meridian, Mississippi newspaper, citing the advocacy of their junior senator, 
seconded this notion on September 23, 1956.  Likely referring to the power of Congress 




Never before in history has respect for the United States Supreme Court reached 
such a low ebb.  Certainly Congress should take the initiative in an effort to 
change the political plum nature of Supreme Court appointments, making judicial 
experience – as was first advocated by Mississippi Senator John Stennis – on a 
court of respective level, a prerequisite to service on the nation’s highest bench, 
the Supreme Court. 
  
 Taken together, these many instances of constitutional argumentation constitute 
the production and presentation of Southern white social/political doctrine.  That doctrine 
was not created by the Supreme Court; it was at times evident in editorials before May of 
1954, and certainly had roots in the Founding and Civil War.  But the Court’s challenge 
to Southern social institutions and customs motivated the defenders of segregation to 
argue publicly in defense of their social system, and to make that argument in 
constitutional terms.  Southern editorialists and writers of letters became advocates of a 
particular theory of constitutionality, and they advocated their position in the public 
forum of newspaper editorial pages. 
 This greater focus on constitutionality, and the increased frequency of discussion 
of race, are at minimum strongly associated and correlated with Brown.  I argue that the 
timing and substantive orientation of this quantitative and qualitative shift in the Southern 
discussion of race support the claim that Brown caused the transformation.  The decision 
had an effect outside of the judicial system, and that affect took the form of 
judicialization, with the Court remaking political conflict in a manner consistent with its 
institutional identity as a Court. 
 The broader consequences of Brown for Southern elections and American politics 
are the subject of Chapters 4 and 5, but it is useful here to point to one broader 
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implication of the Court’s opinion.  By stimulating increased debate on a given issue, and 
transforming debate on that issue, the Court can alter politics outside of the direct 
intended recipients of its decisions.  This broad transformative role of the Court is 
significant to the scholarship of American Political Development, which is concerned 
with historical patterns and institutional change.  The backlash against Brown activated in 
Southern whites a defense of what Rogers Smith and Desmond King have called the 
white supremacist political order in America.  Since its decisions were presented as 
authoritative statements of what kind of government action is constitutionally 
permissible, the Supreme Court is particularly able to reveal and activate the values and 



















Table 1:  Editorials and Letters to the Editor by Newspaper 
 Number of Race  
Editorials, 1950-56 
Number of Race  
Letters, 1950-56  
Richmond News-Leader 188 572 
Birmingham News 105 210 
Florence(SC)  Morning News 250 n/a 
Meridian (MS) Star 72 8 
Bryan (TX) Eagle 33 n/a 
















































































Table 3:  Frequency of editorials, before and after Brown,  













































Table 4:  Frequency of letters to the editor, 
before and after Brown 
 Total Letters Letters 
Per Month 








































Table 5:  Frequency of letters to the editor, before and after Brown,  
without Richmond News-Leader 
 Total Letters Letters 
per month 








































Table 6:  Race Editorials Using  
Constitutional Frame by Year 
Year Const. Total % Const. 
June 1950 – 
April 1951 
26 69 38% 
May 1951 –  
April 1952 
12 57 22% 
May 1952 –  
April 1953 
2 38 5% 
May 1953 –  
April 1954 
10 52 19% 
May 1954 –  
April 1955 
47 105 45% 
May 1955 –  
April 1956 
93 189 49% 
May 1956 –  
Nov 1956 
63 136 46% 

























Table 7:  Percent of Editorials that use Constitutional Frame, 









50 218 23% 
After 
Brown 



































Table 8:  Percent of Editorials that use Constitutional Frame, 









17 165 10% 
After 
Brown 



































Table 9:  Race Letters to the Editor Using  
Constitutional Frame by Year 
Year Const. Total % Const. 
June 1950 – 
April 1951 
1 21 5% 
May 1951 –  
April 1952 
4 24 2% 
May 1952 –  
April 1953 
5 17 29% 
May 1953 –  
April 1954 
13 32 41% 
May 1954 –  
April 1955 
100 173 58% 
May 1955 –  
April 1956 
215 381 56% 
May 1956 –  
Nov 1956 
63 129 49% 
Total 401 790 51% 
Note:  The first year contains only 11 months,  























Table 10:  Percent of Letters that use Constitutional Frame, 









23 107 21% 
After 
Brown 



































Table 11:  Percent of Letters that use Constitutional Frame, 
before and after Brown, without Richmond News-Leader 
 Constitutional 
Letters 




1 34 3% 
After 
Brown 



































Table 12:  Number of Editorials that use Constitutional Frames,  
Compared to Other Frames 
  Constitutional 
 
Economic Religious Cold War 
Before Brown  50 12 4 5 





































Table 13:  Number of Letters to the Editor that use  
Constitutional Frames, Compared to Other Frames 
  Constitutional 
 
Economic Religious Cold War 
Before Brown  23 9 14 4 

































Chapter 3:  Race and Brown’s Effect:  Discussion of Race in Black 
Newspapers 
 White Americans occupy much of the story of transformation from regionalized 
legal segregation before Brown v. Board of Education to a national legal commitment to 
equality in 1964.  White politicians protected segregation both regionally and nationally 
before and after the Supreme Court outlawed public school segregation, and white 
politicians voted to make integration a national standard with the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  
While the previous and succeeding chapters are concerned with the role of Brown in this 
transformation of white politics and white-led government, this chapter is concerned with 
reaction to the Supreme Court decision among blacks.  It continues the empirical focus of 
Chapter 2, examining political debate before and after Brown. 
 In this chapter I examine editorials from three African-American-oriented 
newspapers:  The Atlanta Daily World, The Birmingham World, and The Chicago 
Defender.  A sample of editorials from 1952, 1954 and 1956 illuminate the substance of 
argument about race and politics in the black11 community in the 1950s, and the effect of 
Brown on that argument.  It also shows similarities and differences between black and 
white reactions to the decision, and contributes to a broader understanding of the 
relationship between national political institutions and black politics. 
                                                 
11 In order to maintain stylistic consistency, I use the term “black,” to refer to Americans of African 
descent.  I do not use “Negro” or “colored” because these terms have fallen out of general usage, and in 
contemporary language are often considered derogatory, unless as part of the name of an established 
organization like the National Association of Colored People or the United Negro College Fund.  I use 
black to mean what Negro meant in the 1950s, and retain the word Negro in quotations.  I use black instead 
of “African-American” only to be consistent, and whenever I use the term black it is meant to be 
synonymous with the contemporary usage of African-American.  The use of the term black is not meant to 
implicate the political and social contestation that surrounded the movement of accepted terminology from 
Negro or colored to black, and then partially from black to African-American.  
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 The first part of this chapter discusses quantitative findings from black 
newspapers in the 1950s, comparing attention to race and constitutional issues before and 
after the Brown decision.  The second part examines the argumentative content presented 
in black newspaper editorials, and argues that it fits the broader judicialization pattern 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.  The final section discusses how the black reaction to 
Brown fits into the pattern of dialectical change that I argue Brown contributed to in the 
Civil Rights era. 
Data and Methods 
 This chapter, like Chapter 2, is concerned with assessing the empirical effect of a 
Supreme Court decision.  I use opinion from black newspapers12 to establish whether a 
Supreme Court decision has a measurable impact outside the judicial system.  My 
analysis of editorials from three black newspapers in the 1950s finds the same type of 
judicialization effect as found in white-oriented newspaper of the same period.  Editorials 
after Brown are more likely to make constitutional arguments, and to adopt a 
constitutional frame, than before Brown.  The number of editorials concerned with race 
generally, however, does not increase after the Supreme Court decision.  This lack of 
increase likely is a result of the importance of race to black newspaper editors before 
Brown, which made an increase in frequency less likely. 
                                                 
12 I here use the term “black newspapers” to refer to newspapers that are chiefly oriented to the black 
community, and reach mainly black readers.  The term should not be read to mean that the staff or 
readership of black newspapers was made up only of blacks, or that no blacks read mainly white-oriented 
newspapers like The Birmingham News.  I focus on black newspapers as a group because of their similarity 
of orientation and readership. 
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 My data source for this chapter is three black newspapers that published 
continuously in the period under review, 1950-56.  I chose the Atlanta Daily World, the 
Birmingham World, and the Chicago Defender.  These three papers were chosen partly 
because of availability.  Complete collections of black newspapers from the 1950s are 
rare, and completeness is necessary for the type of analysis undertaken here.  The two 
major sources of microfilm archival copies of newspapers, the Library of Congress and 
the Center for Research Libraries, have limited collections of black newspapers.  Also 
many black newspapers publish only weekly, and like many small town white 
newspapers have infrequent editorial comment.  The three papers only infrequently 
published letters to the editor, so I focus here on editorials. 
 The papers from Birmingham and Atlanta were chosen because of their location 
in the south, because they published either twice per week (Birmingham) or daily 
(Atlanta), and published editorials every issue.  The Defender was chosen even though it 
is not a Southern paper, but based in Chicago.  The Defender provided a third source for 
black newspaper data, expanding the data set.  Including the Defender in this study also 
fits because of the connections between blacks across regions, and the connections 
between black politics nationally and Southern regional politics.  The growing black 
population of Northern and Western states was mainly drawn from the South, and thus 
Northern blacks retained social and political connections to their ancestral region.  The 
Chicago Defender helped to maintain those connections, circulating throughout the 
nation, in particular through the efforts of black porters serving Pullman rail sleeper cars. 
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By the early 1920s, northern Negro papers, sent by mail, bus, and train, had 
reached deep into the South.  The Chicago Defender, with a circulation of more 
than 150,000, was selling more than two thirds of its copies outside Chicago.13 
 
This southern connection and circulation supports the inclusion of the Defender in this 
study.  Including the Chicago-based paper expands the data set beyond the only two 
Southern black newspapers that are available for the entirety of the period under review. 
 In analyzing black newspaper opinion, I utilized a sampling method chosen to 
identify data that could help illuminate the effect of Brown.  A sampling method is 
necessary because of the prevalence of the discussion of race in black newspapers.  While 
Southern white newspapers were concerned with racial issues, race was not the subject of 
the majority of editorials, and many issues had no discussion of race, segregation or civil 
rights at all.  Black newspapers were the opposite, with almost every issue containing 
editorial coverage of race.   
 In order to gather a meaningful sample of black newspaper opinion 1950-56, I 
sampled time periods before and after the Brown decision was handed down.  Instead of 
using a random sample, which might miss entirely the occurrence of important arguments 
about race or constitutional issues, I used a kind of purposive sampling method that drew 
upon known attributes of the data set.  My strategy was to sample time periods before and 
after Brown that were substantially similar, and would likely show difference in argument 
if those differences existed.  One obvious set of paired, similar time periods were the 
weeks immediately preceding the Supreme Court decision, and the weeks immediately 
after the decision.  I sampled the two months before May 17, 1954, and the two after. 
                                                 
13 Roberts and Klibanoff 16. 
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 I also took advantage of the occurrence of the presidential nominating 
conventions of the two major political parties, since Brown occurred between the 
elections of 1952 and 1956.  The similarity of the two periods is increased because in 
both years the Republicans nominated Dwight Eisenhower, and the Democrats Adlai 
Stevenson.  On the Democratic side two of Stevenson’s major competitors, Estes 
Kefauver and Averell Harriman, ran both in 1952 and in 1956.  The nominating 
conventions stimulated discussion and editorial comment in black newspapers.  The 
substantive connection between electoral politics and race provided me two similar 
periods to sample, and their substantive similarities reduces the likelihood that 
differences over time are unrelated to Brown, and instead arise from particular 
characteristics of the two time periods. 
 I used the same coding procedure as in Chapter 2.  I first selected all editorials in 
the chosen time period that mentioned race.  Editorials were considered race editorials if 
they mentioned race or racial issues specifically, if they spoke of either Negro or colored 
people, or of white people.  Editorials also were classified as race editorials if they 
discussed civil rights or civil rights public policy. 
 After selecting all race editorials, I then coded for the existence of a constitutional 
frame, or constitutional argument.  I coded an editorial as constitutional if it mentioned 
the constitution, the Supreme Court, or discussed the power of particular parts of 





 Just as in Chapter 3, I am interested in the change or lack of change that occurred 
in editorials discussing race after Brown v. Board of Education was decided on May 17, 
1954.  Coding editorials helps to establish whether attention to racial issues increased 
after the decision, and if discussion of constitutional issues was more prevalent within the 
post-decision race discussion.  The three newspapers studied yield enough data about 
race to draw conclusions about the effect the Supreme Court had on discussion of race in 
media available to American blacks.  The Birmingham, Atlanta, and Chicago newspapers 
yielded a total of 187 editorials, taken from six months of total coverage in 1952, 1954, 
and 1956.  Table 14 presents the number of editorials by newspaper, with attention to 
race common in all three. 
 Unlike in the mainly white newspapers discussed in Chapter 2, the three black 
newspapers did not show an increase in discussion of racial issues after the Brown 
decision.  The total number of editorials after the decision is actually slightly lower after 
the decision than before, dropping from 95 to 92.  The fact that these totals are nearly 
identical shows a difference between black and white newspapers in the effect of Brown.   
The lack of change in frequency in the black papers likely results from the greater 
focus of those newspapers on racial issues in general.  As media that served a community 
of citizens who were discriminated against based on their race, black newspapers focused 
on race to a degree only rarely seen in white papers.  Brown and other civil rights events 
like the direct action protests or the killing of Emmett Till were not necessary to stimulate 
sustained interest in race, as they were in white papers.  In their study of news coverage 
of the Southern civil rights movement, Roberts and Klibanoff note that mainstream 
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white-oriented news organizations like the New York Times and CBS News began in the 
1950s to cover issues that had long been the primary focus of black newspapers: 
Long after white papers had turned to coverage of general-interest news, their 
Negro counterparts remained loud, clear instruments of protest, by turns educative 
and provocative.  And for virtually all of their history into the 1950s, they had the 
race story all to themselves.14 
 
This orientation toward coverage of and protest against racial discrimination motivated 
not only reporters, but editorial writers as well.  Thus the Supreme Court did not 
stimulate a greater focus on race by black newspapers, but merely shifted that focus to 
more constitutional issues. 
 The lack of increase in race editorials after Brown may also be due to one 
particular component of this continuous focus on race.  The various segregation cases 
making their way through the federal court system were often discussed on the editorial 
pages of black newspapers before the Court issued a decision in 1954.  Thus there was 
significant discussion of the cases that would make up Brown in the days leading up to 
the decision’s release.   
The only one of the white papers that showed such a pre-Brown focus was the 
Florence, South Carolina Morning News, which focused on the Clarendon County, South 
Carolina desegregation case (which was one of the companion cases of the Topeka, 
Kansas case) as it worked its way through the federal court system.  The Florence paper 
was the only one of the five examined in Chapter 3 that did not more than double its 
frequency of race editorials after the Supreme Court’s decision, although the number did 
increase.  Race was present in black newspapers constantly, in a manner only seen in 
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white papers after a major event or an event that occurred geographically close to the 
newspaper’s coverage area. 
The portion of race editorials that also discussed constitutional issues, however, 
increased after May 17, 1954.  Table 15 shows that of the four periods analyzed, the two 
with the lowest percentages of constitutional discussion were before Brown, the two 
highest were after the decision.  I also combined the two periods before the decision with 
the two periods after the decision.  Since each group includes one period containing the 
major party nominating convention and one period from April – June 1954, comparison 
can reveal the pattern or lack of pattern in race discussion before and after the decision.  
The Birmingham, Atlanta, and Chicago papers used a constitutional frame in only 16% of 
editorials before the decision, and 46% after the Court ruled for integration in schools.  
With attention to constitutional issues nearly tripling after the decision, the data supports 
the claim that a major Supreme Court decision can have an effect on political debate 
consistent with the judicialization model discussed in previous chapters. 
Textual Findings 
 While black newspaper editorial pages did not increase their focus on race after Brown, 
owing to the fact that an editorial on a racial issue appeared in nearly every edition, 
editorials did move to a more sustained discussion of constitutional issues implicated by 
racial discrimination.  In this section I will first discuss the kinds of constitutional 
argument offered by black newspapers, and then discuss how the post-Brown discussion 
of race fits into the broader group empowerment narrative that ran throughout black 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 Roberts and Klibanoff 13. 
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editorial writing in the period.  Several themes – a call for anti-discrimination action by 
whites, identifying non-discrimination with core American values, and support for 
implementing the Supreme Court’s integration decision – together form an argument for 
including non-discrimination in the broader constitutional order.   
 Much like the white newspapers analyzed in Chapter 2, the three black 
newspapers under review here discussed race, in most cases, without a constitutional 
frame before Brown.  The struggle for racial equality was usually presented with 
reference to black empowerment, or in calls for non-discriminatory action by powerful 
whites.  On August 30, 1952, the Chicago Defender addressed their black readers, 
arguing in favor of black voting: 
Whether you know it or not, you are an important person.  If you have registered 
and met any other requirements for voting, you are even more important.  But if 
you actually cast your ballot on election day for the leaders you think are best 
qualified, you may be one of the most important persons is the world. 
 
Such general reference to the possibilities for black participation in American politics and 
society were common in all three papers. 
 Such general arguments, not making reference to the constitution or constitutional 
issues, also were directed at the white politicians and business leaders that exercised 
power over the black community.  Although there was some discussion of the 1950 
Sweatt v. Painter and Mclaurin v. Oklahoma decisions, and some discussion of the 
Brown case as it advanced through the federal court system, editorials before May 17, 
1954 tended to focus on the basic obligations of white leaders to avoid racist actions and 
demagoguery.  The Atlanta Daily World was typical of this period in arguing “there is no 
place for race baiting, the waving of the red flag and the stirring up of passion to eclipse 
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the sunlight of decent reasoning” on May 7, 1954.  Voting, voter registration, and the 
growing power of black voters were more common subjects than constitutional issues. 
 Brown v. Board of Education stimulated greater discussion of constitutional 
issues in black newspaper editorial pages.  The quantitative results presented above might 
actually understate the effect of the Supreme Court case, since it stimulated some 
editorial discussion of constitutional issues before the May 17, 1954 date of issuance.  An 
Atlanta Daily World editorial just before the decision demonstrates discussion of the 
constitutionality of government action, a core component of the judicialization model: 
Besides the moral aspects of the issue we are concerned with the real fact of 
inequality which is in conflict with our national Constitution and the policies of 
the national government.   
 
We think the time of legal segregation has expired and we think the great majority 
of the citizens can soon adjust themselves to a non-segregated situation if the 
politicians would just lead them in the right direction. 
 
This argument that the racial inequality is unconstitutional is part of the general support 
for Brown discussed below. 
 Argument about race and the constitution in black newspaper editorials is also 
grounded in particular references to American history.  In particular black papers 
incorporated the Supreme Court’s decision into a broader narrative of racial progress.  
The Atlanta Daily World wrote just after the decision on May 21, 1954: 
Let us make no mistake about the magnitude and meaning of the decision on last 
Monday.  Apparently two of the three branches of our government came to the 
conclusion that the time had come for this nation to make another great step 
toward a fuller freedom for all men - of all colors - and not only those in this 
nation, but also for those in the world at large.  Hence, what happened a few days 




Two great events in behalf of freedom have occurred since the founding of this 
nation.  The first came on January 1, 1863 when the Emancipation Proclamation 
was issued.  The other occurred Monday, May 17th, 1954.   
 
The men who are responsible for these two events will live eternally in the hearts 
of freedom loving people everywhere. 
 
This citation of historical warrant for the integration decision is the mirror image of 
references in white editorials to the states’ rights precedents set by Jefferson, Madison, 
and Calhoun.  Just as if they were lawyers engaged in constitutional appellate litigation, 
editorial writers at both black and white newspapers are acting as advocates for particular 
positions in a public argument.  The editorial is analogous to a lawyer’s brief or a 
Supreme Court amicus curiae brief. 
 Unlike James J. Kilpatrick writing in the Richmond News-Leader, the writer of a 
May 27, 1954 Atlanta Daily World editorial presented post-Civil War American history 
as a history of continuing contradiction, not as a glorious past that was interrupted by 
Brown.  In discussing Georgia Governor Herman Talmadge’s opposition to implementing 
desegregation, the World argued: 
It is deplorable for a man to be seeking the highest office in the gift of the people 
of the state, in the face of having to swear to uphold and defend the Constitution 
of the United States, and then state a platform to do the opposite. 
 
But this is in keeping with the pattern of inconsistency, as the practice of what he 
is running on has done for over 80 years 
 
This argument fuses two themes present in 1950s black newspaper editorials:  the 
existence of a fundamental right to equal treatment, and a hope that white politicians 
would recognize and protect that right. 
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 The Atlanta paper uses the oath of office taken by Governor Talmadge as a way 
of highlighting its view of the proper role of states in the American constitutional system.   
Since, according to their equal rights understanding, the constitution protects equal rights 
for all races, the governor’s oath to uphold and defend the constitution obligates him to 
protect the rights of Georgia’s black citizens: 
We are in the market for a governor for all the people.  His qualifications as such 
must measure at least up to the oath prescribed for him to take and no man 
deserves consideration for an office upon a platform against the very oath that he 
expects to take if and when he is elected governor (May 27, 1954). 
 
This integrationist and egalitarian constitutional vision was presented after the Supreme 
Court’s decision, in hopes that both federal and state governments would bring to fruition 
the constitutional vision of American blacks. 
 One particular core component of the white newspapers’ constitutional rebuttal to 
Brown, a call for some alteration in the constitution, is not present in the black newspaper 
editorial discussion.  Such an absence is understandable, since black writers were getting 
what they wanted from the Supreme Court’s exercise of judicial review.  Southern whites 
who favored segregation were receiving unwanted authoritative constitutional 
interpretation from the Court, and thus were willing to discuss amending the constitution 
to prevent future decisions. 
 Brown v. Board of Education fit into a broader narrative of black progress and 
empowerment that was presented by editorials in black newspapers.  The empowerment 
narrative contrasted the Supreme Court decisions and its correct understanding of the 
constitution with the recalcitrance of southern white politicians.  On May 19, 1954, two 
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days after the decision, the Atlanta newspaper cast the segregationist leadership of 
Georgia as fighting against the inevitable victory of racial equality under the law: 
The expressed reaction from some of the state’s top officials, if persisted in, will 
make the inevitable change slower and more difficult.  But wisdom demands that 
every responsible person should show tolerance and self-control in the present 
situation which has been created—not by the court’s decision—but by the 
unfounded doctrines that have been delivered to the people by politicians who 
have profited from exploitation of the racial issue. 
 
Unlike in white newspapers, where the defenders of the established regional racial order 
are presented as defenders of proper constitutional understanding, they are presented in 
black newspapers as self-interested actors who undermine the proper constitutional order. 
 Southern reactionaries were not the only prominent politicians that black 
newspapers judged to be acting inconsistently with the constitution.  Northern and 
national politicians received criticisms as well.  On August 25, 1956, during the 
Democratic Party convention, the Chicago Defender criticized the once and future 
Democratic presidential candidate: 
 
Democratic leaders like Adlai Stevenson and others have scoffed at the possibility 
of a wholesale defection away from the party by Negro voters.  This is relatively 
unimportant.  The question is how long a party which hedges and subjects itself to 
all kinds of mental torture over the simple matter of giving every person the rights 
guaranteed them by the Constitution can enjoy the confidence of the people. 
 
The argument for equality joins together black voting and a proper equal rights 
understanding of the constitution, in the hope that Democratic Party elected officials will 
uphold the rights found in the constitution. 
 Running throughout black newspaper editorials, both before and after Brown, is a 
hopeful vision of American politics and society organized around principles and norms of 
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equal justice under the law and equal treatment of all, irrespective of racial status.  This 
hopeful, deterministic, and even teleological understanding of American politics is 
similar to the argument of Gunnar Myrdal’s 1944 work An American Dilemma, which 
posited that an “American Creed” of liberty and equality contrasted with the 
contemporary reality of racial segregation.  The Chicago Defender turned this creed or 
vision on white politicians, arguing that “Our law-givers cannot escape their 
responsibility to uphold the fundamental tenets of liberty and the pursuit of happiness 
about which prate so much, without endangering the whole process of democracy” on 
August 4, 1956.  
 The Supreme Court’s integration decision of 1954 stood as an authoritative legal 
statement supporting the egalitarian vision of black editorialists.  Much of their rhetorical 
effort afterward was focused on how to implement the decision, especially in the face of 
white opposition.  The Birmingham News, on May 25, 1954, argued that a meeting of 
black community leaders could, and hopefully would, support the just-issued directive of 
the Court: 
 
Next Sunday, May 30 leaders from Alabama’s 67 counties are scheduled to meet 
in Montgomery for the purpose of formulating a program for first-class 
citizenship.  This is a vital and timely conference. 
 
Likely major attention will be given to building a program to implement the May 
17 United States Supreme Court decision asserting the principle of all public 
schools for all.  A formula for changing over should be earnestly sought. 
 
To obey the decision is to apply it.  Our leaders have the task of helping to 





More than two years later, on July 28, 1956, the Birmingham newspaper saw the defeat 
of a civil rights bill in the Senate15 
The irony of it is that people, living under a Constitution whose very ideals calls 
for equality, justice and equal opportunity for all, have to work and fight for those 
things already spelled out in simple terms in that Constitution.  It becomes more 
ironical when, elected officials, through selfish interests, regionalism and 
prejudice wage a fight, spending tax money to defeat that which should be 
guaranteed every citizen.   
 
The defeat of the bill leaves a strong feeling in the minds of Negro voters that 
serious consideration should be given as to the national party best qualified to 
implement Civil Rights legislations.   It is obvious that the Southern Democratic 
bloc is responsible for the bill’s recent defeat.  This same bloc was responsible for 
implementation of the Southern Manifesto, a measure purposely designed to 
circumvent the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision on public school education. 
 
Black editorialists, writing at the end of the period under study, understood the need for 
involvement by elected officials to help implement the Supreme Court’s integration 
decision. 
Conclusion:  A Black Perspective on White Backlash 
 Black editorialists showered the Brown decision with vociferous praise, and 
hailed it as a sign of positive change in race relations.  Their idealistic positive reaction, 
however, was tempered by a realistic appraisal of the potential for opposition by Southern 
whites.  The backlash that would dominate regional politics for much of the following 
decade was foreseen on the editorial pages of black newspapers.  Soon after the decision, 
on May 20, 1954, the Atlanta Daily World warned of the danger that lay behind the 
comments of white politicians: 
                                                 
15 A weaker bill passed in 1957, but substantial action by Congress in furtherance of civil rights in the 
South would not come until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
78 
 
It is clear and conclusive that the strategy of those leading the opposition against 
the decision is to attempt to create a reaction so strong that it will have an 
intimidating effect on Negro citizens.  We must by all means guard against such a 
shrewd maneuver. 
 
Black editorialists were aware that implementation of the decision depended on white 
politicians acting against their normal patterns.  The Atlanta paper, on May 28, 1954, 
seized on calls for calm by Governor James Byrnes of South Carolina: 
 
The background of Governor Byrnes is strictly southern.  The decision would 
involve all that is against the grange of his tradition and heritage; still he implores, 
“I earnestly urge all of our people, white and colored, to exercise restraint and 
preserve order.” 
 
It is notable that the writer focused on the comments of Byrnes, who was not supportive 
of black civil rights in his earlier career, and at the time was continuing an effort to 
counteract the Court’s decision that he had been attempting since the Clarendon County 
desegregation case was first filed. 
 The hope for restraint in opposing the Supreme Court’s decision, or even for 
support of it, by white politicians drove much of post-Brown discussion in black 
newspapers.  The decision activated a doctrinal argument that was previously implicit or 
infrequently expressed in black newspaper editorials, that the constitution rightly 
interpreted forbade the Southern practice of racial segregation.  The call for support for 
Brown by white politicians was the mirror image of white paper’s call for local and 
national resistance to the Court’s decision.  On June 5, 1954, the Defender presented 
Brown as beginning a time of testing for the white politicians that maintained the racial 
monopoly on political power in the South: 
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The school decision and the others which have followed are a challenge to the 
political leadership of the South.   
 
From the unintelligent manner in which many have reacted to the situation, it is 
our guess that they will be repudiated sooner than might otherwise have occurred.   
 
The new era ushered in by these decisions calls for a leadership far different from 
that which has dominated the South in the past.  If the present leaders can’t meet 
the challenge they are doomed.   
 
It’s up to them. 
 
Two years later, on June 16, 1956 , the Chicago paper foresaw the pattern of events that 
would, after the Birmingham and Selma demonstrations led to the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, eventually bring about equal rights under the law.  In 
discussing the reaction of white municipal politicians and the influence of the 
institutionalized backlash groups called Citizens Councils, presaged the kind of conflict 
that in Birmingham and Selma would spark a dialectical change process that would 
eventually lead to action by the other branches of the national government in support of 
the constitutional vision of Brown. 
More than likely, the commissioners at the behest of the White Citizens Councils 
will come up with some kind of interposition to overrule the Federal District 
Court.   
 
This kind of defiance is going to inevitably end in some law enforcement officer 
running head on into the law and leaving himself open for prosecution.   
 









Table 14:  Editorials in Three Black Newspapers,  
June-July 1952, April 15-June 15 1954, June-July 1956 
Newspaper Number of Race  
Editorials, 1950-56 
Birmingham World 39 
Atlanta Daily World 76 




































Table 15:  Race Editorials Using  
Constitutional Frame by Time Period, Black Newspapers 
Time Period Total Const. % Const. 
June-July 1952 71 7 10% 
April 15- 
May 17 1954  
24 8 33% 
May 18 –  
June 15 1954 
42 22 52% 


































Table 16:  Race Editorials Using  
Constitutional Frame Before and After Brown 
Time Period Total Const. % Const. 
Pre-Brown 95 15 16% 






















Chapter 4:  The Supreme Court, White Backlash, and Southern 
Elections in the 1950s 
 This chapter examines the effect of Brown on Southern elections in the 1950s.   
After discussing the general pattern of Southern elections in the periods before and after 
Brown, I trace the decision’s impact on the careers of four elected officials of national 
significance:  James Byrnes of South Carolina, Orville Faubus of Arkansas, and George 
Wallace and Eugene (Bull) Connor of Alabama.  The electoral and political success of 
these politicians, often because of their militant segregationist rhetoric and policies, 
shows the changed context of Southern politics after the Supreme Court’s integration 
decision.  The chapter closes by placing the backlash to Brown in the context of the 
process of social and political change that culminated in the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 
the 1965 Voting Rights Act. 
 Analysis of the careers of Southern politicians in the 1950s makes clear the 
significance of the backlash to Brown and Brown II in 1954 and 1955.  The backlash to 
the Court decisions is not only significant because it was an attempt to thwart the 
integrationist will of the national high court that succeeded for over a decade, or because 
it dominated the rhetoric and results of Southern electoral campaigns.  The reaction to 
Brown was particularly significant because it marked a sharp break from a progressive 
and comparatively racially tolerant period of Southern white politics in the early 1950s.  
The careers of politicians like Byrnes, Connor, Wallace, and Faubus illustrate the kind of 
campaigns and policy strategies that were successful in the post-Brown period, and the 
kinds of politicians who gained popular support as a result of backlash to the Court. 
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 Focus on these four politicians demonstrates the particular effect backlash to the 
Court had upon Southern politics, and the contribution of that backlash to the pro-
integration shifts of the 1960s.  This chapter starts from an assumption that the national 
government became involved in the struggle for civil rights when prompted by the black 
civil rights movement.  The most prominent and successful part of that movement used 
nonviolent action to highlight the legal inequities of Southern society.  This process of 
national agenda-setting through nonviolent protest required the participation of 
segregationist politicians.  The decisions of those politicians to oppose the movement for 
black civil rights with the coercive and violent powers of their offices were crucial to the 
change process that led to national legislation and executive branch action against legal 
segregation.  This chapter explores the effect of the Supreme Court on this change 
process by identifying the role of Brown in the careers of particular Southern politicians.  
If the men who used the powers of their offices to symbolically and violently oppose 
integration gained those offices partly because of the backlash to Brown, then the 
decision contributed to social change in the area of civil rights.  Such a finding would 
calls into question Gerald Rosenberg’s claim that the Supreme Court did little to bring 
about integration, but support his argument that courts can only bring about social change 
when the broader political context supports court-initiated change.   
The chapter ends with an argument for broadening the understanding of Supreme 
Court impact to include participation in a dialectical change process.  I argue that 
Rosenberg’s skeptical view of Supreme Court impact does not take into account crucial 
specific characteristics of the backlash to court-mandated integration.  Analysis of 
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Southern newspaper opinion in Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrates that even an unpopular 
decision like Brown that does not immediately bring compliance with its vision of the 
Constitution can bring about observable changes, in this case increasing the use of 
constitutional argumentative frames.   Brown also brought a specific observable shift in 
electoral politics, helping to define the path of civil rights policy change.   
 Discussion of the careers of Wallace, Connor, Faubus and Byrnes identifies three 
significant components of the post-Brown backlash.  The careers of Wallace and Connor 
show how state-level backlash could support or hinder candidates for office based on 
their connections to the politics of race.  The rise of Faubus during and after the Little 
Rock crisis is an example of how backlash to court-ordered integration created a new 
opportunity structure for elected officials who were able to modify their politics to fit the 
new politics of militancy.  The career of Byrnes, while less central to the narrative of civil 
rights in national politics, highlights the strength of Southern elites in national politics.  
The narrative analysis of the four politicians below focuses mainly on their campaigns 
and service in elected office before they came to prominence as opponents of civil rights 
for non-whites.   This allows me to identify possible effects of the backlash to Brown on 
Southern politics, as expressed in election outcomes.  
Southern Politics Before and After Brown v. Board of Education 
While I chose these four politicians for discussion because of their prominence in 
the clashes of the period, they are representative examples of the electoral politics of the 
post-WWII South.  The shift from relative moderation to militant segregationism after 
Brown and its progeny was the most common pattern in Southern elections of the period.  
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The backlash affected the career arcs of politicians differently based on their pre-1954 
record in office and on the campaign trail, as well as the status of their political career 
when backlash to the Supreme Court hit their state.16  These four politicians, and most 
successful Southern politicians of the period, built a record in campaigns and office of 
opposition to integration.  In the post-integration period that lies beyond the scope of this 
study, they also are representative of the politics of the South as the one-party 
Democratic dominance was fading.  Faubus would unsuccessfully campaign for governor 
within the racially inclusive Democratic Party of Arkansas, losing comeback races for 
governor in 1972 and 1986.  George Wallace ran for president once as an independent in 
1968, and three times as a defender of racial conservatism in the Democratic presidential 
primaries.  Meanwhile he dropped explicitly segregationist appeals from his 
gubernatorial campaigns and policies, getting enough black votes to prevent serious 
Republican challenge in his later races.  Bull Connor left local politics when his position 
was eliminated in 1963 Birmingham government reorganization, but continued his 
opposition to integration of the national Democratic Party as National Committeeman 
and delegate to the Democratic National Convention.  James Byrnes in his retirement 
supported Richard Nixon for president in 1960 and 1968, helping to deliver the state to 
the Republican.  
                                                 
16 Although the precise date of May 17, 1954 provides a useful break point to structure analysis of public 
communication, like the newspaper opinion discussed in Chapter 2, analysis of elections and behavior in 
office must take account of the more complex process by which the Court’s decision activated a backlash in 
electoral politics.   The impact on elections was tied closely to the pace of implementation of the 1954 
ruling.  Thus much of the backlash occurred after the 1955 implementation decision, or when a federal 
court ordered integration of a particular local public school or state university.  Court-ordered integration 
became a real possibility in Alabama in 1956 with the attempt of Autherine Lucy to enter the University of 
Alabama, and backlash then began in earnest. 
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Before the Goldwater Republicanism of the 1960s brought two-party competition 
to the former confederacy, Southern electoral politics was conducted almost entirely 
within the confines of the Democratic Party.  Southern whites supported the party of their 
father and grandfathers as a bulwark against hostile federal intervention that would 
challenge white supremacy in Southern states.17  Republican success in the region was 
limited to Appalachian mountain areas like Western North Carolina and Eastern 
Tennessee18 that were opposed to secession and civil war in the nineteenth century, and 
still voted for the GOP out of ancestral loyalties.  In 1950 the Republican Party only 
elected two out of 106 House members from the eleven former Confederate states, both 
from East Tennessee.   Conflict and disagreement over economic issues, which would be 
resolved in other parts of the country in the general election, were instead contested in 
Southern Democratic primaries. 
 At the time of Brown v. Board of Education, presidential voting in the South was 
the one exception to the Democratic dominance of campaigns and elections.  Dwight 
Eisenhower carried four peripheral Southern states19 – Texas, Tennessee, Virginia and 
                                                 
17 Key argues that “there is one, and only one, real basis for southern unity: the Negro” (315). 
18 Other parts of the South that did not support cotton agriculture or have a significant black population, 
like Northwestern Arkansas or Southwestern Virginia, would occasionally elect Republicans.  These 
pockets of strength could not support statewide two-party competition. See Key pp. 277-97.  
19 The terms Peripheral South and Deep South are taken from the literature on Southern politics to 
differentiate sub-groups within the region based on their demographic characteristics.  The Deep South 
includes Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina, due to their large black populations 
and historical dependence on cotton agriculture.  The Peripheral Southern States – Texas, Arkansas, 
Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina and Florida – all have lower black populations and a more 
differentiated economic history.  The term “Upper South” is sometimes used, but does not capture Florida.  
Some authors use “Rim South” to mean the same thing as Peripheral South (see Earl Black 1976, Black and 
Black 1987, Bartley and Graham 1975, Bass and DeVries 1976). 
 In this work the terms Peripheral South and Deep South refer to demographic groupings, not to 
classifications based on behavior or adherence to the norms of segregation.  Consequently Virginia is not 
temporarily reclassified as a Deep South state because of its massive resistance to integration in the 
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Florida.   This variation from the norm of solid Democratic voting in presidential 
elections was the second time in the twentieth century that a characteristic of one of the 
presidential candidates could capture electoral votes in the peripheral South, where 
maintenance of white supremacy through support for the Democratic Party was 
comparatively less important.  Republican Herbert Hoover in 1924 took advantage of 
backlash to Democratic candidate Al Smith’s Catholicism to win five Southern states.  
Similarly, Eisenhower’s military background and role in the Allied victory in WWII 
helped to make the GOP candidate competitive in the region, while he was achieving a 
landslide victory in the rest of the country.  The former general had very weak coattails, 
however, and was unable to alter the fundamental patterns of Southern voting.  In 1952 
Republicans only added five House seats to the two they already held from East 
Tennessee.  Eisenhower’s landslide elections in 1952 and 1956 resulted in no Republican 
Senators or Governors from the region. 
 The 1948 Dixiecrat revolt did result in Strom Thurmond winning the electoral 
votes of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and South Carolina.  The third party run likely 
cost the Truman-led Democratic ticket popular and electoral votes, and began the process 
of shifting of Deep Southern white votes that culminated in Barry Goldwater’s sweep of 
the Deep South in 1964.20  The Dixiecrat campaign is best understood as a protest within 
                                                                                                                                                 
immediate post-Brown period. Its intransigence, which departed from the pattern of moderation evident in 
other Peripheral Southern States in the pre-Little Rock period, shows the variation present within sub-
groupings.      
20Joseph Lowndes argues that the shift of white southern voters to abandon the Democratic Party was 
connected to the deliberate actions of leaders of the Dixiecrat revolt who later worked to rhetorically link 
the northern liberal wing of the Democratic Party with black insurgents and violent crime. 
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the Democratic Party structure.21   Thurmond and Mississippi Governor Fielding Wright 
both remained in the Democratic Party after the 1948 presidential election, with 
Thurmond waiting until passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to make his switch to the 
GOP.  The Dixiecrat Party only won electoral votes in states where Thurmond “ran under 
the rooster,” as the designate Democratic Party nominee for president.  The Rooster 
symbol was significant because of its long use to signify the Democratic line on Southern 
ballots, and as a voting cue for illiterate voters.  The incumbent President Truman was 
not even on the ballot in Alabama, as Dixiecrats temporarily captured the state party 
apparatus and there existed no provision in state law for getting an independent candidate 
on the ballot. 
 Even if it could not always deliver all the region’s electoral votes to the 
presidential candidate chosen at the Democratic National Convention, the Southern 
Democratic Party in the early 1950s was uniformly successful at two electoral tasks:  
electing U.S. Senators and Congressmen who were committed to upholding white 
supremacy, and running a segregated white primary that was the only vehicle for election 
to statewide and most local offices.  The Democratic Party was an institution that owed 
its monopoly status to support for white supremacy, but was tasked with producing 
elected officials who would produce public policies that dealt with all the other issues of 
politics and society.  In the post-Brown area that was dominated by anti-integrationist 
backlash, maintaining white supremacy would push aside contestation on economic and 
                                                 
21 Key points out that Thurmond ran best in black-belt areas that were traditionally strongest in their 
support for Democratic presidential candidates.  These areas, like the Delta region in Mississippi, had been 
least affected by the pro-Republican shift in southern voting in 1928 (329).  See Ader 1955 for a 
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other issues.  But in the period before the Supreme Court decision, the place of white 
supremacy in Southern elections was more complex.  Southern members of Congress, 
especially Senators, would be elected and reelected so that they could prevent the passage 
of national legislation threatening Jim Crow segregation.  While nearly unified on issues 
of race, the Southern congressional delegation was quite varied on other issues.  
Governors, however, were usually elected in the immediate pre-Brown period based on 
their appeals on economic issues. 
 Democratic primaries in the early 1950s for governor, and for other statewide and 
local offices, existed within a space protected from federal interference in matters of race.  
Several facets of the political system, while not overtly supportive of segregation, 
operated to protect the prerogatives of white southern citizens from possible integrationist 
federal legislation.  For example, bicameralism benefitted an organized group of 
legislators who wanted to stop legislation favored by a majority of their colleagues.  
Southerners held positions of power in both houses, giving them several opportunities in 
the early and middle twentieth century to block even federal anti-lynching legislation. 
 In particular, seniority norms in Congress benefited southern incumbents, 
regularly granting them positions as chairmen of standing committees.22  The structure of 
party competition after the 1896 realignment benefitted Southerners in the decades-long 
quest for a chairman’s gavel.  The electoral system in the United States, while operating 
under a single set of constitutional rules and structures, was actually two separate but 
                                                                                                                                                 
contemporaneous discussion of the failure of the Dixiecrat movement to fundamentally alter the Southern 
Democratic Party. 
22 Key 346. 
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related systems that selected members of Congress.  The Southern system would only 
produce Democratic senators, and almost entirely Democratic congressmen.  Thus the 
main limitation on Southern members of Congress’s length of service was their life 
expectancy. 
 Non-Southern members of Congress were sent to Washington from a very 
different system.  The Democratic Party of the North was forced to compete with the 
Republican Party, and thus non-southern Democratic members of Congress could lose 
their seats.  Even after the New Deal realignment of 1932, the GOP often gained several 
House and Senate seats, as it did in 1938, 1942, 1946, 1950, and 1952.  Each of these 
elections eliminated several Northern Democratic congressmen and senators from the 
slow-moving quest for committee chairmanships, but left their Southern rivals in office.  
Even when the Northern Democratic Party recovered many of those seats in 1948 or 
1954, the new arrivals would start at the back of the line behind the electorally 
bulletproof Southerners. 
 In the post-New Deal period in which Democrats would hold the majority for all 
but four years, Southern Democrats controlled more than their proportional share of 
chairmanships.  At the time of Brown in 1954 two chairmen were of particular 
importance.  Howard Smith of Virginia chaired the House Rules Committee, which set 
the terms by which a bill could be debated and voted on23.  James Eastland of Mississippi 
                                                 
23 Shickler (2001) discusses how Smith gained his position on the committee as an afterthought after a 
leadership contest in 1933, as Smith was put on the committee as a concession prize for Sam Rayburn’s 
unsuccessful faction.  Smith eventually combined his seniority with alliances with conservative 
Republicans to block civil rights bills in the House. 
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chaired Senate Judiciary, which became the choke point for civil rights legislation.24  
Eastland, with backing from other Southerners on the committee and conservative 
Republican allies, kept civil rights bills from coming to the floor.  He would often delay a 
bill by refusing to hold hearings on a proposed bill for months.  When he would relent 
and hold hearings, he would often refuse to let pro-civil rights Senators speak, calling 
only on his allies.25 
 These committee chairmanships would only slip from the grasp of the Southern 
defenders of segregation if Republicans gained control, which occurred in only two of the 
eleven Congresses before 1954.  Even without the chairmen’s gavels, Southerners 
possessed significant power positions.  In the Senate they could filibuster bills by holding 
their 22 Senators together and gaining ten of the remaining 78 others.  Often allies could 
be found in conservative Republicans who were either skeptical of increasing federal 
power or protective of the prerogatives of Senators in general.   
 The outsized influence of Southern senators and congressmen created a protective 
wall between the forces of racial liberalism and Jim Crow segregation.  Characteristics of 
the national government like bicameralism, seniority in committee assignments, and the 
Senate filibuster created several veto points for a united and motivated minority 
grouping.  Southerners could use these veto points to block federal civil rights legislation 
as long as they remained unified on matters of race.  In the decades preceding 1954, they 
                                                 
24 Branch (1998) notes that Eastland had killed 120 of 121 civil rights measures in the decade before the 
1964 Act (p.267). 
25 Caro 875. 
93 
 
maintained this unity, preventing passage of anti-lynching legislation, a permanent 
federal Fair Employment Practices Commission, and any general civil rights legislation. 
 This unity of purpose and behavior on issues of race blunted any possible effects 
of Brown v. Board of Education on elections for U.S. Senator and member of Congress in 
the South.  Incumbent Democrats had a record of opposing federal civil rights legislation 
that could buttress campaigns built on support for white supremacy.  Southerners in the 
Capitol took advantage of the visibility of their offices to make clear their support for 
segregation, with the Southern Manifesto of 1956 the most prominent example.  This 
argument for states’ rights and continued support for the Plessy v. Ferguson precedent 
was signed by all but three Southern Senators.26 
 Evidence of a backlash to Brown would thus likely not appear in Southern 
congressional elections.  A white voter motivated by anger at the Supreme Court and fear 
of national government intervention in Southern affairs would likely vote after Brown as 
he or she would before the 1954 decision.  Voters would reelect their incumbent 
segregationist Democratic member of Congress, sending them back to Washington to 
accumulate seniority and oppose civil rights measures. 27  
 Elections for governor, however, do yield evidence about the nature of the post-
Brown transformation in the regional electoral environment.  Most Southern states had 
                                                 
26 Senators Estes Kefauver and Albert Gore, both from relatively moderate Tennessee, did not sign the 
Southern Manifesto.  The only other senator not to sign was Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, who was not 
asked to sign in order to preserve his future viability as a presidential candidate. 
27 In the mid-1950s the Republican Party was not yet a viable vehicle for white backlash against civil rights 
policies emanating from Washington, even though Eisenhower did win several Southern states and fifteen 
unpledged presidential electors went to segregationist Harry Byrd instead of John Kennedy in 1960.  The 
pro-civil rights actions of Kennedy and Johnson led to the beginning of white backlash Republican voting, 
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term limits, in some cases like Virginia, South Carolina, Mississippi and Alabama 
prohibiting consecutive terms.  Alabama, which is discussed in more detail below, 
provides particularly fertile ground for analysis of a possible Supreme Court effect on 
gubernatorial elections.  The Alabama Constitution then prohibited consecutive 
gubernatorial terms, but allowed former governors to run again after a term out of office.  
As a result politicians like George Wallace and Jim Folsom had long careers with 
multiple runs for governor, demonstrating the shifts in state voting and how politicians 
adapted to these shifts over time.   In the period beginning in 1946 and ending in 1962, 
Alabama had five men elected governor in six elections.  The moderate progressive 
Folsom ran three times, and Wallace ran twice, with each losing one election.  The four 
spots in Democratic Party gubernatorial runoffs that were not occupied by either Folsom 
or Wallace were occupied by four different men (Folsom won a majority in the first 
primary round in 1954 and avoided a runoff).  During this period Alabama had the same 
two U.S. Senators, Lister Hill and John Sparkman, both gaining reelection with a record 
of racial conservatism and economic liberalism.  Gubernatorial elections in Alabama, and 
across the South, exhibited more variation. 
 Earl Black, in a book-length study of gubernatorial elections in the South from the 
1950s through the 1970s, finds that in the elections immediately preceding Supreme 
Court action, race was not a central issue in campaigns for the highest statewide office.  
In the years preceding the Brown decision, when racial segregation could be understood 
by white politicians as an intrinsic, seemingly immutable characteristic of southern life, 
                                                                                                                                                 
with the near-defeat of Senator Lister Hill in Alabama in 1962 and the election of several Republican 
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references to race in political campaign were sporadic and commonly pertained to 
occurrences outside the South.  Black finds that events of the previous decade that had 
seemed initially to threaten segregation, like establishment of a Federal Employment 
Practices Commission, the Smith v. Alright decision abolishing the white primary, or 
support for civil rights by President Harry Truman and the convention that nominated 
him in 1948, “had largely dissipated in state elections by 1950, and from then until 1954 
campaigning southern politicians gave relatively little attention to racial matters.”28 
 Black argues that “racial segregation was, at most, a secondary concern” in 
elections where most candidates were best described as moderate segregationists.   These 
seekers of high office would express satisfaction with established regional social patterns, 
and treat race as a settled issue.  Black finds that in the period just before Brown (1950-
1953), 95 out of 100 major candidates for governor in the former confederate states were 
moderate segregationists.  The five remaining candidates were strong segregationists.  
Owing to the general acceptance of Jim Crow norms by the overwhelmingly white 
southern electorate and the white politicians it elected, no major candidates were 
classified as Non-Segregationists.  Fourteen of the sixteen elections were won by 
moderate segregationists.29 
 Black finds that the most important axis of conflict was economic.  Ninety percent 
of candidates were classified as either marginalist or redistributive on economic issues, 
with the proper balance of taxation and public education spending as the primary issue set 
                                                                                                                                                 
congressmen from Deep South states in 1964. 
28 Earl Black 29. 
29 Ibid 30-31. 
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before the electorate.  Marginalists called for marginal improvements in state education, 
and holding taxation to existing levels.  Redistributive called for increased taxation to 
fund improvements in public education, which they argued was necessary to provide 
equal opportunity to those of modest means.  The most common successful type of 
candidate was a moderate segregationist marginalist.30 
 Strong segregationists with unadulterated racist appeals were rare.  In the 1950 
Alabama first Democratic primary, militant segregationist candidates State Senator Bruce 
Henderson and Birmingham Public Safety Commissioner Bull Connor finished a distant 
fourth and sixth.  Even in Mississippi, the most segregationist candidate finished fifth in 
the 1951 gubernatorial first primary.  Newspaper editor Mary Cain was unable to get 
traction with the voters with her warnings about “smart alecks in Washington who think 
they can improve on God’s plan of different races by making us abolish segregation and 
absorb the negro into the white.”31  Even in the Deep South, elections for governor were 
not decided merely by which candidate could most vociferously support segregation. 
 This relative moderation in Southern gubernatorial campaigns fit with some of the 
important characteristics of American national politics in the twentieth century.  
Segregation need not define the tenor of gubernatorial campaigns and records in office 
because national policies on race were to a great extent defined by Southern members of 
Congress.  With state legislative and executive offices always in the hands of whites 
committed to maintaining Jim Crow, a threat to white supremacy had to come from 
Washington.  But the dispersal of power and the multiplicity of veto players in the 




national government provided Southern Senators and congressmen significant power to 
stop legislation.  The power of Southerners in Congress was not unlimited; they would 
have had trouble passing any legislation imposing facets of the Jim Crow system on the 
nation.  But the power of the region’s delegation on Capitol Hill, while never making up 
a majority of even the Democratic caucus, was sufficient to block any legislation that 
would threaten the existing organization of Southern society.  This power that was so 
effective in blocking legislation32 was clearly insufficient to block the court-mandated 
integration that began in 1954.33 
James Byrnes:  The Changing Defense of Southern Autonomy 
 Politicians like George Wallace and Orville Faubus adapted their policies and 
campaign positions to succeed in this new context, in which militant resistance to federal 
government action dominated statewide elections and the policies supported by southern 
governors.  Their style and actions in office stand as a contrast to the pre-Brown career of 
James Byrnes, who was governor of South Carolina when the Brown decision was 
decided.   While holding elected and appointed positions in federal and state office, 
Byrnes was able to exert power and influence on behalf of the white supremacist racial 
order, but often in cooperation with non-southern leaders.   
                                                                                                                                                 
31Ibid 34. 
32 Whittington points out that the backlash to Brown in the South was in contrast to support for the decision 
by non-southern elites, who had met with failure in attempts to pass strong Civil Rights legislation: 
“Entrenched and disproportionately powerful southern conservatives had gridlocked Congress.  The Court 
became the alternative” (134). 
33 Murphy (1962) discusses the attempt to pass jurisdiction-stripping legislation in 1957 and 1958.  
Southern Democrats joined with conservative Republicans to attempt passage of a bill responding to 
Supreme Court decisions involving free speech and anti-communism.  This effort was a test case for a 
planned push to limit the court’s appellate jurisdiction in areas of civil rights, but even then was 
unsuccessful in the Senate. 
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 The career of James Byrnes demonstrates the changes in southern politics that 
Brown brought about.  In particular his career shows the opportunities that were available 
for Southern politicians, and the continuing viability of the Southern project of 
maintaining support for segregation in national government.  His career, which began in 
the early twentieth century and overlaps with the careers of Wallace and Faubus, 
highlights the power of the white supremacist order.  The changes brought on by the 
Supreme Court caused him to move from the politics of influence to the politics of 
resistance. 
 James Byrnes is not a prominent figure in the history of the Civil Rights 
Movement like Wallace, Connor and Faubus.  Although a key figure in elected office for 
much of the early and middle twentieth century, Byrnes is probably best remembered for 
three unelected positions, as a Supreme Court Justice for one uneventful term, and as 
Director of the Economic Stabilization Office, often called “Assistant President,” for 
Franklin Roosevelt during WWII, and as Secretary of State for Harry Truman.  His 
career, with service in all three branches of the national government and as governor of 
South Carolina, demonstrates the influence of Southerners on the national government, 
and the diminished possibilities for resistance after Brown. 
 James Byrnes’s one term as governor from 1951-1955 came at the end of a career 
mainly focused on national politics.  He was a rare former Senator to serve as governor of 
a Southern state, since Senators from the region would normally keep their seats and 
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accumulate power and seniority.34  Elected to the U.S. House in 1910, Byrnes was 
unsuccessful in his first run for the Senate in 1924, losing in the Democratic runoff 
primary to the militant segregationist Cole Blease.  Byrnes’s refusal of an offer of 
membership by the Ku Klux Klan, at the height of the group’s power in state and national 
politics, furnished ammunition to Blease.35 The refusal of Byrnes to join the Klan in 1924 
contrasts with the actions of the much more progressive Hugo Black, who won a senate 
seat from Alabama that year and went on to support racial equality on the Supreme Court.  
Byrnes came back to defeat Blease in 1930 with an economics-focused campaign that 
connected with voters at the beginning of the Great Depression.  Blease unsuccessfully 
countered with what he termed a “nigger and liquor” campaign.36 
 Although Byrnes won election to the Senate as the more moderate candidate on 
racial issues, in Washington he was a strong defender of the ability of the South to 
maintain a segregated social system.  While filibustering antilynching legislation in 1938, 
he argued that the bill should be retitled “a bill to arouse ill-feeling between the sections, 
inspire race hatred in the South, and destroy the Democratic Party.”37  That Byrnes could 
take such a stand while maintaining close relations with liberal president Franklin 
Roosevelt, which made him what Earl and Merle Black called “the South’s most 
                                                 
34 Usually the pattern would be reversed, with a long senate career following service as governor.  When 
Byrnes was elected governor seven of the twenty-two senators from the South had previously served as 
governor, including Burnet Maybank and Olin Johnston of South Carolina. 
35 Robertson 95. 
36 Ibid 113 
37 Black and Black 2003 p. 53 
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influential Democratic senator” of the time, is evidence of the influence of the South 
within the New Deal Democratic Party.38 
 The connection to Franklin Roosevelt, which was cemented as Byrnes lined up 
support for Roosevelt at the 1932 Democratic Convention,39 made James Byrnes a 
national political figure in the 1940s and 1950s.  In a Senate where the power of Majority 
Leader Joseph Robinson was weak and limited by the power and prerogatives of 
individual senators, Byrnes would often shepherd New Deal legislation through the 
chamber.40  He also exerted power in Washington for local purposes, successfully 
pushing the Santee-Cooper dam project through Congress, bringing hydroelectric power 
to much of South Carolina.  Byrnes still maintained, however, independence from the 
administration, opposing the Court-packing plan in 1937.41  When FDR attempted to 
purge conservative Democratic opponents of New Deal measures in 1938 primaries, 
Byrnes supported his South Carolina colleague “Cotton Ed” Smith against an 
administration-backed challenger.42 
 The ascent of Byrnes in the Senate was cut short when President Roosevelt put 
him on the Supreme Court, and then entrusted him with management of much of 
                                                 
38 The service of Byrnes as South Carolina Governor was during a period of declining influence within the 
party and increasing influence for blacks and northern liberals.  While Byrnes would serve as Truman’s 
Secretary of State from 1945-47, John F. Kennedy refrained from nominating the comparatively racially 
tolerant J. William Fulbright to the same post because he signed the Southern Manifesto (Halberstam 29-
30, Woods 258) 
39 Ibid 137-141.  Byrnes would provide crucial aid to Roosevelt by keeping in line the wavering 
Mississippi delegation at a point after three deadlocked ballots when a defection could have stopped 
Roosevelt’s momentum.  Byrnes also personally delivered campaign contributions to Roosevelt from his 
longtime ally financier Bernard Baruch.  
40 Caro 359 




domestic wartime policy as “assistant president.”  This evidence of Roosevelt’s favor, 
combined with the support of his fellow Southerners, made Byrnes a viable contender for 
the vice presidential nomination in 1944.  FDR’s likely reelection, combined with his 
failing health, meant a spot on the ticket would probably lead to the presidency.  
Although southerners and other conservatives were able to pressure Roosevelt to dump 
the liberal Henry Wallace, their choice of Byrnes was blocked by northern liberals and 
big-city bosses worried about losing black votes.43  Truman later appointed Byrnes 
Secretary of State, but the South Carolinian resigned after disagreements with the 
president over his authority and the direction of policy.44 
 As a Southerner working within the New Deal Democratic coalition, Byrnes 
conceived of his work as a twentieth-century version of that of the nineteenth-century 
politician and political philosopher John C. Calhoun.  The earlier South Carolina Senator, 
and Vice President and Secretary of War, argued for a regional minority veto over 
national government action.  Byrnes saw his work building cross-regional coalitions in 
the Senate as part of this project.45  
 The return of James Byrnes to South Carolina politics as governor in 1950 was an 
admission that the national project of creating a Calhounian concurrent majority for the 
South had failed on several fronts.  While Byrnes and his Southern allies were able to 
block renomination of the unpalatable Henry Wallace as vice president, they were unable 
to secure the nomination for Byrnes.  Wallace’s replacement as vice president, Harry 
                                                 
43 Klarman 178 
44 Robertson 488-90 
45 Ibid 501 
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Truman, proved a major disappointment to Southerners.  As president Truman 
desegregated the Armed Forces and established a commission to identify civil rights 
violations in the South.  His popularity with northern liberals, big-city political bosses 
and organized labor, combined with the change of the proportion of delegates needed to 
win from two-thirds to a majority,46 made futile any attempt by the South to deny Truman 
nomination in 1948.   
 The return to state politics in 1950 by Byrnes refocused the fight for Southern 
autonomy on the power of state governments.  While Senate Democrats would be able to 
forestall meaningful national civil rights legislation for another fourteen years, the 
Supreme Court was considering four challenges to the separate-but-equal standard of 
Plessy v. Ferguson.   Byrnes, anticipating an era in which Southern states would have to 
alter their racial policies in response to federal court decisions, returned to South Carolina 
to shepherd a massive improvement in the state’s black educational system to comply 
with the “equal” part of separate-but-equal.   He ran a moderate segregationist 
campaign47 and cast equalization of black and white schools as both prudent and ethical, 
stating “to meet this situation we are forced to do what we should have been doing for the 
last fifty years.”48   Byrnes was attempting use state public policy to protect segregation 
from national government interference, complying with friendly Supreme Court 
precedent.   Brown and Brown II precluded this strategy, foreclosing another of Byrnes’s 
attempts to institute a Calhounian concurrent majority for the South.  He then joined 
                                                 
46 The change was instituted on the wished of Byrnes’s ally and benefactor Franklin Roosevelt. 
47 Earl Black 33 
48 Black and Black 1987 p. 91 
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other Southern governors in using state resources to obstruct, rather than comply with, 
federal court decision on civil rights. 
 Brown v. Board of Education constituted a challenge to southern segregated 
institutions that emerged from an institution much less subject to Southern influence than 
the U.S. Senate, Democratic Party or even the presidency.  Even if Byrnes had remained 
on the Court, he would have merely been able to prevent the decision from being 
unanimous.  A regional minority of eleven states with less than a quarter of votes in the 
Senate could block the national government from producing effective desegregation 
policy.  The white southern Democratic Primary could send experienced politicians like 
Byrnes, Richard Russell of Georgia and Harry Byrd of Virginia to accumulate seniority 
and influence.  Committee chairmanships granted power to the southern minority when 
the Democrats were in power, and the filibuster empowered southerners no matter who 
controlled the chamber.  The Court was a majoritarian institution, and the only 
Southerners on the Court were the liberal civil rights supporter Hugo Black and moderate 
Truman appointee Tom Clark, had voted to make Brown unanimous.49  If Byrnes had 
been Roosevelt’s last vice president and succeeded to the office, he might have used the 
four appointments Truman made to the Court to buttress support for Plessy.  Roosevelt 
and Truman appointees had put a Supreme Court majority out of reach.  Richard 
Russell’s inability to seriously contend in a weak open field for the Democratic 
                                                 
49Stanley Reed was from Kentucky, which is sometimes classified as a Southern state.  If Black, Clark, and 
Reed are combined with Sheman Minton from Indiana and Harold Burton from Ohio, a majority of the 
Supreme Court in 1954 came from states with some legally segregated schools.  The fact that such a group 
unanimously voted to overturn Plessy was a sign that the Court in 1954 was a fundamentally different 
institution than Congress, where supporters of segregation could exert significant influence.  
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nomination for president in 1952 made clear that a southerner strongly supportive of Jim 
Crow could not be elected to the presidency.50   
 Byrnes had anticipated that when the Supreme Court took the Briggs v. Elliot case 
from Clarendon County, South Carolina, a challenge to segregation was forthcoming that 
could not be blocked by Southern-influenced institutions.  He retreated to another line of 
defense within the national political system:  Supreme Court precedent.  Byrnes 
marshaled the resources of South Carolina state government to produce public policy that 
could be cited as evidence of separate becoming equal in the arguments John W. Davis 
was presenting in Washington.  In The Rise of Massive Resistance, Numan Bartley 
characterizes Byrnes’s actions as governor as an attempt to carve out a new zone of 
autonomy for the South in national politics: 
The restoration of states’ rights and southern rights, Byrnes seemed to feel, 
required three things:  a broader concept of state responsibility, particularly in 
regard to the Negro; an adamant stand by individual states against further federal 
encroachments, especially in matters pertaining to civil rights and school 
segregation; and cooperative action by the states to counter centralization of 
authority in Washington.51 
 
Bringing the poorly funded black school system up to resource equality with white 
schools in South Carolina would require a new funding stream, so Byrnes convinced a 
skeptical legislature to institute a three percent sales tax.  Byrnes hired the nationally-
prominent lawyer and former Democratic presidential candidate John W. Davis to defend 
South Carolina before the Supreme Court, and sent him to Washington with a state plan 
                                                 
50 Caro 469-70.  Russell only garnered 268 out of 1,230 votes on the first ballot in 1952.  Lyndon Johnson 
unsuccessfully attempted in 1956 and 1960 to expand his base into Western states, and move beyond 
Russell’s nearly exclusively southern coalition 
 51 Bartley 44 
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to equalize school facilities and funding.  Byrnes also privately assured his former 
Supreme Court colleague Felix Frankfurter and Chief Justice Fred Vinson that he would 
ensure such equalization in state policy.52   
The strategy of making facts on the ground fit the argument of Plessy was itself a 
betrayal of the states’ rights position of Byrnes’s former colleagues in the Senate 
Southern Caucus, in that it accepted that the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
Clause created a national standard on racial issues.  It was a last attempt by Byrnes to 
accomplish his career’s project, the creation and maintenance of a zone of autonomy 
within which Southern states could maintain a society segregated by race.   
Brown made such a project impossible, and left southern white politicians with a 
choice between resistance and accommodation.  Byrnes struck the same defiant tone as 
that of other Southern governors, decrying Brown as judicial tyranny.  He threatened to 
close South Carolina public schools to prevent integration,53 and in U.S. News and World 
Report criticized his former colleagues in a column titled “The Supreme Court Must Be 
Curbed.”54 The final time of James Byrnes in public office was spent supporting massive 
resistance to national government, a departure from the work within that national 
government that had occupied most of his career.  
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George Wallace:  From Progressive to Champion of Segregation 
 George Wallace is best known for his high-profile opposition to court-ordered 
integration and to direct action civil rights protestors in the 1960s.  When he was 
inaugurated as governor in 1963, he proclaimed his support for “segregation now, 
segregation tomorrow, and segregation forever.”  He symbolically stood in the 
schoolhouse door to oppose integration of the University of Alabama, fulfilling a 
campaign pledge.  He ran a quixotic campaign against incumbent president Lyndon 
Johnson in several 1964 Democratic primaries to protest the passage of the Civil Rights 
Act.  He refused to use state law enforcement resources to protect civil rights protesters 
like the Freedom Riders from white vigilante violence, and even countenanced the 
beating of voting rights marchers at Selma by state troopers in 1965.  He ran three more 
times for president, as an independent in 1968 and again as a Democrat in 1972 and 1976, 
converting his segregationist rhetoric to a general law and order message focused on 
crime and bussing. 
The early political career of George Wallace, however, was not characterized by 
militant support for segregation.  Wallace affiliated with the populist and progressive 
faction of Alabama politics in the 1950s, only fully shifting to running as the most 
segregationist candidate in his breakthrough election to the governorship in 1962.  The 
early success of Wallace as a comparatively progressive candidate for elected office 
before Brown, his partial but electorally insufficient shift to a more segregationist 
position in the years after the decision, and his ultimate transformation into the most 
prominent regional opponent of integration, all demonstrate the transformative effect the 
Supreme Court had on Southern politics after 1954. 
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 The early career of George Wallace is best understood through his connection to 
Jim Folsom, two-term governor of Alabama elected in 1946 and 1954.  Wallace affiliated 
himself with Folsom after his election to the state legislature in 1946 and vigorously 
campaigned for him in 1954.  Support for Folsom put Wallace on the left of Alabama 
politics, as the governor was the closest thing to a progressive elected in mid-century 
Alabama.  Folsom’s agenda included tax increases to support  increased spending on 
public education, reform of the state’s agriculture program to support small farmers 
instead of large plantation-owners, and increasing the status of blacks.  Folsom’s support 
for racial equality was expressed within the context of the Jim Crow segregation system, 
and did not advocate the kind of wholesale shifts in the legal status of Southern 
institutions that would come in the 1960s.  His rhetoric called for equality within the 
context of Jim Crow, making the system truly “separate but equal.”  He called for an end 
to the poll tax, asking “are the Negroes being given their share of democracy, the same 
opportunity of having a voice in the government under which they live?”55  He called for 
increased opportunities for professional education for blacks, and linked his support for 
an equal society with the dominant Christian religion. 
 This rhetoric of racial equality exposed Folsom to criticism from the more 
segregationist candidate in the 1946 Democratic runoff election, Handy Ellis.  Ellis said 
that election of Folsom would result in “complete destruction of our segregation laws – 
laws under which our white folks and colored folks here in Alabama and the South have 
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lived in peace and harmony and friendly understanding.”56  Such criticism in the post-
Brown South would likely lead to clear defeat at the polls.  Folsom not only won the 1946 
runoff, but was returned to the governor’s mansion in 1954 with a rare first primary 
victory.57  His success contrasts with the period starting with the election of 1958 and 
ending with the passing of integration as a major issue in Alabama politics in the mid-
1970s, during which the most segregationist candidate won the governorship every 
election.  George Wallace dominated this period, winning three of five elections.  The 
exceptions were his defeat as the more moderate candidate in 1958, and the election of 
his wife Lurleen in 1966 when he could not run for reelection due to term limits. 
 The Alabama politics that Wallace entered upon his return from military service 
in the Second World War was one of bifactional competition within the Democratic 
Party, in which the more progressive faction was most often successful.   This statewide 
approximation of an ideologically-organized two-party electoral system was a result of 
the reorientation of Alabama politics by Jim Folsom.  Key’s Southern Politics finds that 
many Southern states were organized with the Democratic Party by reference to a 
particular set of ideas and politicians.  This factional organization varied from the 
Virginia politics of support and opposition to the Byrd machine, to the Texas competition 
between economic progressives and conservatives.  Alabama elections for governor did 
not typically conform to any factional pattern, but were organized around temporary 
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“friends and neighbors” followings of individual candidates.  This pattern resulted partly 
from the two-stage primary election system, in which all candidates ran in the first 
primary, and if no candidate received a majority of votes, the top two finishers would 
compete in a runoff election.  Candidates would compile massive majorities in their home 
county and surrounding counties, and hope that their local following was enough to make 
up for their lack of support statewide.  Candidates would often make it to the runoff with 
less than 30 percent of the vote. 
 Folsom benefitted from this system in 1946, racking up large majorities in both 
his South Alabama childhood and family base and his adult residence in Northeast 
Alabama.  The runoff, however, matched Folsom against the conservative Ellis.  
Consequently, Democratic runoff voters were presented with a clear choice between 
divergent visions for the future of the state.  Folsom’s victory tracked patterns of class 
and demography, with Folsom running strong in the areas of the state that were home 
mainly to small farmers, North and Southeast Alabama.  His support for increased 
taxation and racial moderation stimulated the coalescence of a conservative bloc located 
mainly in the plantation-dominated “black belt” running across the middle of the state 
and the comparatively wealthy urban areas of Birmingham and Montgomery.58 
 In analyzing the effect of Brown v. Board of Education on Southern politics, the 
Alabama of the Folsom era is not primarily important because it was temporarily 
                                                 
58 Alabama in this period was similar to Mississippi, where populists ran well in the hills of Northern and 
Eastern Mississippi, and conservatives in the Delta along the Mississippi River Delta.  This pattern was 
grounded in the agricultural geography of the region, with the areas that would support plantation cotton 
agriculture home to large disenfranchised populations of former slaves, and reactionary white electorates 
hostile to all forms of progressive government.   
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organized into progressive versus conservative factionalism59, but that progressive could 
have electoral success in Alabama.  The victories of Folsom are part of the pattern, 
explored by Earl Black and others, of a comparatively moderate period of regional 
campaigns and elections.60  Black’s analysis shows how mass politics in the South, 
channeled through the dominant institution of the Democratic primary, provided electoral 
support for candidates who were not the most segregationist of those running, and who 
gained office mainly on economic issues.   U.S. Senate elections in Alabama were 
characterized by relative moderation on racial issues, as Lister Hill and John Sparkman 
won landslide elections as economic populists just as Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black 
had in the 1930s.61  Sparkman’s record on race, unlike more militantly segregationist 
Senators from neighboring states such as Richard Russell of Georgia or James Eastland 
of Mississippi, made him palatable to Northern Democratic leaders as vice presidential 
candidate in 1952.   
                                                 
59The rise of George Wallace would bring to an end the “friends and neighbors” pattern in gubernatorial 
elections.  After his 1962 victory the first Democratic primary electorate was organized around support or 
opposition to Wallace, always leading to a victory for him or his wife as stand-in.  The Alabama 
Democratic primary has not since the 1980s automatically determined the general election winner, and now 
is usually defined by candidates attempting to both appeal to a left-leaning black base while simultaneously 
crafting a viable general election campaign. 
60 The identification of this period with the Dixiecrat presidential campaign of 1948 thus obscures the 
broader pattern of Southern elections in the pre-Brown period.  Thurmond’s landslide in Alabama does not 
contradict the finding of relative moderation, because the Dixiecrat ticket was the only nominally 
Democratic choice on the ballot.  Thurmond’s landslide of 80 percent thus shows only that Alabama voters 
were willing to vote for a militantly segregationist candidate when the alternate choice was to vote for a 
Northern Republican like Thomas Dewey.   Thurmond’s support in Alabama was a result of a hard-fought 
victory by anti-Truman forces in the state party apparatus, combined with the lack of an alternate means to 
put Truman on the ballot. 
61 Lister Hill’s moderation on racial issues, and support for the “Loyalist” (anti-Dixiecrat) faction in 1948 
and 1952 almost caught up with him in the racially charged electoral environment of 1962.  Running his 
last race for reelection, Hill won with only 51 percent of the vote.  Republican Jim Martin was able to tie 
Hill to the racial liberalism of the Kennedy administration, presaging the success of Goldwater and 
Republican House candidates in 1964. 
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 Although populist economic appeals were the core of Folsom’s successful 
gubernatorial campaigns in 1946 and 1954, his rhetoric was notably tolerant on racial 
issues.  He argued that racial equality was a fulfillment of Jesus’s Sermon on the Mount: 
We have got to give our fellow man the same rights and privileges which we 
ourselves expect to live by and enjoy.  This means that every man and woman has 
a certain dignity which must be respected; that no man is to be enslaved by 
another; that every man has a voice in the choosing and operation of the 
government under which he lives; that he has one vote and the right to cast it; that 
he fears no reprisal for expressing his honest conviction.62 
 
Folsom’s relatively progressive views were expressed in the context of the segregated 
society; he was advocating something like a true separate but equal system. 
 Folsom even criticized the poll tax and the unwillingness of local voting registrars 
to register blacks to vote, core components of the state election system that maintained an 
overwhelmingly white franchise.  When running for governor in 1946 he asked “Are the 
Negroes being given their fair share of democracy, the same opportunity of having a 
voice in the government under which they live?”  Folsom even entertained black 
Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, who represented New York from a Harlem district, 
in the Governor’s mansion in Montgomery.  Sharing a drink with a prominent black 
politician and civil rights leader showed Folsom’s progressivism on issues of race, and 
would later be used to tar him as pro-integration in the post-Brown backlash period.  
From his start in electoral politics George Wallace cast himself as a populist, and 
affiliated himself with Folsom when he entered the state legislature in 1946.  Wallace had 
given nominal support to Folsom’s more conservative opponent Handy Ellis, a move that 
fit the demography of Wallace’s Barbour County base.  Barbour County, which would 
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elect Wallace as Probate Judge in 1952, is located on the eastern end of Alabama’s black 
belt.  The County voted for Folsom in 1946, but was just south of the broad swath of the 
black belt across the middle of the state where Ellis had support.63  
 The 55 percent victory of progressive Jim Folsom pointed the way to statewide 
electoral success for the young and ambitious George Wallace.  He cemented his 
connection to Folsom, and his connection to what passed for racial progressivism in mid-
century Alabama, by securing appointment by Folsom to the governing board for the 
black state Tuskegee University.  His next move would be to consolidate his home base, 
which he did by securing election as Circuit Judge.  Wallace served as Folsom’s South 
Alabama campaign manager when the former governor was eligible to run again in 1954.    
The next steps in the friends and neighbors politics of one-party Alabama were clear:  run 
for governor, pump enough votes out of his home base to secure a spot in the runoff, and 
then reassemble Folsom’s geographic base in Northern and Southeast Alabama to gain 
the party nomination and certain victory in November. 
 By the time that the gubernatorial election of 1958 came around, Alabama politics 
had been transformed by the backlash to court-ordered integration.  No longer would the 
traditional campaign strategies based on economic appeals to demographic and 
geographic groupings be sufficient to gain election.  Victory would go to the candidate 
who could most clearly and vociferously defend segregation.  Wallace sensed this shift 
and attempted to transform his image to fit the backlash that was sweeping the South.  
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But in 1958, he had not yet gone far or fast enough in his race to the militant pole of the 
segregationist continuum, owing partly to his more progressive history.   
 The first major post-Brown conflict over school integration in Alabama public 
school concerned the flagship campus of the University of Alabama in Tuscaloosa.  On 
February 3, 1956 a federal District Court in Birmingham ordered the admission of 
Autherine Lucy, a black woman, to the heretofore segregated institution.  Folsom was out 
of state, and took no action to support or oppose her admission.  University officials also 
took no action, and Lucy was forced to flee campus in a police car.  The University then 
expelled Lucy for causing disorder, which was allowed by the federal court.64 
 Governor Jim Folsom responded to the growing backlash against Brown and the 
Lucy case that followed it just as he had responded to the Dixiecrat backlash.  Folsom 
counseled against reaction against the Supreme Court, just as he had counseled against 
desertion from the Truman-led Democratic Party.  Wallace biographer Dan Carter 
discusses Folsom’s opposition to the state legislature resolution of interposition: 
When the politicians start hollering “Whip the Nigger” Folsom told dwindling 
crowds of supporters, “then you know damn well they are trying to cover up dirty 
tracks.”  He contemptuously dismissed the interposition resolution as so much 
“clap-trap …. Like a hound dog baying at the moon and claiming it’s got the 
moon treed.”  And he refused to join the growing chorus of defiance against the 
decision in Brown.  “You can call the Supreme Court Justices s.o.b.'s if you want 
to, but that doesn’t relieve Southern officials sworn to uphold the Constitution of 
their responsibility.”65 
 
Governor Folsom was rapidly shifting from an asset to a liability for a young upwardly 
mobile politician like Judge George Wallace.  Folsom only mustered 25 percent of the 
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vote in a race for a position as a delegate to the Democratic National Convention in 1956, 
the kind of election that a sitting governor should win easily.  Folsom’s refusal to follow 
the Dixiecrats in their defiance of national racial liberalism had not hurt at the polls back 
home.  But after Folsom won his second term as governor in 1954, backlash to the 
Supreme Court would undermine his political standing in a way that the pro-civil rights 
Truman administration had not only six years before. 
 Wallace, who less than two years previously had traveled the state in support of 
Folsom, rapidly distanced himself from his former ally.  He complained publically in the 
state capitol in Montgomery that Folsom had “gone soft on the nigger question.”  He 
publically rebuffed Folsom’s requests to talk, and told friends who still backed the 
governor that “Folsom’s gonna gut you.  Hit him.  You better hit him now before it’s too 
late.”66 
Wallace appeared at a White Citizen’s Council rally at the high school football 
stadium in his adopted home town of Clayton.  He also publically vowed that he would 
not comply with a FBI request for grand jury lists from his Barbour and Bullock County 
judicial circuit, to prevent the Justice Department from inquiring about exclusion of 
blacks from jury service.  Even though a Justice Department official denied there were 
any complaints about or investigation into Wallace’s court, such militant rhetoric 
publically put Wallace on the segregationist side of the race issue that was rapidly 
dominating state politics. 
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 While Wallace was willing and able to use his judicial office to establish a 
segregationist record in preparation for his run for governor in 1958, he was clearly 
surpassed in public obstruction of integration by Attorney General John Patterson.  
Coming into office just after the Brown decision, Patterson dusted off a little used state 
law mandating that organizations that were headquartered out of state must register with 
the state government in Montgomery and used it against the NAACP.  This kind of legal 
maneuver had previously been used by New York State to block Ku Klux Klan action in 
New York, but now Patterson was using the tactic to run the New York-based NAACP 
out of Alabama.  He succeeded when he obtained a subpoena for the civil rights 
organization’s membership list, causing the one NAACP staffer to flee the state instead 
of exposing members to retribution. 
 Although the gambit against the NAACP would be overturned by the Supreme 
Court in 1958, it effectively prevented the organization from operating in the state for 
years.  It also established John Patterson’s credentials as a militant segregationist as he 
campaigned for governor in 1958.  Patterson, who received campaign help from an 
Alabama chapter of the Ku Klux Klan,67 was able to establish himself as the most 
segregationist of the three major contenders, surpassing Wallace and the racial moderate 
Jimmy Faulkner.  Patterson was a new figure in Alabama politics, with his election as 
Attorney General coming on a wave of sympathy after his prosecutor father was killed 
while combating organized crime in Phenix City, Alabama.  Patterson initially was not 
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the favorite, with a Montgomery Advertiser survey of state political leaders pegging 
Wallace and Faulkner as the favorites. 68  
 Patterson’s militant segregationist campaign gained him first place in the first 
primary, and then allowed him to finish off Wallace in the runoff.   Wallace, according to 
Dan Carter, waged a campaign of economic populism and racial moderation:  “Wallace 
gambled that voters, particularly those in north Alabama, would respond to a positive 
program emphasizing improved roads, better education, an industrial recruitment – along 
with a more dignified defense of segregation.”  Wallace even tried to gain votes by 
attacking John Patterson as a race-baiter after the Klan publicly endorsed him, saying 
“Patterson chatters about the gangster ghosts of Phenix City while he himself is rolling 
with the new wave of the Klan and its terrible tradition of lawlessness.”69  
 Wallace’s attempt to counter Patterson’s segregationist strength by rebuilding the 
progressive economic coalition that elected Folsom in 1946 and 1954 was unsuccessful.  
His strength in the areas of the state with low black populations, in the north and 
southeast, were overcome by Patterson landslides in black belt counties.  Patterson later 
attributed his victory to his segregationist campaign, claiming the “primary reason I beat 
him was because he was considered soft on the race question at the time,” and “it was 
political suicide to offer a moderate approach.”  Patterson’s four years as governor were 
marked by continued opposition to integration, such that by end of his term in 1963 the 
amount of school integration in Alabama was negligible.70  
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 George Wallace was quoted by biographer Marshall Frady, and by campaign 
aides who were with him the night of his gubernatorial runoff loss, as saying of John 
Patterson, “Well boys, no other son-of-a-bitch will out-nigger me again.” 71  Wallace later 
denied the quote; it did not fit with his late career as governor of Alabama, in which he 
was elected with substantial black support in 1974 and 1982.  The rise of the conservative 
Republican Party in the Deep South had made it necessary for even conservative 
Democrats like Wallace to add blacks to their coalition to counteract the migration of 
conservative suburban whites to the GOP.  But the quote, whether real or apocryphal, 
describes the actions and campaigns of George Wallace after that initial loss in 1958.  He 
would carry out an intentional rehabilitation of his political career as a candidate who 
would have the strongest association with segregation of any candidate in the field.72  In 
the South of the post-Brown backlash period, that would be a successful strategy.  
 The repositioning of George Wallace as the most segregationist candidate running 
for governor began soon after the inauguration of John Patterson as governor in 1959.  
On January 9 Federal District Judge Frank Johnson provided Judge Wallace with a high-
publicity opportunity to burnish his Jim Crow credentials.  Johnson, an Eisenhower 
appointee, would frequently play the integrationist antagonist to the segregationist 
Wallace.   Their 1959 confrontation came as a result of the mostly ineffectual 1957 Civil 
Rights Act, which established a federal Civil Rights Commission that could do little 
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except investigate allegations of voter suppression.73  When the Commission began an 
investigation into the disenfranchisement of black voters in Southeast Alabama, Federal 
Judge Johnson ordered the release of voter registration lists of Barbour and Bullock 
counties.  Those records were under the control of George Wallace as the state judge for 
the district including those counties. 
 Wallace initially refused to surrender the records, but met resistance from 
Johnson.  In the face of a possible contempt finding and significant jail time, Wallace 
devised a way of complying while posing in public as a staunch defender of the whites-
only franchise.  He summoned a hand-picked grand jury, and handed the records over to 
them.  He then let the grand jury foreman know that he should allow staffers from the 
Civil Rights Commission to examine the records in the grand jury room.  This diversion 
allowed Wallace to go before Judge Johnson in Federal District Court and stand in 
defiance of the letter of the order, but avoid jail time.74  This episode served as foundation 
for Wallace’s 1962 gubernatorial campaign as “The Fighting Judge.” 
 When George Wallace ran to succeed John Patterson as governor in 1962, he 
demonstrated that he had learned the lessons of the 1958 campaign.  His newspaper and 
print advertisements counseled voters to “Vote right – vote white – vote for the Fighting 
Judge.”  He connected his support for white supremacy with a states’ rights constitutional 
argument.  The most famous line of the campaign, later to land him his first major 
national attention, referred to the possibility of federal court-mandated integration:  “I 
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made the possibility of enforcement remote, if not impossible. 
74 Carter 99-102 
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shall refuse to abide by any such illegal federal court order even to the point of standing 
in the schoolhouse door.”75 
 Helping Wallace to craft his rhetoric of racism and defiance to federal authority 
was a new addition to the campaign:  the right-wing writer Asa Carter.  Carter was 
prominent in Alabama white supremacist circles, and often worked with Ku Klux Klan 
leader Robert Shelton.  Carter worked as an organizer for both the Alabama Citizens’ 
Council and various Klan groups, organizing mobs that hounded Autherine Lucy from 
the University of Alabama and assaulted civil rights activists in Birmingham.76  After 
Wallace’s election Carter would write the inaugural address with the line “segregation 
now, segregation tomorrow, and segregation forever.” 
 George Wallace had two major opponents in the 1962 Democratic primary for 
governor.  Ryan deGraffenried, a Tuscaloosa attorney, appealed to metropolitan voters in 
Birmingham, Montgomery and other small cities.  He would narrowly capture second in 
the first primary, bumping Jim Folsom from a comeback attempt.  Wallace soundly 
defeated deGraffenried in the runoff, winning a majority of the vote in every county 
except those containing Birmingham and Tuscaloosa, and five other counties scattered 
across the state.77  He had successfully transformed himself from a populist in the Folsom 
mold to a firebrand militant segregationist.  Wallace understood his comeback as a result 
of his shift to more militant support for white supremacy, telling the editor of the 
Florence Times newspaper, “I started off talking about schools and highways and prisons 
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and taxes – and I couldn’t make them listen.  Then I began talking about niggers –and 
they stomped the floor.”78 
 The poor showing of Jim Folsom in the election of 1962 shows the transformation 
of Alabama electoral politics after Brown and its progeny like the Autherine Lucy case 
and the Little Rock integration crisis.  Folsom ran for governor four times:   in 1942, 
1946, 1954 and 1962.  Until 1962 the arc of his career was ascending, going from second 
place in 1942 to a runoff victory in 1946 to a first primary victory in 1954.  The years 
after his smashing reelection victory, however, were not kind to Folsom, as he stood 
against the rising tide of racial militancy by opposing a state interposition resolution and 
publicly supporting the authority of federal courts.  Folsom’s New Deal-like progressive 
economic appeals were a relic of a different time in Alabama politics.   The last sign of 
Folsom’s fall from popularity and political power was a defeat in statewide race for 
Public Utility Commissioner in 1964 to Bull Connor, who was riding the wave of 
popularity among Alabama white voters after his role in the 1963 Birmingham 
demonstrations.  Meanwhile Wallace would take his rhetoric of racial resentment and 
defiance to federal authority to a national stage, but remain the dominant figure in 
Alabama politics.79  The politics of economics, of taxation and public education and 
public improvements, would not return to Alabama gubernatorial elections until the first 
post-Wallace election in 1978.  By then the conservative voters of the black belt and 
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metropolitan areas had migrated to the Republican Party and the remaining progressive 
whites joining with blacks to support Democrats.  This class-based voting pattern 
continues in Alabama statewide elections, with Democratic candidates sometimes able to 
attract enough working class and poor white voters (who vote Republican for president) 
to defeat conservative Republicans.80 
During the period after Folsom last victory in the Democratic gubernatorial 
primary in 1954 lasting for almost two decades, the elections for governor would belong 
to militant segregationists like John Patterson and the retooled George Wallace.  This 
shift was partly a result of the backlash to Brown, showing the massive effect the decision 
had upon regional politics.  The shift also fits the pattern of judicialization, with conflict 
over fiscal policy giving way to a contest to become perceived as the most adamant 
opponent of court-mandated integration.  Wallace gained statewide and national electoral 
success from his politics of constitutional advocacy.  While his actions, like handing over 
voter rolls to a grand jury instead of Judge Frank Johnson and “standing in the 
schoolhouse door” were ineffective in stopping legal integration, they worked to make 
Wallace a prominent advocate of a states’ rights understanding of the American 
constitutional system. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
son of the former progressive Democratic governor, narrow loser as Democratic nominee for Senator in 
1978 and Governor in 1994, won a narrow victory. 
80 Michael Barone and Richard Cohen note in the 2008 Almanac of American Politics that in his narrow 
loss to Republican Bob Riley, incumbent Democratic Governor Don Siegelman amassed “the coalition of 
blacks and poor whites the political scientist V.O. Key longed for” (43).  
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Bull Connor:  The Segregationist in Power after Brown 
 At the height of the Civil Rights Movement in 1962 and 1963, George Wallace 
and Bull Connor were together on the same side of the conflict that defined Alabama 
politics.  Wallace provided the rhetoric and symbolism for a reactionary militancy that 
was implemented in public policy controlled by Connor.   But in 1948 they had been on 
opposing sides of the issue that divided the white power structure and electorate in 
Alabama – whether to support the national Democratic presidential ticket and platform.  
When the delegates assembled in Philadelphia responded to Minneapolis Mayor Hubert 
Humphrey’s call to “step forward into the light of human rights” and passed a strongly 
pro-civil rights platform plank, the majority of the Alabama delegation walked out of the 
convention, leading other Deep Southern delegates in a party bolt that led to the 
segregationist Dixiecrat candidacy of Strom Thurmond.  Bull Connor led the Alabama 
rebels out of the convention hall carrying the Alabama state banner.  He walked past 
Loyalist delegate George Wallace, who remained with his mentor Jim Folsom at the 
convention and supported the pro-civil rights Harry Truman for president. 
 The two aspiring politicians would both later run for governor, but only Wallace 
was successful.  While Wallace was working for Jim Folsom’s progressive economic 
agenda in the state legislature, Connor was running for governor in 1950.  Running as a 
militant segregationist, Connor finished a distant fifth.  Pushed out of municipal office by 
scandal, he struggled in several runs for local office, finally regaining his City 
Commissioner position after the backlash to Brown and the attempted integration of the 
University of Alabama came to dominate state politics.  In 1962 and 1963, he became the 
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right man in the right office to serve as the creative antagonist for the direct action civil 
rights protest movement. 
 In many respects the careers of George Wallace and Bull Connor were similar.  
Both first won elective office as member of the state legislature, and then won local 
office, Wallace as a judge covering two counties and Connor as a Birmingham City 
Commissioner.  Both used their local base to run for governor, with some hope for 
success.  The friends-and-neighbors localism of the Democratic first gubernatorial 
primary made such campaigns by local officials viable, even though they were not 
running from a higher-profile office like Congressman or a statewide down ballot office.  
Connor, 22 years older than Wallace, mounted an explicitly segregationist campaign in 
1950, too early to capitalize on the backlash to Brown v. Board of Education and its 
progeny.  He spent the next few years in an unsuccessful attempt to retain city office, 
until his backlash politics again appealed to the electorate. 
 While Wallace gained his prominence as an opponent of civil rights by rhetoric 
and symbolic actions designed to gain national attention, Connor became a national 
figure by being chosen by his opponents.  Birmingham was chosen as the site for direct 
actions demonstrations in 1963 because of the likelihood that Connor would react to 
nonviolent protest with police violence.  After Martin Luther King and the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference failed to move national leaders with their 1962 
demonstrations in Albany, Georgia, they sought a city that would provide a better setting 
for dramatizing the oppression of Jim Crow segregation.  Albany Sheriff Laurie Pritchett 
had quietly arrested protesters, briefly held them in jail, and then released them.  He had 
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arranged with several neighboring law enforcement jurisdictions to take arrested 
protesters, making it impossible to “fill the jails.”  King and SCLC left Albany without a 
symbolic or policy victory.  Connor provided the antagonist to nonviolent protest that 
Pritchett had not.  
 Bull Connor occupied the position of Birmingham Public Safety Commissioner 
because his politics of segregationist militancy was successful at the ballot box in the 
backlash period of the late 1950s and early 1960s.  He took advantage of the 
opportunities presented by the backlash against court-ordered integration by presenting 
voters with a consistently extreme position on racial issues.  George Wallace pursued 
deliberate strategies in the post-Brown period, eventually emerging as the clearly most 
militantly segregationist candidate in the 1962 gubernatorial primary.  Connor’s record in 
office from his first stint in municipal government was clearly segregationist, and he 
lacked any connection to racial moderation.  That record would provide the foundation 
for his second period in municipal office, which coincided at its end with the climactic 
protests of 1963. 
 As Public Safety Commissioner of Birmingham, Connor had frequent 
opportunities to implement his views on race and segregation as public policy.  
Birmingham, like most Deep Southern cities, was segregated in housing and public 
accommodations.  But as an urban area, it was home to an active civil rights community 
by regional standards, particularly in the form of activist reverend Fred Shuttlesworth.  
Birmingham also was the site of events that brought to the Deep South national figures in 
progressive and civil rights protest.  Local civil rights activists, while certainly vulnerable 
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to attacks like the bombing of Shuttlesworth’s church and parsonage in 1956, were able 
to carve out space for activism in urban areas that would be unthinkable in the rural Deep 
South.81 
 Connor began building a reputation as a strong defender of segregation soon after 
his first election to the Birmingham City Commission in 1937.  When the Southern 
Conference for Human Welfare, a regional group that worked for labor and civil rights, 
met in Birmingham in 1938, Connor enforced city segregation laws.  Meeting attendees, 
who included Alabama Senator Lister Hill, Eleanor Roosevelt, Alabama Governor Bibb 
Graves and Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, were forced to hold separate meetings for 
whites and blacks.  Connor publicly proclaimed that, as long as he was commissioner, 
“negroes and whites will not segregate together.”82   Such a pronouncement may have 
mangled vocabulary, but its meaning on racial issues was clear. 
 Ten years later another Birmingham meeting of a civil rights group that included 
whites and blacks gave Connor the opportunity to burnish his segregationist image. The 
Southern Negro Youth Conference came to town in May of 1948, weeks before the 
Democratic Party Convention in Philadelphia that would see Connor and other southern 
delegates bolt the party.  Connor attempted to use his influence to keep the group from 
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meeting in Birmingham altogether, pressuring local black ministers not to let their 
churches be used as a meeting place.  The black Alliance Gospel Tabernacle agreed to 
host the meeting, and the city police arrested three white conference attendees for 
violating the city segregation ordinance.  The church responded by erecting a barrier in 
the sanctuary separating white and black seating areas, and designated the front entrance 
for blacks and the back entrance for whites.83 
 When U.S. Senator Glen Taylor of Idaho, a liberal running as Henry Wallace’s 
vice presidential candidate on the Progressive Party ticket, attempted to enter through the 
front door, was arrested by police.  He was threatened with jail and the kind of treatment 
regularly meted out to black arrestees, and released on bond.  Taylor was later convicted, 
sentenced to 180 days in jail, but never returned to Birmingham to serve jail time.  The 
incident gave Connor a chance to get quoted in local media identifying the meeting with 
non-southern attempts to flout segregation laws and legal order generally.84 
 Connor’s role as Alabama delegate to the 1948 Democratic Convention gave him 
an additional platform for his segregationist views, a platform that also had statewide 
relevance.  While committed to renominating President Truman when he began his 
campaign for a statewide at-large delegate spot, Connor withdrew his endorsement after 
Truman’s February address to Congress in favor of a strong civil rights program.  Connor 
said that “segregation is absolutely necessary and must be maintained to avoid serious 
difficulties” and in a campaign flyer sought to tie segregation to broader conservative 
themes: 
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It is my hope that, as one of your delegates, I can help roll back the attempt of 
meddlers, agitators and Communist stooges, to force down our throats, through 
our own Democratic Party, he bitter dose they are now offering us under the false 
name of Civil Liberties.85 
 
Connor won election at that year’s state Democratic convention, and went to Philadelphia 
pledged to oppose any pro-civil rights platform with a walkout.  He kept his pledge and 
supported Strom Thurmond for president. 
 His segregationist record, when combined with a law-and-order record that helped 
him get reelected Commissioner in 1949, put Bull Connor in position to run for governor 
in 1950.  His position as a citywide elected official in the state’s largest city and his role 
in the 1948 Dixiecrat revolt was enough of a foundation to possibly make the runoff in 
Alabama’s friends and neighbors Democratic primary, but his segregationist appeal 
netted less than a tenth of the vote and sixth place.  The revolt of 1948 lacked staying 
power, and segregationist campaigns like that of Bull Connor were not what voters chose.  
Conservatism in general was a viable campaign stance; conservative Gordon Persons 
finished far ahead of the progressive Folsom-backed Phillip Hamm.  Connor’s loss 
followed the regional pattern of elections contested over fiscal issues by candidates who 
supported segregation but in a comparatively moderate manner. 
 Issues not directly related to segregation would push cause Bull Connor to be out 
of office when Brown v. Board of Education sparked a sustained backlash among 
southern whites.  Although he had long been criticized for misusing public resources and 
putting his own interests above the needs of the police and fire departments, he declined 
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to run for reelection in 1953.  Connor’s public image was sullied by an impeachment 
inquiry and a morals conviction for violating city ordinances against occupying a hotel 
room with a woman not your wife and having intercourse outside of marriage.  Two 
impeachment trials ended in mistrials, and the Alabama Supreme Court overturned the 
morals charge, but Connor decided against putting himself before the voters again in 
1953. 
  Bull Connor would spend four years out of office.  A victory for his old post of 
City Commissioner in 1957 was his first electoral victory since 1949. By 1957 the 
statewide furor over the Autherine Lucy situation had established support for segregation 
as the dominant issue in the white Alabama electorate, and Connor would win every city 
and statewide race until 1972.  After his office was eliminated in a Birmingham 
government reorganization that took effect just after the civil rights protests of 1963, 
Connor was elected to two terms as chairman of the state Public Utilities Commission.  
His statewide identification with coercive and violent opposition to desegregation 
allowed him to build the statewide constituency that had eluded him in 1950.  Connor 
also continued to be selected as a delegate to the Democratic National Conventions in 
1964 and 1968. 
 During the period between leaving office in 1953 and becoming a national anti-
civil rights figure in 1963, Connor won a steadily increasing share of the vote in attempts 
to get back into municipal office.  He suffered his first loss when he failed to make the 
runoff in the Democratic Primary for sheriff in spring 1954.  In May 1956, soon after the 
Lucy episode at Tuscaloosa, Connor ran for an unexpired post on the City Commission.  
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He made the runoff this time, but lost to another former Commission member, who 
credited his victory to Connor’s lack of identification by voters with the transportation 
portfolio of the position.  When Connor’s old post of Public Safety Commissioner was up 
for election in 1957, the almost-entirely white Birmingham electorate returned him to 
power.  He was reelected with 61 percent of the vote in 1961 in a four-candidate field, his 
largest vote ever. 
 The ups and downs of Bull Connor at the ballot box in Alabama in the 1940s, 
1950s and 1960s show the importance of the electoral backlash that dominated state and 
local politics for over a decade.  This segregationist reaction, which Brown and its 
progeny contributed to, altered the output of Alabama elections.  The dispositive 
Democratic primary in the 1940s and early 1950s provided multiple paths to office for 
white politicians who avoided frontal critiques of segregated institutions.  The militant 
focus on race that Connor presented was successful in some contexts, but was usually 
beaten by economic appeals in elections for governor and senator.  By the late 1950s 
Alabama politics was dominated by politicians like John Patterson, Bull Connor and the 
resurgent George Wallace. 
 The changed behavior of voters put into power politicians who produced rhetoric 
supporting a vision of the national constitutional order that granted states wide latitude to 
maintain systems of institutionalized white supremacy.  Elected officials also were 
willing to use the public resources they controlled to defend this constitutional argument 
against the nonviolent protest movement that marched and rode and sat in to support an 
integrationist vision of the constitutional order.  Connor withheld police protection from 
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Freedom Riders in 1962, allowing a white mob to beat those attempting to put into 
practice Supreme Court decisions integrating interstate bus lines.86  He would then 
deploy police and fire department officers to beat protestors, hit them with fire cannons, 
and attacked them with police dogs.  He was using the municipal resources at his 
command to put the rhetoric and constitutional arguments of men like Wallace into 
action.   
Orval Faubus:  Seizing the Opportunities of Post-Brown Backlash 
 The career of Orval Faubus followed the same pattern as George Wallace.  Both 
achieved early electoral success as part of loose progressive factions in state politics.  
Both used the powers and visibility of the governor’s office to oppose integration both in 
policy and symbolism.   Both seized the opportunity of the backlash to Brown and the 
litigation it spawned to dominate state politics and become national figures. 
 Faubus differed from Wallace in two important ways.  First, unlike Wallace after 
his initial victory in 1962, Faubus involuntarily left statewide office, failing in comeback 
attempts to defeat moderate Democratic governors Dale Bumpers in 1972 and Bill 
Clinton in 1986.  These losses constituted additional defeats for the politics of 
segregationist populism that Faubus constructed in 1950s and 1960s.  Faubus retired after 
narrowly defeating Republican Winthrop Rockefeller in 1964 and segregationist 
Democrat James Johnson was unable to reassemble the Faubus coalition and lost to 
Rockefeller in 1966.  While Wallace was continuing his electoral dominance in Deep 
                                                 
86 He claimed to have given the entire police force a day off for Mother’s Day. 
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Southern Alabama, Faubus involuntarily left politics in Peripheral Southern Arkansas as 
a relic of the 1957 backlash.   
 Faubus and Wallace were also similar in that they entered state politics as 
supporters and   protégés of progressive governors who campaigned as moderate 
segregationists.  Just as Wallace’s past racial progressivism was a liability in the 1958 
race for governor, Faubus actually carried with him leftist baggage that almost derailed 
his election in 1954.  His father had been an openly socialist political activist, and young 
Orval had briefly attended the leftist activist Commonwealth College.  With the 
advantage of being in office in 1957 when court-ordered integration transformed 
Arkansas politics, Faubus could quickly reinvent himself as a last-ditch defender of 
segregation and subsume his earlier progressivism.  As a result Faubus did not have to 
suffer a defeat as Wallace did in 1958, as the former Alabama moderate was unable to 
put enough distance between himself and the moderate Folsom. 
 Orval Faubus’s 1954 election and 1956 reelection87 made possible his prominent 
transformation in 1957, and were an indirect result of the defeat of his mentor Sid 
McMath in 1954.  McMath, for whom Faubus campaigned and later served as a 
gubernatorial staffer, won his 1950 election on a platform of progressive stances on 
economic issues.  McMath’s surprise defeat by the conservative establishment-backed 
Frank Cherry, well-funded by Arkansas business interests seeking less government 
regulation and lower taxes, created an opening for Faubus.  Faubus ran an economic 
                                                 
87 Arkansas was the last Southern state to elect a governor every two years, eliminating the practice with 
the 1986 reelection of Bill Clinton to a four-year term.  The only remaining states with two-year 
gubernatorial terms are New Hampshire and Vermont. 
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populist campaign that criticized Cherry for cutting welfare benefits, vetoing a bill 
repealing the regressive taxes on small producers of chicken and eggs, and allowing 
private monopoly utilities to raise electricity rates.88  He finished second to the incumbent 
in the first primary, and then defeated him in the runoff. 
 In addition to pushing a tax increase to fund education through the legislature, 
89while in office Orval Faubus governed as the closest thing to a racial liberal as possible 
without directly confronting the institutions of white supremacy.  He appointed six black 
citizens to the state Democratic Committee.  On his watch five public school systems 
began desegregating, and Arkansas became the first Southern state to open all its white 
colleges to black students.  He had even awarded an “Arkansas Traveler” honorific 
designation to Daisy Bates, the president of the state branch of the NAACP who would 
lead the effort to integrate Little Rock Central High School in 1957.  He even told a 
group of people gathered at the home of Winthrop Rockefeller, then his appointed state 
coordinator of industrialization, that Brown v. Board of Education was correctly decided, 
stating “If I had been on the Court, I would have voted that way myself.”90 
 Faubus faced criticism of his relatively liberal record on race in his first campaign 
for reelection.  Running a campaign as a militant segregationist,91 Johnson vowed to 
replace the six black Faubus appointees to the state party committee with whites.  In 
winning 42 percent against Faubus, an incumbent who should have benefitted from the 
                                                 
88 Reed 86-87 
89 Bass and DeVries 90 
90 Reed 169 
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custom of giving governors at least four years to establish a record, Johnson 
demonstrated the possible vote-winning potential of a militant segregationist campaign.  
He would have to wait a decade for another chance to run that campaign, as Orval Faubus 
would in 1957 preempt the possibility of a challenge from his conservative flank on race. 
 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to examine in detail the complicated and 
contested chain of events of the early fall of 1957 that would make Orval Faubus a 
national leader in the fight against court-ordered school integration.  But in summary, 
after calling out the Arkansas National Guard to block the court-ordered admittance of 
nine black children to Central High, and prompting Eisenhower to federalize the Guard 
and then replace it with national Army troops, Faubus was inextricably linked with 
militant resistance to the desegregation of public schools in a way that would pay 
electoral dividends.  Earl Black writes that: 
During much of the post-Brown era, gubernatorial elections in Arkansas were 
dominated by Orval Faubus.  Faubus’s efforts in 1957 to resist token school 
desegregation in Little Rock gave him an unchallengeable position in Arkansas 
politics and, somewhat misleadingly an international reputation as an intransigent 
and virulent segregationist.92 
 
Faubus’s policies as governor in general, while never returning to the progressivism of 
his first term, did not fit the militant segregationist image that he presented during the 
Little Rock crisis.  But his actions and symbolic defiance led to militant segregationist 
reelection campaigns in 1958 and 1960, and to smashing success at the ballot box until he 
retired in 1966.  Faubus was never forced into a runoff in the Democratic primary, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
91 Earl Black (172-173) classifies the 1956 race as between the moderate segregationist Faubus and the 
militant segregationist Johnson.  The victory of the moderate Faubus was rare in the post-Brown period, 
with militant segregationist losses usually to incumbents in Peripheral Southern states. 
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was only seriously challenged in the general election by Winthrop Rockefeller in his last 
campaign as an incumbent in 1964. 
 Orval Faubus’s 57 percent victory that fall would be the last gasp of his 
segregationist politics in Arkansas.  Rockefeller constructed a post-Voting Rights Act 
biracial coalition of blacks and whites that defeated James Johnson, the militant 
segregationist who battled the pre-Little Rock Faubus.  The first Democratic governor of 
Arkansas after Faubus was the racial and social progressive Dale Bumpers, who defeated 
Rockefeller in 1970 after easily beating back a comeback attempt by Faubus in the 
Democratic runoff. 
 Faubus was an unlikely champion of the social conservatism of white supremacy.  
His previous progressive mentor Governor Sid McMath said, “the last person I would 
have expected to have called out the National Guard in defiance of federal court orders 
was Orval Faubus. “93  His 1957 turnaround made Faubus the chosen candidate of an 
entirely different coalition than the one that catapulted him from relative obscurity to the 
governorship in 1954.  In the first primary that year, he made the runoff with support 
mainly in his home area of Northwest Arkansas, where the small black population did not 
drive white voters to conservative candidates.  In 1956 Faubus expanded his support 
beyond his home area, but the militant segregationist Johnson won majorities in several 
counties in Southeast Arkansas, the only part of the state with a black belt demography.  
After the Little Rock crisis, Faubus in 1958 won majorities in all but two of the state’s 
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counties.  When his support dropped in later years, it dropped in the more tolerant 
Northwest Arkansas region that once provided the progressive Faubus’s base of support. 
 The politics of militant segregationism practiced by Faubus after 1957, which 
constituted a similar kind of advocacy about the constitutional system as that presented 
by George Wallace, had greater staying power that previous appeals based on competing 
visions of fiscal policy.  Faubus’s two predecessors, Ed McMath and Frank Cherry, had 
won office with opposing plans for how the state should tax its citizens and for what 
purposes it should spend that tax revenue.  Each was defeated in their first run for 
reelection, McMath by Cherry and Cherry by Faubus.  The post-Little Rock politics of 
defiance in the face of court-mandated desegregation won Faubus four nearly 
uncontested victories as the most prominent Arkansas defender of white supremacy. 
Dialectical Causation 
 The backlash effect on Southern elections described in is connected to policy 
change through a process I call dialectical causation.  The Brown decision stimulated 
both support and opposition, aiding both sides in the civil rights struggles of the 1950s 
and 1960s.  The election of politicians like George Wallace and Bull Connor formed one 
side of the dialectic, and the direct action civil rights movement the other.  If the 
Birmingham demonstrations are understood as the result of a dialectical change process, 
then evidence of opposition to Brown is not necessarily evidence of a lack of effect on 
society and public policy.  While the dialectical change process does not only originate 
from courts, there are characteristics of the Supreme Court’s indirect effects that are 
particularly well-suited to contribute to this pattern of social change. 
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 The concept of dialectical causation helps to link events outside the judicial 
system that occurred in the decade after Brown II, and place the Supreme Court in what 
Michael McCann has termed “the complex chain of events that we understand as the civil 
rights movement leading up to the congressional passage of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Movement.”94 Rosenberg is correct in focusing on the long continuation of public school 
segregation in the years after the Supreme Court declared the practice unconstitutional.  
Integration of schools in the Deep South was clearly ordered in Brown, and at least hoped 
for in Brown II, even with its ambiguity and lack of a timetable.  He is also correct in 
identifying the causal significance of congressional and presidential action in 1964 and 
1965.  He assumes, however, that the indirect effects stimulated by Brown were either 
irrelevant to legislation and executive branch action, or that those effects slowed the 
progress of civil rights legislation in Congress.95  The dialectical causation concept helps 
to highlight ways that the events of the decade after Brown II were relevant to later 
executive and legislative action.96 
                                                 
94 Gillman and Clayton 79. 
95 If backlash to the Supreme Court slowed down Congressional commitment to civil rights, it would most 
likely take the form of weakening the position of liberal proponents of civil rights legislation in the Senate 
(because of the lack of a filibuster and other procedural differences from the Senate, combined with a larger 
bloc of liberals, the House at the time would easily pass whatever civil rights bill emerged from the 
Senate).  Rosenberg only addresses the causal relationship between Brown and the 1957 act in a short 
section (118-19) that cites primary and secondary sources to argue that if there was external pressure for a 
bill in 1956 and 1957, it came from reaction to the Emmet Till murder and the Montgomery bus boycott.  
Caro’s account of the bill’s passage in his biography of Lyndon Johnson argues that three factors led to the 
Senate considering and rejecting a strong bill in 1956 and passing a weak one in 1957:  Republican desire 
to gain black votes outside the South, Southern Democratic desire to prevent integration, and the attempt by 
Southern Senators to buttress Lyndon Johnson’s 1960 presidential campaign.  None of these would at first 
glance seem to be weakened by the backlash to Brown.  Changes in the relative balance of forces in the 
Senate might have led to no bill passing, but would not have been able to overcome Southern resistance to 
anything like the 1964 and 1965 legislation. 
96 Dialectical causation provides a framework for me to analyze the significance of indirect effects of 
Brown that are deemphasized or ignored in Rosenberg’s account.  McCann argues that The Hollow Hope is 
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 The causal relationship between Brown and the successful demonstrations in 
Birmingham and Selma is dialectical because it has three components:  an activating 
event that empowers opposing forces; opposing forces that move in a direction that will 
lead to direct conflict in the future; and conflict that leads to a new equilibrium of forces 
in politics that is significantly different from what existed before the initial event.  The 
Supreme Court sparked a reaction that empowered both supporters and opponents of 
integration.97 The form taken by these reactions was dialectical because the direct action 
civil rights movement and southern militant segregationism were empowered to go 
forward in ways that would bring them into conflict.  The conflict between thesis and 
antithesis in Birmingham and Selma was crucial to the construction of a new equilibrium 
for the politics of race, where integration gained the force of law. 
 The concept of the dialectic is not intended here to include the ideas of dialectical 
political theorists like Hegel or Marx.  I am not claiming that Court-stimulated dialectical 
conflict is teleological, moving toward a predetermined purpose.  In the conclusion of 
this dissertation I briefly discuss the possibility that the politics of race in America are 
inherently dialectical, but the data discussed in previous chapters only supports strong 
conclusions about the 1950s and 1960s.  Here the concept of the dialectic is confined to 
the creation of thesis and antithesis, which come into conflict in a manner that creates a 
new state of affairs. 
                                                                                                                                                 
“focused mostly on judicial capacity to coerce or inspire changes in behavior rather than changes in 
variable social contexts of struggle” (p 291 n12). 
97 Whittington argues that polarized response to a Supreme Court decision results in part from the 
opportunity offered to members of Congress to match their positions to that of their respective states and 
districts. “The Supreme Court’s leadership on the civil rights issue allowed legislators to play to their 
individual constituencies by either directing blame at the Court or lining up with it” (149). 
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 Even if an event like a Supreme Court decision stimulates support and opposition 
that take the form of thesis and antithesis, dialectical causation requires the cooperation 
of authoritative actors.  Dialectical causation can only take place if other parts of the 
political system view the clash between thesis and antithesis as a reason to reconsider the 
direction of public policy.  This reconsideration came after the demonstrations in 
Birmingham in 1963, and again after the Selma marches of 1965.  Dialectical change 
requires support for the argument of the thesis from authoritative actors, but a lack of will 
to take difficult steps make that change reality.  Dialectical conflict between thesis and 
antithesis overcomes this lack of will. 
 Here my argument follows that of Michael Klarman in From Jim Crow to Civil 
Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality.  He focuses on how 
Brown gave support to white segregationists like Bull Connor: 
The violence used by white law enforcement officers in the South against 
peaceful black demonstrators repulsed national opinion and led directly to the 
passage of landmark civil rights legislation.  Brown was less directly responsible 
than is commonly supposed for putting those demonstrators on the street, but it 
was more directly responsible for the violent reception they encountered (441). 
 
While Klarman does not use a specifically dialectical framework in his analysis, he also 
argues that backlash to the Court eventually contributed to integrationist policy change. 
 After Brown, the thesis in the dialectical pattern was the direct action civil rights 
movement, and the antithesis was the backlash among Southern whites.98  The Supreme 
Court did not create either phenomenon, but it did empower them and helped to focus 
                                                 
98 I exclude the work of the NAACP and others to end segregation through the courts, since I am focusing 
on extra-judicial effects.  This process is important to the dialectical change process mainly by its initial 
lack of success in most southern states, which created an opening for a more indirect change process. 
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their energies.  The Court’s impact on the antithesis side was more consequential and 
immediate; it supported both sides of the conflict.99  This dissertation argues that Brown 
had an impact on the change process that led to legal integration, but only in conjunction 
with other forces.  
 The indirect impact of Brown took a dialectical form because it rearranges 
existing components of Southern politics into a pattern that led to the creative conflict of 
1963.  George Wallace was an active young Democratic politician before Brown, and 
was committed to maintaining segregation.  But after the decision, he was forced to 
reinvent himself as a militant segregationist.  Bull Connor was an active participant in 
state and local politics, and he had some success with his unabashed support for 
segregation.  But the backlash to Brown created the conditions that put the power of 
Birmingham law enforcement in his hands. 
 The role of a militantly segregationist elected official like Bull Connor becomes 
clear when the Birmingham demonstrations are compared with the 1962 Albany, Georgia 
campaign of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference.  
Albany Police Chief Laurie Pritchett reacted to black protesters in a manner that 
prevented violent confrontations that would attract media attention.  With knowledge that 
the SCLC targeted his small city in the majority-black but white-ruled area of southwest 
                                                 
99 By arguing that Brown contributed to the pro-integration side of the civil rights struggle, I am not taking 
a position with respect to the debate among historians of the period about what people or events were most 
important in the larger struggle.  My argument rests on the more limited claim that Brown provided some 
support to the opponents of segregation (for a detailed review of competing explanations for movement 
activity and success see the bibliographic essay in Payne) .  One important manifestation of that support 
was that many important direct action protest actions were attempts to implement court orders, which relied 
on Brown as precedent, that ordered public places and accommodations be integrated.  Also, Stephan 
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Georgia, he arranged with other law enforcement jurisdictions in the area to rent space at 
their jails.  When the protests began, his officers would arrest protestors for violation of 
local segregation laws, and send them away to jail.  Protestors would then quickly be 
released, creating a low-intensity cycle that kept SCLC marchers from either filling the 
jails or sparking violent reaction.100  The contrast with Birmingham a year later shows the 
necessity of Connor to bring the stark visual images of Jim Crow to television viewers 
outside the South.   Connor had regained his position of power for just long enough to 
provide the antithesis to SCLC’s thesis.   
 In his history of American politics during the Warren Court period, Lucas Powe 
argues that “there is no doubt that Birmingham was the catalyst for the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.”101  He also connects the actions of Bull Connor to the backlash against Brown, 
and emphasizes the importance of the 1963 demonstrations in transforming the national 
political agenda.  “Brown v. Board of Education had brought out the worst in the 
American South, and King had learned how to reflect that southern behavior to the 
American North to bring out the best in the country.”102  The Supreme Court stimulated 
both southern regional militancy, and national support for legal integration.  As the causal 
pattern played out in the decade after Brown, the first reaction was necessary to bring 
about the second. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Wasby (1995) argues that Brown caused civil rights organizations and liberal private foundations to invest 
in litigation (p. 32).  
100 Branch 600-07, 632. 
101 See also McCloskey and Levinson pp. 221-22. 
102 Powe 226.  Lewis (2006) argues that “non-violent campaigns provided watching newsmen with 
particularly vivid copy of the ongoing nature of racial inequality in areas of the South” (p. 157).  See Eskew 




 Three characteristics of Supreme Court-stimulated dialectical change merit 
mention in the context of assessing the power of the Court to impact society.  First, as 
discussed above, opposition to the Court in some cases is both evidence of a lack of 
direct effect, and of an indirect effect that ultimately helped to bring about the social 
change sought by the original opinion.  Such an assessment is impossible in the period 
immediately following the issuance of an opinion.  In some cases, like the 
reapportionment decisions, opposition to the Court’s decision is initially strong but then 
dissipates.  In other cases, like the decisions striking down New Deal measures before 
1937, opposition to the Court ultimately leads to a policy settlement adverse to the 
original opinion.  A retrospective analysis that includes the possibility of dialectical 
causation, however, can identify causal connections a linear-focused analysis like 
Rosenberg’s cannot. 
  Second, a Supreme Court opinion will not necessarily empower support and 
opposition to its position in equal measures.  Thus thesis and antithesis will often 
progress toward conflict at different rates.  In the case of school integration, the stimulus 
the Court provides to non-judicial actors is received by asymmetrical adversaries in an 
existing conflict.  The resources available to the defenders of segregation were far more 
powerful initially than those available to the proponents of integration.  Politicians like 
George Wallace and Orville Faubus could, by shifting their stances on racial issues at the 
right time, gain control of both the state Democratic Party and state government.  The 
resources available to civil rights activist were building in 1954, as black veterans 
returned from duty in World War II and Korea, and shifts in membership and leadership 
142 
 
of black churches provided a fertile ground for protest campaigns.103  Bull Connor could 
be back in office within two years of Brown, and editorial pages in mainly white-oriented 
newspapers could within weeks be filled with editorials and letters to the editor defending 
segregation.  The building of a movement that could frontally challenge segregation 
successfully took much longer.  If the creative conflict is delayed, then the dialectical 
causal effect of a Supreme Court opinion is delayed.   
 Third, the dialectical change process can expand its policy focus as it works its 
way through the political system outside of courts.  The 1964 Civil Rights Act that was at 
the end of the dialectical process sparked by Brown had a policy scope that reached far 
beyond that of the Court’s opinion.  The two most transformative results of the act, the 
banning of segregation in employment and public accommodations, were not directly 
addressed by Brown or Brown II.  A dialectical change process, in conjunction with other 
parts of the political system, can magnify the effect of a Supreme Court decision. 
 This dialectical causation account presents an alternative account of the effect of 
Brown than that presented by Gerald Rosenberg.  The history of backlash highlights a 
kind of effect that is minimized in The Hollow Hope.  Rosenberg correctly counts the 
segregationist backlash to Brown as evidence that the decision did not directly, or 
quickly, lead to the social change that was clearly anticipated by Warren’s language and 
                                                 
103McAdam argues that the growing urbanization of the southern black population in the twentieth century 
provided the necessary context for civil rights organizing.  He contrasts the urban church, with 
congregations affluent and numerous enough to support an educated and activist clergy, with the rural 
church that was dependent on circuit-riding part-time ministers and financial support from white 




hoped for by the decision’s supporters.104  He does not entertain the possibility, however, 
that in the long run backlash could contribute to the fall of segregation.  The importance 
of the direct action protests of the 1960s is presented as evidence of Brown’s lack of 
effect.  Rosenberg argues that the later success of the direct action movement, 
particularly the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, owes little or nothing to the 
Supreme Court.  The proof for this finding of little significant indirect effect comes from 
the long time that elapsed between Brown and Brown II and the SCLC successes and 
growth in civil rights organization membership of the middle 1960s.105 
 If the inquiry into judicial impact is broadened to include effects, and not merely 
effectiveness, then the data analyzed in previous chapters is relevant.  Increases in the 
volume and constitutional focus of newspaper opinion are evidence that Supreme Court 
decisions have measurable effects on political debate in non-judicial fora.  A transformed 
electoral environment, as evidenced by changes in the kind of politicians elected in 
Southern states, is both evidence of Brown’s effect and its lack of effectiveness, at least 
in the near term.  Dialectical causation provides a channel for backlash to a Court 
decision to later affect politics in a way that promotes and expands the social change 
originally sought by the Court. 
 The shift in southern elections after Brown v. Board of Education did not follow 
the integrationist direction of the opinion’s argument.  Compliance with the Court’s 
decision was made less likely by the reaction it stimulated.  Such reaction remains an 
effect of the decision, and evidence of the impact of a Supreme Court decision.  Brown 
                                                 
104 Rosenberg 78-82. 
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changed the opportunity structures available for ambitious Southern politicians, and thus 
changed Southern politics.   It enhanced the election prospects of strong segregationists, 
and forced moderate progressives to alter their campaigns in order to get elected, ending 
a comparatively moderate period of gubernatorial elections.  Like the newspaper opinion 
analyzed in Chapter 3, Southern elections were appropriated as a forum for countering 
Brown’s constitutional argument, and the victors in those elections were able to back up 
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Chapter 5:  Conclusion 
 The reaction to Brown v. Board of Education in the American South shows both 
the limits and possibilities of a Supreme Court decision.  Public schools in the region 
would remain segregated for at least a decade after the decision, but political debate and 
elections were transformed.  Southern whites changed how they wrote about race in the 
public forum of newspaper opinion, and they changed their voting behavior.  Debate over 
civil rights was more likely to discuss constitutional issues, and militant segregationists 
were more likely to gain public office.  These shifts, which emerged from the indirect 
effects of Brown, altered the politics of race in the South and the nation. 
 The preceding chapters have focused on the extra-judicial effect of Brown v. 
Board of Education, presenting findings from newspaper opinion and statewide elections.  
This chapter connects these findings to each other, and draws insights from those findings 
that speak to the general project of political science scholarship on the Supreme Court.  
First I comment on the general project of Gerald Rosenberg in The Hollow Hope, the 
work that both stimulated and structured this inquiry.  Second, I connect findings from 
newspaper opinion and statewide elections through the use of the concept of racial 
institutional orders, developed by Rogers Smith and Desmond King.  Third, I present 
three generalizable patterns that emerge from the preceding analysis of Brown’s indirect 
effect, and connect them to patterns emerging from the contemporary politics of same-
sex marriage.  I close with a brief discussion of future research avenues that are suggested 
by this dissertation. 
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THE HOLLOW HOPE AND THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
SCHOLARSHIP AS STRATEGIC ADVICE 
 Preceding chapters, particularly Chapter 4, have built on and responded to 
Rosenberg’s thesis of limited Supreme Court impact in the case of Brown v. Board of 
Education.  In particular, his identification of legislative and executive actions in 1964 
and 1965 as the cause of eventual integration of southern public schools is the starting 
place for the dialectical causation argument involving electoral backlash.  I argue that he 
was correct about the impotence of the Court to effect policy change directly, but he 
ignores or dismisses crucial indirect effects.  The identification of electoral backlash as a 
contributing factor to policy change in the 1960s emerges from the strictly empirical 
focus of this project, which seeks to identify and measure indirect effects of Brown.  
Rosenberg also treats the Court as a political institution, but as part of a strategic advisory 
for progressive political activists.  Rosenberg’s broader perspective, which includes both 
empirical and normative analysis, leads to a discounting of backlash as a contribution to 
later policy change. 
 Rosenberg’s focus on the court-centered view of social change in the civil rights 
era leads to both the strengths and weaknesses of his argument.  The major contribution 
of The Hollow Hope is to subject commonly-held perceptions about Brown’s impact to 
empirical testing.  Rosenberg reviews available data about school desegregation and other 
pro-integration effects, and finds that the Supreme Court had little impact on the ending 
of legal Jim Crow segregation.  He helps to clear away a view of racial change that treats 
the lofty integrationist rhetoric of Warren’s Brown opinion as descriptive of future 
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events, and that attributes causal significance to Brown when events happened many 
years after the decision. 
 Rosenberg’s audience for this critique of the Brown-centered change narrative is 
clearly broader than professional academics who study judicial impact.  His argument for 
a limited conception of the capacity of courts to cause social change serves as foundation 
for a broader critique of the choices that activists and social movements make in working 
for social justice and change.  The Hollow Hope is not just a work of empirical social 
science.  It is also a call for a progressive politics that focuses more on electoral outcomes 
and less on favorable judicial rulings. 
 This goal of presenting strategic advice to progressive movements drives 
Rosenberg to a narrow understanding of judicial impact.  He focuses on direct 
measurable effects, and finds Brown wanting.  He successfully undermines the fall of Jim 
Crow segregation as an example of social change brought about by successful litigation.  
He thus produces a work that both speaks to the interests of social scientists in explaining 
social change, and provides a thought-provoking argument about how resources should 
be allocated by those groups and individuals that hope to change society. 
 But social scientists are interested in the effects of court decisions beyond 
Rosenberg’s focus on direct effects that lead to measurable social change.  Previous 
chapters of this dissertation have focused on two kinds of effects that are either ignored 
by Rosenberg or dismissed as either irrelevant to his inquiry, or classified as evidence of 
Brown’s impotence.  The newspaper opinion analysis presented in Chapters 2 and 3 
demonstrates that the Supreme Court altered political debate about race in measurable 
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ways.  This effect did not lead to pro-integration change; what limited effect increased 
and more-constitutionally-focused debate had on social change was likely to reinforce 
that status quo.  The limited or pro-segregation effect of changed debate does not lessen 
its status as a social phenomenon that was caused by the Supreme Court. 
 The backlash history discussed in Chapter 4 highlights another kind of effect that 
is minimized in The Hollow Hope.  Rosenberg correctly counts the segregationist 
backlash to Brown as evidence that the decision did not directly, or quickly, lead to the 
social change that was clearly anticipated by Warren’s language and hoped for by the 
decision’s supporters.106  He does not entertain the possibility, however, that in the long 
run backlash could contribute to the fall of segregation.  The importance of the direct 
action protests of the 1960s is presented as evidence of Brown’s lack of effect.  
Rosenberg argues that the later success of the direct action movement, particularly the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, owes little or nothing to the Supreme Court.  
The proof for this finding of little significant indirect effect comes from the long time that 
elapsed between Brown and Brown II and the SCLC successes and growth in civil rights 
organization membership of the middle 1960s.107 
 A focus on timing is at the core of both the strengths and weaknesses of The 
Hollow Hope.  Rosenberg makes a significant contribution to political science 
scholarship on judicial impact by comparing the actual timeline of the civil rights era 
with the commonly-held understanding of Brown as a transformative decision.  The focus 
on the timing is a way to assess the comparative impact of different events in a given 
                                                 
106 Rosenberg 78-82. 
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issue area.  Rosenberg’s finding that courts are comparatively weak actors in the policy 
change process provides a useful starting point for research, like that presented in this 
work, that attempts to better integrate our understanding of courts with other parts of the 
political system.   
 This narrow focus on timing, which excludes the possibility that opposition to a 
court decision could later contribute to positive social change,108 fits well with the 
orientation toward strategic advice for progressive activists.  Even if I am correct in 
arguing that Brown contributed to the fall of legal segregation by stimulating a useful 
creative antagonist for the direct action civil rights movement, Rosenberg’s strategic 
argument likely still stands.  If the effect of a court decision that is sought by a social 
movement is to stimulate a reaction that strengthens the movement’s opponents like Bull 
Connor and weakens its friends like Jim Folsom, then a focus on venues outside of 
litigation makes sense.  The full history of the civil rights era, with desegregation of most 
Southern school systems coming over a decade after Brown, is certainly a cautionary tale 
about a movement that relies on judicial allies to help it confront elected enemies.  But 
the aim of political science, or at least this work of political science, is not to interrogate 
the choices of heroic historical actors who were not as effective as we would like to 
believe they were.   
                                                                                                                                                 
107 Rosenberg 131-155. 
108 Johnson and Canon, citing the possible effects of generational change, argue that “Rosenberg’s 
conception of causality is too time-bound.  History teaches us that perspectives are not changed overnight; 
a decade or even a generation may pass before a major impact occurs” 206-07). 
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BROWN AND THE RESPONSE OF WHITE SUPREMACIST 
INSTITUTIONS 
 Previous chapters have treated newspaper opinion and electoral backlash as 
separate and discreet phenomena that demonstrate the importance of Supreme Court 
opinions outside the judicial system.  Both stand as evidence that Supreme Court 
opinions have significant and measurable indirect effects.  They are connected, however, 
in their relationship to the politics of race in the South and the nation.  The newspaper 
opinion discussed in Chapter 2 is connected to the elections discussed in Chapter 4 in that 
both are responses to Brown v. Board of Education by white southerners.  Beyond their 
shared status as extra-judicial responses to the Supreme Court, they are not obviously 
connected causally.  Militant politicians benefited from a supportive media, and could 
regard the increase in editorials and letters to the editor about segregation as a validation 
of their focus in office.  But the data discussed above does not support generalizations 
about the causal connections between newspaper opinion in the 1950s and backlash in 
Southern elections in the 1950s and 1960s.  James J. Kilpatrick’s editorials in the 
Richmond News-Leader were directed at the Virginia legislature, and attempted to rally 
mass support for a special session that would take steps to block and delay court-ordered 
integration.   It is conceivable that his writings, and the letters to the editor they 
stimulated, might have helped to bring about the massive resistance campaign in 
Virginia.109  But support for segregation and distrust of federal intervention in state 
affairs was certainly not a creation of newspaper editorials, and opposing the Supreme 
                                                 
109109 Bartley 130, 183.  See also Thorndike in Lassiter and Lewis 1998. 
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Court was a useful strategy for the Byrd machine in its attempt to fight off reformist 
elements at the polls.110 
 The two reactions to Brown are connected, however, in that they both are 
defenses of southern white supremacy.  This shared origin provides a starting point for 
discussing the relationship between the two phenomena, and how they reflect general 
patterns of response to Supreme Court decisions.  These connections become clearer 
when southern support for white supremacy is understood as not just an expression of 
racism or self-interest on the part of citizens and politicians, but as a network of ideas and 
relationships embedded in regional and national political institutions.  The unique 
character of the threat to this durable network that Brown represented helps to illuminate 
the connections between parts of the backlash to the decision.  Placing the data discussed 
above within the conceptual framework of a racial institutional order used by some 
American Political Development scholars helps to theorize and describe those 
connections. 
Brown v. Board of Education was a massive shock to southern white supremacy 
not because it was an example of a new national commitment to racial equality that was 
embodied in national political institutions and arrangements.  It was a shock to southern 
white supremacy because it ran counter to the national state of affairs.  The defenders of 
segregation controlled so many positions of power in the House, Senate and national 
Democratic Party that legislative action was not a serious threat.  Even Franklin 
Roosevelt, the most powerful president since at least the Civil War, was unwilling to 
                                                 
110 Bass and Devries 347. 
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confront southern power on Capitol Hill by supporting a federal anti-lynching bill.111  
Southern state governments were controlled by segregationists.  Many of the opponents 
of segregation were part of a Democratic Party that blocked their goals.  A southern white 
citizen was protected behind a fortress of men committed to defending the privileges of 
whiteness, and powerful enough to protect it from legislative and executive incursion. 
In 1954 the Supreme Court became a threat to white supremacy that was beyond 
the direct control of segregationist Southern Democrats.  Previous chapters have 
examined two manifestations of this response, in newspaper opinions and elections.  
These two responses are united not only by their opposition to the Supreme Court, but by 
their shared origin in the institutionalized politics of white supremacy. 
The dialectical conflict that was stimulated by Brown emerges from the 
interaction of the Supreme Court with the politics of race in the United States.  This 
conflict occurred within a pattern of coalition and conflict that scholars of American 
Political Development have called “racial orders.”  The concept of racial orders, which is 
a sub-set of a larger category of institutional orders,112 helps to integrate the findings of 
this dissertation into a broader theory of institutional change.  Analyzing Brown through 
this framework also helps to identify the particular unique role extra-judicial effects play 
in social change, and also helps to integrate the newspaper opinion data discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3 with the discussion of statewide elections in Chapter 4. 
                                                 
111 McMahon (2004) argues that Roosevelt, and then Truman and Eisenhower, were able to use the 
resources of the presidency to lay the groundwork for later pro-integration policy change, particular with 
judicial appointments. 
112 See Orren and Skowronek 2004, ch. 3. 
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Rogers Smith and Desmond King argue that much of American political 
development and history, as well as much of contemporary politics, is structured by racial 
orders.  Such orders are “coalitions of state institutions and other political actors and 
organizations that seek to secure and exercise governing power in demographically, 
economically, and ideologically structured contexts that define the range of opportunities 
available to political actors.”113  They argue that American politics since at least the Civil 
War has been the site of conflict between two institutional orders with opposing 
understandings of how society should deal with racial differences.  They designate one 
order as white supremacist and the other as transformative egalitarian.  These orders were 
racial in that they “used racial concepts, commitments and aims in order to bind together 
their coalitions and structure government institutions.”114  According to Smith and King, 
much of American political history is affected by the conflict between these two orders. 
 The institutionalized white supremacy that Brown threatened was more than just 
racist ideas held by southern white citizens or elected officials.  It was a network of ideas 
and institutional power that integrated mass and elite actors, and used the power of 
national and state governments to maintain the privileged status of whites in southern 
society.  This network is best characterized as institutional order because its members 
drew power and influence from existing government institutions, and the network was 
durable over time.   
 The white supremacist order, as conceptualized by Smith and King, often came 
into conflict with the competing transformative egalitarian order.  In discussing the 
                                                 
113 Smith and King 75. 
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aftermath of the Civil War, they argue that this transformative egalitarian order, which 
drew strength from the antislavery order that it overlapped with but was distinct from, 
produced “new constitutional, administrative, political, economic, and social institutions 
to promote greater equality.”  These changes, while temporarily successful in integrating 
black southerners into the broader politics and society, were soon limited by the work of 
the white supremacist order, which “eventually regained dominance in the modified form 
of the Jim Crow system of segregation and disenfranchisement that largely prevailed until 
the civil rights era of the 1960s.”115 The continued success of this order maintained a 
national political equilibrium that, until 1954, prevented consequential national 
government action on behalf of black southerners. 
 Brown destabilized an institutional equilibrium that provided power and 
opportunities to white southern politicians.   Southern politicians could exert power and 
influence in areas beyond the politics of race, and use their positions of power to maintain 
white supremacy.  In particular the national Democratic Party was the site of Southern 
attempts to mold national political institutions in a way that would further buttress 
southern segregation.  The backlash to Brown ended this era of flexibility and opportunity 
for Southern politicians.  Their available routes to state and national power were 
narrowed, as militant support for segregation dominated statewide elections.  Debate over 
race shifted away from venues where Southern influence was strong, like Congress and 
the Democratic National Convention.  The battle in the courts, in which segregationists 
had lost several skirmishes in cases like McLaurin and Sweatt, was one where the South 
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lacked opportunities for influence.  The work of building and maintaining influence in 
national institutions was for the first half of the twentieth century a central project of 
members of the white supremacist institutional order.  The backlash against Brown, given 
conceptual form as constitutional politics by writers like Kilpatrick, was a different kind 
of response to the growing power of the transformative egalitarian order in national 
politics. 
 The move to interposition, however, was also either an unsuccessful rearguard 
action or a blind alley of militant resistance.  If judged as an attempt to stop the 
integration of Virginia public schools, interposition was at most a delaying tactic.  It did 
lead to the denial of free public education to thousands of students, but only for a short 
time.  Its effect on elections and government was to temporarily strengthen the Byrd 
machine, but eventually to weaken it by alienating voters outside of the machine’s 
Southside base.116  Virginia’s pattern of school integration after Brown was similar to 
those of other peripheral Southern states, with all six having less than ten percent of black 
children attending public schools with white children until a rapid increase in the mid-
1960s.117 
 When assessed as an extra-judicial effect of a Supreme Court decision, the 
reaction to Brown stands as a significant phenomenon in the development of American 
                                                                                                                                                 
115 Ibid 81. 
116 Southside Virginia is the part of the state with the most traditionally Southern demography, 
characterized by rural areas, small towns, and a large black population.  Opposition to the massive 
resistance school closures was strongest in the more metropolitan areas of Northern Virginia and the 
Tidewater region around Norfolk.  These areas began in the 1960s to back liberal insurgent Democrats, as 
well as Republicans, so that by the early 1970s the Byrd machine was no longer a viable force in statewide 
politics.  Its one remaining artifact was Senator Harry Byrd Jr., who ran as an independent in 1970 and 
1976 to avoid possible defeat in the Democratic primary. 
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politics.  It stimulated the white supremacist institutional order to take over particular 
parts of the political system to present an opposing constitutional argument to the 
Supreme Court’s position.  The response came from all parts of the white supremacist 
order:  politicians in the form of increased militancy; voters in the form of increased 
support for those militant politicians; local civil society in the form of the White Citizens’ 
Councils;118 state government in the form of Sovereignty Commissions;119 and individual 
citizens in the form of letters to the editor. 
 I argue that the newspaper opinion discussed in Chapter 2 and the election 
backlash discussed in Chapter 4 are both parts of this response of this racial institutional 
order, or at least part of the response of southern white society in general.120   This 
response occurs in the aggregate, as shown by the existence of judicialization effects 
across the five newspapers in the Chapter 2 data set, and in the gubernatorial elections 
analyzed by Earl Black and others.  A Supreme Court opinion is uniquely qualified to 
elicit this kind of response.  It is presented in a form that connects the position of the 
Court’s majority to concepts of justice and finality.  It is presented as an authoritative 
interpretation of the Constitution, which is venerated by American political culture and 
intentionally difficult to amend. 
                                                                                                                                                 
117 Rosenberg 433.  
118 See McMillen 1994. 
119 See Katagiri 2001. 
120 The data from black newspapers discussed in Chapter 3, which is characterized by a constant focus on 
racial issues and an increase of constitutional focus after Brown, fits into the racial egalitarian part of the 
racial orders framework of Smith and King.  The fact that discussion of racial issues does not increase after 
Brown, in contrast to white newspapers, demonstrates the asymmetrical nature of the conflict between 
racial institutional orders.  One of the effects of the success of the white supremacist order is the ability of 




 The finality presented in an opinion like Brown, when combined with life terms 
for appointed justics, makes the Supreme Court both a subject of election campaigns but 
not subject to the will of voters.  The results of elections in the South for over a decade 
were affected by this asymmetry of political conflict, with militant segregationists 
successfully running against a Supreme Court that was not on the ballot.  White 
Southerners would likely have voted to, as billboards across the region instructed, 
“Impeach Earl Warren.”  Their dissatisfaction was instead channeled into support for 
politicians like Bull Connor and the making of constitutional argument in forums like 
newspaper opinion pages. 
TRANSFORMED PATTERNS OF CONFLICT:  A SUPREME 
COURT OPINION OUTSIDE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
 The empirical analysis presented in previous chapters has focused on Brown v. 
Board of Education and its extra-judicial effects.  Along with demonstrating that 
Supreme Court decisions can have massive and significant effects outside the judicial 
system, the data discussed here support the following three empirical generalizations.  
Initial observations about the ongoing conflict over same-sex marriage rights highlight 
how the kind of inquiry presented in this dissertation can be replicated in other and more 
contemporary issue areas.  
Expansion of Constitutional Debate into New Venues 
 The reaction to Brown expanded the portion of the political system that was a 
venue for debate about the constitutionality of segregation.  The main evidence for this 
pattern of extra-judicial effect is the newspaper data set analyzed in Chapter 2, although 
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black newspaper data and the content of statewide election campaigns also follow this 
pattern.  The most consequential new forum for constitutional debate was the public 
space of Birmingham, Alabama in 1963, where constitutional argumentation took the 
form of non-violent direct action protest and law enforcement violence.  I have argued 
that this expansion of debate into new venues is best understood as judicialization, with 
new parts of the political system taking on characteristics of appellate litigation of 
judicial review. 
 This pattern of expanded constitutional debate is visible in the reaction to 
Lawrence v. Texas and Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the Texas sodomy 
and Massachusetts same-sex marriage decisions.  Three components of that reaction in 
particular merit mention.  First, Congress took up a proposal to amend the Constitution to 
ban same-sex marriage, although a test vote in the Senate fell far short of the required 67 
votes needed to send an amendment on to the states.  Second, same-sex marriage became 
a significant issue in the 2004 presidential campaign.  President George W. Bush 
expressed support for the traditional heterosexual definition of marriage, and publically 
supported the proposed constitutional amendment, even though as President he did not 
have any direct role in the constitutional amendment process.   
 Third, many states passed constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage 
in the years after Goodridge,121 even though neither same-sex marriage nor even same-
sex civil unions was possible under statute in any state with a proposed amendment in 
                                                 
121 Arizona in 2006 is the only state to reject such an amendment. 
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2004, 2005, or 2006.122  Fourth, some pro-gay rights local officials married same-sex 
couples as a kind of constitutional protest to the current lack of rights protections.  In 
particular the mayors of San Francisco and New Palz, New York used the powers of their 
office to stage public same-sex marriage ceremonies.  This use of official power to make 
highly public constitutional argument is analogous to the law enforcement violence 
ordered by Bull Connor, in that the powers of office are used to make constitutional 
argument in an unusual venue. These reactions to Lawrence and Goodridge constitute an 
effect similar to the judicialization discussed in previous chapters.    
Expansion of Policy Scope of Conflict 
 The extra-judicial reaction to Brown contributed eventually to policy change that 
went far beyond the original scope of the 1954 opinion, eventually including 
desegregation of employment, public accommodations, hospitals, and voting rights.  The 
contemporary debate over same-sex rights that was transformed and amplified by court 
rulings is still relatively early in its development, and parallels to the civil rights era are 
still developing.  But one particular phenomenon is an example of reaction to a Supreme 
Court decision, in this case Lawrence, that quickly moved beyond the policy scope of the 
majority opinion. 
 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion concerns itself with the question of whether 
or not same-sex couples have the right to engage in intimate sexual contact.  He does not 
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extend his analysis to whether or not laws limiting same-sex marriage to heterosexual 
couples are constitutional. 123  The public reaction to the June 26 decision, even in the 
months before the Goodridge decision in November, was dominated by discussion of 
marriage rights.  This expansion of policy scope, which was accelerated by the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court and the 2004 presidential election, has moved the debate 
over same-sex rights, which in Lawrence was focused on a rarely-enforced state statute, 
to questions that implicate vast amounts of public and private law.  The opposition to the 
decisions, and the possibility of same-sex marriage rights in general, raises the possibility 
that an institutional order has developed around the defense of traditional cultural norms, 
which operates in similar ways to the white supremacist order of the 1950s and 1960s.  If 
this order exists, it likely owes its existence partly to previous Supreme Court decisions 
on prayer in schools and abortion. 
Agenda-Setting that Promotes Policy Settlement 
 The dialectical change process, stimulated and influenced by Brown, presented 
the consequences of Jim Crow segregation in a form that led to a new national consensus 
supporting legal integration.  This process took nearly a decade to develop, and the extra-
judicial effect of the Supreme Court decision eventually combined with other extant 
components of southern and national politics to eventually bring about the agenda-setting 
events of Birmingham in 1963.  Some recent events in the unfolding conflict over same-
sex marriage rights parallel those developments, in ways that may indicate movement 
                                                 
123 Justice Scalia’s dissent does make the argument that Kennedy’s analysis will inevitably lead to same-
sex marriage rights. 
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toward an eventual new legal and constitutional order that includes the right of same-sex 
couples to marry. 
 So far only three state high courts, in Massachusetts, California and Connecticut, 
have used the power of judicial review to establish a right to same-sex marriage.124   The 
three states differ in the kind of legal framework that existed before the court decisions.  
Massachusetts had a legislature-passed law defining marriage as between a man and a 
woman, and California voters had amended the state constitution to ban same-sex 
marriage in 2000.  The Connecticut high court overturned a civil union system that had 
passed the legislature and been signed by the governor.  The reactions of state 
government in Massachusetts and California, however, share a pattern that is working to 
present same-sex rights in a manner conducive to a new policy consensus. 
 The initial reaction to Goodridge by the Massachusetts state legislature was 
negative.  Legislators asked the state supreme court for an advisory opinion about 
whether the new constitutional standard could be satisfied by a civil union system.  The 
Massachusetts Supreme Court reacted differently to such a request than the Vermont 
Supreme Court did in 1999.  The Massachusetts legislature then began the process of 
amending the state constitution to overturn Goodridge.  The Massachusetts constitution 
requires an amendment to pass the legislature twice before it can go to voters in a 
referendum, and the second passage cannot come until after an intervening election.  
When legislators returned to the matter in two years later, they declined to pass the 
                                                 
124 Currently Vermont has a civil union system that was passed by the legislature to comply with a state 
supreme court ruling, and New Hampshire and New Jersey have legislature-passed civil union laws that 
were not the result of judicial action. 
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amendment.  The legislature has since even passed a bill opening same-sex marriage 
proceedings to non-Massachusetts residents. 
   The California constitution allows this process of popular evaluation of a state 
high court decision to move much faster than in Massachusetts.  The ability of citizens 
and interest groups to bypass the legislature and place a constitutional amendment 
referendum on the statewide ballot through petitions made it inevitable that the question 
of same-sex marriage would be put before voters on the November 2008 general election 
ballot, specifically called Proposition 8.  The narrow victory of the referendum banning 
same-sex marriage is part of a process that is following the pattern of the dialectical 
conflict process outlined in Chapter 4.  The institutional path taken by backlash to a 
judicial decision was different in 2008 California than in the South of the 1950s and 
1960s, owing to the differences in available institutional resources.  Segregationist 
politicians did not have a plebiscitary option to challenge Brown, since the federal 
constitution has no provision for amendment through referendum.  A delaying action 
pursued through control of state governments was the option available to Jim Crow’s 
defenders. 
 The long-term finality of the victory of Proposition 8 in California is unclear at 
this time.  The same easy access to constitutional amendment through referendum could 
in the future be harnessed by supporters of same-sex marriage.  There is also the 
possibility that the United States Supreme Court might take up the issue of same-sex 
marriage in the future.  But recent events constitute a statewide popular evaluation of the 
constitutional argument for same-sex marriage rights.  The nationwide post-election 
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protests by supporters of same-sex marriage might be the beginning of a focused national 
debate on the issue.  All of the preceding possibilities would constitute examples of the 
kind of court-stimulated agenda change that is part of the dialectical change process.   
 A similar process that reached different results took place in Vermont after that 
state’s high court forced the state legislature and governor to pass a same-sex civil union 
law.  Initial opposition was vocal and well organized, as several pro-civil union 
Republican legislators lost primary elections to social conservative opponents of civil 
unions.  Republicans gained control of the state House in the November general election.  
Results were mixed however, as pro-civil union Democratic Governor Howard Dean was 
easily reelected, and Al Gore easily won the state.  But opposition to civil unions faded, 
and Democrats regained the state House and increased their advantage in the state Senate 
in 2002, and in 2004 exit polls showed that 40% of voters supported same-sex marriage, 
36% supported civil unions, and only 21% opposed both. 125 
 These state results could be the beginning of a national rethinking of the status of 
same-sex couples in state and federal law.  Court decisions beginning with Lawrence, and 
continuing with state high court decisions, have stimulated the presentation of 
constitutional arguments by the opponents of same-sex rights.  The casting of gay rights 
in the form of constitutionally-guaranteed individual rights has prompted a clear and 
sometimes coherent defense of heterosexual-only marriage.  The national debate is now 
taking the form of the question: “Does legalizing same-sex marriage threaten core 
national values to the point that it should be forbidden by constitutional provision?”  The 
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answer to this question seems so far to be no in Vermont and Massachusetts, and yes in 
California.  These non-representative states, which are relatively fertile ground for gay 
rights arguments, might be the leading edge of a shift in national priorities, or the catalyst 
for reworking of state and federal law to constitutionalize heterosexual-only marriage.  
Either possibility would occur partly because of the contribution of courts to politics 
outside of the judicial system. 
 This dissertation has shown that the extra-judicial effects of Brown v. Board of 
Education were both empirically observable and a significant cause of policy change. 
The newspaper analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 shows that debate over race was 
transformed, with effects visible over time and across parts of the South.  The focus of 
the Richmond News-Leader on interposition is the most coherent example of judicialized 
political debate after Brown, but it is not the only example.  The electoral component of 
white backlash was also massive and durable, and Chapter 4 shows how it contributed to 
change in public policy through dialectical causation.  These two concepts – 
judicialization and dialectical causation – illuminate significant indirect effects of 
Supreme Court decisions. 
 When a Supreme Court opinion interacts with politics outside the judicial system, 
it often stimulates conflict in new venues, and empowers particular sets of combatants in 
existing conflicts.  Brown converted the editorial pages of southern newspapers into 
venues for constitutional argumentation, and empowered militants segregationists like 
George Wallace and Bull Connor.   The letter writer in the Birmingham News who 
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argued that the Supreme Court had violated his right to a republican form of government 
was part of the same backlash as Bull Connor’s use of law enforcement violence to put 
down nonviolent protesters.  This study of the southern response to Brown reveals the 
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